SHOULD GENERAL DEMPSEY RESIGN? ARMY PROFESSIONALS AND THE MORAL SPACE FOR MILITARY DISSENT

by Don M. Snider, Ph.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, from Strategic Insights, November 2014, a newsletter of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press. Reprinted by permission of SSI and USAWC.

Given that all Army professionals have taken an oath to “support and defend the Constitution,” in what instances may, or even should, the stewards of the profession dissent in a public way—including resignation or retirement—from an administration’s policy that they believe to be so incorrect as to be ineffective, potentially endangering the Republic’s security.

This is not a new issue, in fact far from it. Our Republic’s history has many examples of civil-military discord in which senior military leaders have dissented in various ways from an administration’s decisions—from General Douglas MacArthur in the Korean era, to General Ronald Fogleman during the post-Cold War Defense reductions, to more recently Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold and others in the “revolt of the generals” during the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq.1 In that instance, in 2002 Newbold, then director of operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quietly retired even though he was rumored to be in the running for the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, acknowledging later that he had done so because he objected to the planning of the upcoming war in Iraq.

Now, in early fall of 2014, the issue has been raised again as several military leaders have acknowledged publicly their frustrations and disagreements with the Obama administration’s policies for the current airpower-only campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in those countries—policies for which uniformed professionals hold the most extensive military expertise. As one would expect, respected voices appear on both sides of the debate as it focuses now on potential actions by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even though he has not indicated what those actions, if any, might be. Arguing in favor of more forceful forms of dissent is Seth Cropsey of the Hudson Institute:

Senior officers must accept their commander in chief’s judgment and carry out orders. But they and like-minded advisers have another option: resigning. Not to embarrass the administration or cause a constitutional crisis, but to indicate the gravity of the ISIS threat. Until stopped, ISIS or its collaborators are likely to mount an attack against the U.S. homeland with the aim of equaling or surpassing al Qaeda’s 9/11 [September 11, 2001] success. A military commander’s resignation, accompanied by a clear and respectful explanation, would prompt a needed debate over U.S. strategy to achieve the president’s goal “to degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS. . . . Politics is, by human nature and design, complex and messy. It exists in the military no less than in other large organizations. But the stakes are particularly high where the nation’s security is at risk—as it now is. Clarity of purpose is essential and where it is lacking—as in how to defeat ISIS—senior military officers can make an important difference with their actions.2

On the other side of the debate is Professor Peter Feaver of Duke University, a very respected scholar and practitioner of civil-military relations in America. His take is quite different from Cropsey’s:

Advocating resignation and protest like this is bad counsel and would do much to undermine healthy civil-military relations if it ever became accepted practice among senior officers. . . . This does not mean the military lacks all recourse whatsoever. On the contrary, it has three courses of action available to a dissenting senior officer, all well-grounded in democratic civil-military norms. First and most importantly, the military has both the right and the duty to speak up in private policymaking deliberations, offering its counsel on the likely risks and benefits of different courses of action. . . . Second, when asked to do so in sworn testimony in congressional hearings, all flag and general officers have not just the right but the obligation to offer their private military advice even if it differs from administration policy. In fact, all flag and general officers have already sworn under oath that they will do just that—it is the first question on the confirmation form for all senior officers, and the Senate will not confirm them to their promoted rank if they fail to promise to provide such candid advice. . . . Third, the military has the right—and, I would argue, the obligation—to clarify the public record when senior civilians misrepresent the content of their advice in public.3

Even Newbold has now re-entered the debate, stating that some extreme circumstances may require a break with military tradition:

In time of war, we know that our misjudgments—whether through rash actions or timidity—are paid in blood by the most selfless and patriotic of our nation’s youth. . . . While military leaders almost always should follow the prescription of ‘counsel in private, praise in public,’ there are occasionally and rarely instances, where intelligence used to justify conflict is manipulated or judgments on the use of force are so flawed that an experienced military leader must (as we say) speak truth to power.4

So should General Dempsey consider resignation? What is the role of the Stewards of the Army Profession with respect to domestic civil-military relations—how best for them to maintain the necessary trust of the American people, while at the same time disagreeing in an appropriate manner with civilian leaders who, by our Constitution, rightly exercise authority over them?

A more thorough review of American civil-military relations is well beyond the scope of this article.5 Suffice it to say that such relations are usually laden with healthy tensions.6 But, certainly, key among the factors that should frame such an analysis is the Army’s professional ethic. For its own stewards, in its new doctrine of profession the Army has explained:7

The key condition for effective American civil-military relations is a high level of mutual respect and trust between civilian and military leaders. Army professionals fulfill their obligation to create such mutual respect and trust by strictly adhering to a set of norms established by law and past practice:

The Army Profession’s principal obligation is to support the democratic institutions and policymaking processes of our government. Military leaders should offer their expertise and advice candidly to appropriate civilian leadership within the Department of Defense and more broadly within the JIIM [Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational] community.

Civilian decisionmakers seek and consider professional military advice in the context of policy deliberations. Army professionals properly confine their advisory role to the policymaking process and do not engage publicly in policy advocacy or dissent.

As the last bullet implies, little has apparently changed since Samuel Huntington noted over five decades ago, that “loyalty and obedience” are to be the cardinal military virtues.8 This precept has remained embedded in the Army’s professional ethos to this day, especially for the Stewards of the Army Profession. But, given the current debates can something more be said other than, “. . . do not engage publicly in policy advocacy or dissent”? Can Army doctrine be further explicated? Specifically, how are Army Stewards to interpret “. . . engage publicly”?

I think we can say more, and, to do so, we must draw on the thoughts of two other scholars in the field. First, Dr. Martin Cook, the Stockdale Chair of Ethics at the Naval War College, has focused on the challenge the potential dissenter faces when he or she uses discretionary professional judgments to arrive at a decision to dissent. To Cook, the challenge is:

. . . how to understand professionalism so that two equal values, somewhat in tension with each other, are preserved: the unquestioned subordination of military officers to constitutionally legitimate civilian leadership; and the equally important role of the officer corps in providing professional military advice, unalloyed with extraneous political or cultural considerations.9

As Cook and others believe, part of that judgment must rest on the idea that professionals are obligated not only to serve the client (in this case, ultimately, the state and its Constitution) but also are obligated to have “their own highly developed internal sense of the proper application of the professional knowledge.”10 In other words, dissent without insubordination to civilian authority can rightly be based on loyalty to the profession’s expert knowledge and its effective and ethical application. This is the moral obligation owed the client by the profession.

The second scholar of interest here is Dr. James Burk, military sociologist at the Texas A&M University. In a challenge to Huntington’s functionalist assertion that loyalty and obedience are the cardinal military virtues, Burk contends that:

Military professionals require autonomy, to include moral autonomy, to be competent actors held responsible for what they do. By autonomy, I mean the ability to govern or control one’s actions with some degree of freedom. Autonomous action is a precondition for responsible obedience and the opposite of blind obedience. . . . [There is a] conceptual space within which military professionals exercise moral discretion. The map includes a definition of responsible obedience and disobedience. But it also includes two types of actions that do not fit the classic definitions of these alternatives. They each exhibit a defect in which discretion is used either to do what is morally wrong or to do what was explicitly not authorized. Nevertheless, they are not simply forms of disobedience. They are “protected” actions, protected because the discretion to commit them preserves the autonomy on which the moral responsibility of the military profession depends.11

As I have stated before, I believe that Burk’s argument is compelling.12 On rare occasion the exercise of discretionary professional judgment may lead to acts of dissent beyond the accepted norms offered by Professor Feaver. I believe such acts by the profession’s stewards can fall in Burk’s “protected space,” a space that may indeed require acts of dissent or disobedience if “the moral responsibility of the profession is to be preserved.” Professions simply must preserve the autonomy to “profess” based on the uniqueness of their expert knowledge held in trust for their client, or they cease to be professions.

But that is a narrow space, indeed. Knowing with certitude which acts fall in this narrow space will never be easy. But the knowledge that it exists should give all Stewards of the Army Profession, including General Dempsey, the confidence that, if prudential military judgment dictates, they will not be violating their profession’s ethic if they do “engage publicly.”

About the Author: Don M. Snider is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at West Point, NY, from which he retired in 2008. He is now a Senior Fellow in the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) at West Point and an Adjunct Research Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. In a previous military career, Dr. Snider served three combat tours in Vietnam as an infantryman; after battalion command, he served as Chief of Plans for Theater Army in Europe, as Joint Planner for the Army Chief of Staff, as Executive Assistant in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on the staff of the National Security Council in the White House. He retired from the Army in 1990. Dr. Snider’s research examines American civil-military relations, the identities and development of the American Army officer, military professions, and professional military ethics. He was research director and co-editor of The Future of the Army Profession, (2d Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), and Forging the Warrior’s Character (2d Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008). More recent publications include, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of Military Professions” (Orbis, 2008), The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict (co-author, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008) and, co-editor with Suzanne Nielsen, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in the New Era, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). His opinion editorials appear on the website of the Strategic Studies Institute; his most recent contribution was, “What Our Civilian Leaders Do Not Understand about the Ethic of Military Professions: A Striking Example of the Current Gap in Civil-Military Relations.” Dr. Snider holds M.A. degrees in economics and public policy from the University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Maryland.


ENDNOTES
1. For a review of that “revolt” and the derivation of norms for public dissent by military professionals, see Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions,” ORBIS, Spring 2008, pp. 256-277.
2. See “The Obama-Military Divide,” The Wall Street Journal, available from online.wsj.com/articles/seth-cropsey-the-obama-military-divide 1412033300?KEYWORDS=seth+cropsey.
3. See Foreign Policy, available from shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2014/10/07/should_senior_military_officers_resign_in_protest_if_obama_disregards_their_advice.
4. See Military Times, available from www.militarytimes.com/article/ 20140930/NEWS05/309300067/Calls-brass-resign-add-debate-over-Mideast-policy.
5. For a current overview, see Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.
6. See Don M. Snider, “What Our Civilian Leaders Do Not Understand About the Ethic of Military Professions,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, 2013, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles//What Our-Civilian-Leaders-Do-Not-Understand/2013/11/26.
7. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1- The Army Profession, Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, June 3013, para 6-12, p. 6-3.
8. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and The State, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957, p. 73.
9. See, Martin Cook, The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004, pp. 55.
10. Ibid., p. 65.
11. See James Burk, Chap. 8, “Responsible Obedience and the Discretion to Do What is Wrong,” Neilson and Snider, eds., pp. 149-171.
12. See Snider, ORBIS.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the Editor for Production via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”

THE ARMY ETHIC WHITE PAPER JULY 2014

“The foundation of our profession is centered on trust… it will take every measure of competence and commitment to forge ahead and above all it will take character.” —General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff, US Army, US Military Academy, 27 May 2014

“Being an [Army Professional] means a total embodiment of the Warrior Ethos and the Army Ethic. Our Soldiers need uncompromising and unwavering leaders. We cannot expect our Soldiers to live by an ethic when their leaders and mentors are not upholding the standard. These values form the framework of our profession and are nonnegotiable. —SMA Raymond F. Chandler, III , Sergeant Major of the Army,  from an article published in Military Review, September 2011

11 July 2014
Center for the Army Profession and Ethic
Mission Command Center of Excellence
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Foreword

Professionals are guided by their ethic; the set of principles by which they practice, in the right way, on behalf of those they serve – demonstrating their Character. This is their identity. Likewise, as Army Professionals we perform our Duty according to our Ethic. Doing so reinforces Trust within the profession and with the American people.

As we move further into the 21st Century, complete operations in Afghanistan, and preserve the legacy of honorable service and sacrifice we have all made during the last thirteen plus years of continuous conflict, we find ourselves in a period of strategic transition which presents tremendous opportunities for the profession. The Army should be the nation’s leading institution for human capital and ethical development. To become that leader, we must intensify our understanding of what it means for the Army to be a Profession. The recent publication of ADRP 1, The Army Profession, brought us a long way in achieving that understanding, but we must do more. 

This White Paper identifies an omission in our doctrine – the absence of an articulated, accessible, and understandable expression of the Army Ethic. The Army Ethic does exist and emanates from our foundational heritage, beliefs, traditions, and culture. The intent, therefore, is not to invent the Army Ethic, but rather to glean its fundamental nature. Doing so is of urgent importance and is worthy of our collective wisdom and judgment. As the Army Profession prepares for the environment that lies ahead, we must anticipate the unique ethical challenges the future will present, and remain committed to developing Army Professionals of Character, Competence, and Commitment. Clearly articulating our ethic will help us do just that. 

This effort allows us to synthesize and draw from previous expressions and prior work that collectively provide the content for a unifying, enduring, and comprehensive articulation of the Army Ethic. I envision this articulation assisting the Army with: informing and inspiring Army Professionals in making right decisions and taking right actions in the conduct of the mission, in the performance of Duty, and in all aspects of life; driving Character Development and Professional Certification; inspiring shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals; guiding the Army Profession in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower (Honorable Service in defense of America’s values and people); and motivating stewardship of the Army Profession.

As we move forward with this strategically important initiative, I welcome your perspectives and recommendations in order to achieve consensus on the expression of our Ethic.

Raymond T. Odierno, General, United States Army, Chief of Staff

Introduction

The Army Ethic explains the nature of Honorable Service* for the Army, both as an institution and as a profession, in the accomplishment of the mission. It expresses the standard and expectation for all of us to make right decisions and to take right actions in the conduct of the mission, performance of Duty, and in all aspects of our lives.

* Throughout this paper, words or expressions in Italics have an operational meaning within the lexicon of the Army Profession. They must be commonly understood and consistently applied in the practice of our profession.

The Army Ethic explains why we conduct ourselves morally and ethically, instead of just describing the what and how of professional service. It provides motivation and inspiration for each of us to perform our Duty in a manner worthy of the Trust of the American people and each other.

“When people talk about the institutions that they trust…the United States Army is at the top of the list. Whether it is a man or woman in uniform or a Civilian…this is a team that needs to ensure that there is a mutual trust…so it is a very special relationship…forged over time….”1 —John M. McHugh, 21st Secretary of the Army

The Army Ethic emphasizes and informs Stewardship: caring for and developing subordinates, peers, and leaders in Character, Competence, and Commitment; safeguarding and maintaining property; and exercising appropriate and disciplined use of resources.

The Army Ethic guides the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, including regulations, policies, programs, procedures, practices, and systems.

Living the Army Ethic inspires and strengthens our shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals, drives Character Development, and reinforces Trust — among Soldiers, Army Civilians, Army Families, and with the American people.

Therefore, expressing the Army Ethic in doctrine is imperative. 

The goal is an articulated, accessible, commonly understood, and universally applicable Army Ethic — motivating Honorable Service, guiding and inspiring right decisions and actions. In turn, the Army Ethic will drive the Concept and Strategy for Character Development.

Background

The present need to articulate the Army Ethic surfaced during the CY11 Army Profession Campaign. In April 2012, the Commanding General, TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] published the Army Profession Campaign Report. It provided findings and recommendations related to the status of the Army Profession after more than a decade of continuous armed conflict.2

Among its findings, Soldiers and Army Civilians asked for an expression of the nature of our profession, the Army Ethic, and the doctrinal concepts and principles that clarify our identity and roles. Specifically, members across the profession noted that no single document exists to identify and define the Army Ethic.3

In response, ADP 1 – The Army, September 2012, included a new chapter entitled, Our Profession. It identified Trust as the foundation for our relationship with the American people and for successful accomplishment of the mission.4 Subsequently, for the first time, a supporting ADRP 1 – The Army Profession was released on 14 June 2013.

This doctrine describes Army culture and the Army Ethic as the foundation for developing the moral identity of Army Professionals. It notes that the essential characteristic Trust is based on adherence to the Army Ethic in the performance of Duty and in all aspects of life.5

“The people entrust … the lives of their children to soldier in our ranks. They trust that the Army will not waste those precious resources…. This sacred trust defines the bond between our Nation and its Soldiers.
[Those] who display questionable characteristics, such as double standards, evidence of unfaithfulness, or even disregard for law … create an environment of mistrust. There can be no equivocation of trust; it either exists or it does not.”—General Robert W. Cone, Former CG, TRADOC

Army doctrine further recognizes that the Army Ethic is informed by law, Army Values, beliefs expressed in codes and creeds, and is embedded within our unique Army culture. 

Our ethic embodies fundamental precepts that enable us to understand the purpose of our lives in Honorable Service to the Nation. It notes that ethical practices are the professional standard and that unethical practices must not be tolerated.

“The Army has earned the trust of the American people as a professional organization and we must employ all necessary measures to preserve this confidence. We expect all of you to…demonstrate the character, competence, and commitment that are essential to the profession.”7 —General John F. Campbell, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

Problem

Although ADRP 1 offers a definition and framework, it does not fully describe the Army Ethic so that it is accessible, commonly understood, and universally applicable. This does not mean that the Army Profession lacks an ethic. However, the moral principles underlying our oaths, creeds, values, and virtues, are not integrated within a concise, holistic expression. 

Today, we remain without doctrine that clearly expresses why and how the Army Ethic motivates and inspires Honorable Service as reflected in our decisions and actions.8

This omission causes inconsistent understanding among Army Professionals and must be redressed.

Risk

Failure to publish and promulgate the Army Ethic in doctrine:

  • Neglects the explicit inclusion of moral and ethical reasoning informing Army Values-based decisions and actions under Mission Command;
  • Fails to inspire our shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals and our Duty to uphold ethical standards;
  • Compromises our ability to develop and certify the Character of Army Professionals, essential to Trust;
  • Continues misunderstanding among the Army Profession cohorts concerning the vital role that each plays in the ethical conduct of Mission Command;
  • Concedes that legalistic, rules-based, and consequential reasoning dominate Soldier and Army Civilian decisions and actions; and
  • Permits the continuation of dissonance between our professed ethic and nonconforming institutional policies and practices.

Discussion

The imperative of the Army Ethic is not new. Its influence on the conduct of our mission and the performance of Duty is evident in the guidance of General Washington and Congress to the Continental Army. “In 1776, American leaders believed that it was not enough to win the war. They also had to win in a way that was consistent with the values of their society and the principles of their cause….It happened in a way that was different from the ordinary course of wars in general. In Congress and the Army, American leaders resolved that the War of Independence would be conducted with a respect for human rights, even for the enemy.”9 Decades later, the Commander in Chief, President Lincoln, promulgated General Order No. 100 (1863) Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, based upon the Lieber Code, to guide the ethical conduct of the Union Army in the Civil War.10 Even later, as the American Army entered World War I, General John J. Pershing found it necessary to publish guidance concerning the conduct of his Officers and Soldiers.11


Following World War II, General George C. Marshall asked Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall to write The Armed Forces Officer. He believed all services needed to base their professional commitment on a common moral-ethical foundation, providing guidance on conduct, standards, and Duty for the American military.12 Today, the current edition continues to instruct all services regarding the fundamental moral-ethical obligations of serving in the Armed Forces of the United States. The philosophy unites the uniformed services in their common calling of supporting, defending, and upholding the Constitution in service to our country.13

Over forty years ago, as the Army transitioned from the Vietnam War, the Study on Military Professionalism recognized there can be no tension between mission accomplishment and professional ethics.14

In 1986, then Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Jr. published DA Pam 600-68 – The Bedrock of Our Profession, which addressed the “Professional Army Ethic.”15 This document was not updated with the promulgation of Army Values and it expired.

In 1998, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Dennis J. Reimer directed that FM 22-100, Army Leadership include the essential nature of Army Values in guiding the decisions and actions of Army Professionals.

Values are at the core of everything our Army is and does. Army Values form the foundation of character. … These values tell us what we need to be in every action we take. They are non-negotiable and apply to everyone all the time in every situation.16 —General Dennis J. Reimer, 33rd Chief of Staff of the Army

This sentiment endures. As affirmed in The United States Army Operating Concept, the Army Values serve as our guide about our covenant with the American people.17 The principle underlying this observation is emphasized in doctrine. “The Nation’s and the profession’s values are not negotiable. Violations are not just mistakes; they are failures in meeting the fundamental standards of the [Army Profession].”18 In this light, “American values affect every aspect of how U.S. forces fight and win.”19

In December 2010, then TRADOC Commander, General Martin E. Dempsey, distributed an Army White Paper on The Profession of Arms.20 This paper, intended to facilitate dialogue, was neither definitive nor authoritative. It served as the catalyst for the CY 11 Profession of Arms Campaign (later renamed the Army Profession Campaign). In February 2012, the Army Civilian Corps released its own White Paper recognizing the importance of Army Civilians as vital members of the Army Profession.21 A few months later, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey issued another White Paper on America’s Military – A Profession of Arms.22 In common, all of these works cite the importance of an ethic in guiding the decisions and actions of Army Professionals. None, however, attempted to express the ethic in a manner that was complete and applicable to all Soldiers and Army Civilians.

“A code of ethics … cannot be developed overnight by edict or official pronouncement. It is developed by years of practice and performance of Duty according to high ethical standards. It must be self-policing. Without such a code, a professional Soldier or a group soon loses its Identity [emphasis added] and effectiveness.“23 —SMA Silas L. Copeland, 3rd Sergeant Major of the Army

In the past thirty years, many Army Professionals have published theses, journal articles, and reports reflecting their concerns and recommendations for improving both the expression of and commitment to living by appropriate ethical principles in the practice of our profession. 

In 1985, then Major Linda Ewing wrote that there is an objective, logical, and principled nature to the values that framed our nation; and these remain inherent within our [Army] ethic.24 Citing her work in his own thesis, then Major Martin E. Dempsey, discussed the imperative of Duty within the Army Ethic. He expressed the concern that Duty is not well defined, and therefore not well understood and applied in the conduct of the mission and in shaping the identity of Army Professionals.25

In November 1991, Dr. James T. Johnson wrote a review of Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, authored by now-retired Brigadier General Anthony E. Hartle. Dr. Johnson noted that much had been written about the concept of professional military ethics, but that these collective writings lacked sufficient commonality to define the ethic coherently and systematically. He observed that General
Hartle’s book made a substantive contribution to providing that synthesis. However, in his opinion, it did not concisely and clearly articulate the Army Ethic.26

Nineteen years later, reflecting on the importance of such an expression, the 36th Chief of Staff of the Army, General W. George Casey Jr. explained his decision to create the Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic, at West Point [now the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE)]. General Casey charged CAPE with the mission “to create and integrate knowledge about our ethic.”27 He believed that our Army Ethic was essential to the development of leaders who make ethical decisions and “demonstrate the confidence and courage to do what is right.”28

Today, the Army Ethic remains a concept, described as the, “…set of laws, values, and beliefs…within the Army culture….” motivating and guiding the conduct of Army Professionals in a common moral purpose.29 This description is little advanced from observations made in 2009 by Dr. Don M. Snider, et al. regarding “The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” The purpose of their monograph was to provide a framework within which scholars and practitioners could discuss the various aspects of the Army’s Ethic. They observed that such discussion is especially challenging because the Army lacks common models and language for this dialogue.

“Current Army doctrine and scholarly research do not provide a construct for examining the Army Ethic.”30 —COL (R) Don M. Snider, Ph.D., MAJ Paul Oh, MAJ Kevin Toner, from “The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict Summary,” SSI Monograph, October 2009

In September 2012, LTC Clark C. Barrett suggested “The Right Way” to establish an Army institutional Ethic. His thesis is that the “frameworks” the Army has adopted only imply, they do not explicitly state an Army Ethic. He proposes an integration of the disjointed and disconnected Army ethical prescriptions. He further emphasizes that the Army Ethic plays a key role in shaping the Character Development of Army Professionals.31

Colonel Brian Michelson, in his USAWC Strategy Research Project, argues that the Army Profession’s concept for developing Character is ineffective. It is compromised because Army doctrine does not explicitly articulate the Army Ethic. Hence, the Army Profession does not have a consensus strategy for Character Development. His conclusion is that our approach is laissez faire.32

Colonel John A. Vermeesch, writing in Military Review, offered his conclusion that the Army Profession is challenged by the lack of Character Development systems. In redressing this condition, he recommends paying particular attention to moral and ethical reasoning. He believes a well-designed and implemented strategy for Character Development will strengthen professional identity and enhance appreciation for and application of Army Values.33

Similar concerns and expectations exist for Army Civilians. Brigadier General (Retired) Volney Warner, President of the Army Civilian University, and Ms. Natalie Liu Duncan stated in their 2011 “Army Civilians – Professionals by Any Definition,” Military Review article, “As government professionals Army Civilians have obligations to the highest standards of performance and accountability to high ethical standards.”34

In the Army Civilian White Paper (2012), the authors noted that all Army leaders must be the living embodiment of the Army Ethic. The Army Ethic enables Trust externally with the American people and internally within the ranks. They affirmed that Army Civilians, “…share the same Army Values, profess and embody the same Army Ethic, and maintain the same mission-focus.” 35 Thus, all Army education for Soldiers and Army Civilians requires an articulated Army Ethic in order to support a holistic concept and strategy for Character Development.

Recognizing this decades long omission in doctrine and strategy, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Imiola and Major Danny Cazier, of the US Military Academy, Department of English and Philosophy, recommended in their Military Review article that we get “on the road” and articulate our Army Ethic. Their position, echoing the point previously made by Major Ewing, is that the Army Ethic must be expressed as enduring principles. They emphasize that these principles must be “internalized, not merely memorized.”36 In a more recent article, Lieutenant Colonel Imiola restates this view and concludes, “Up to this point the Army has failed to adequately express such an ethic.”37

Within the Army Profession, described in ADP 1/ADRP 1, the Army Ethic is integral to Military Expertise (Competence), Honorable Service (Character), Stewardship (Commitment), and Esprit de Corps (Winning Spirit and Morale); without these, Trust fails. However, with an articulated and understandable Army Ethic, we can sustain the moral-ethical ethos within our Army culture. Thus, the Army Ethic should drive Character Development and inform certification of Army Professionals.

“Reputation is what people think you are; Character is what you are.
We build Character … in order for us to withstand the rigors of combat and resist the temptations to compromise our principles. … [We] must have the intestinal fortitude to carry out [our] Duties and to do what is right for our Soldiers and our Army.”38 —SMA Glen E. Morrell, 7th Sergeant Major of the Army

Properly expressed, the Army Ethic explains Character and how this quality is reflected in decisions and actions. The ethic informs the identity of Army Professionals (Soldiers and Army Civilians) in providing loyal and Honorable Service to the Nation. It explains why ethical conduct is the standard, why unethical practices are not tolerated, and provides motivation for upholding Army Values. The ethic also explains what is expected in ethical conduct of the mission, in the performance of Duty and in all aspects of life. Thus, it inspires Army Professionals’ dedication to continuous development in Character, Competence, and Commitment.

Our mission is to publish and promulgate the Army Ethic to inspire and strengthen our shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals, drive Character Development, and reinforce Trust among Soldiers, Army Civilians, Army Families, and with the American people.

The key facts informing mission accomplishment — The Army Ethic:

  • Embraces American values embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
  • Expresses the nature of Honorable Service and the mandate to uphold Army Values.
  • Guides the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower.
  • Informs regulations, policies, doctrine, programs, systems, practices, and procedures.

To accomplish this mission we make two fundamental assumptions. First, the Army Ethic does exist, but must be concisely and clearly expressed so that it is accessible, commonly understood, and applicable throughout the profession. This assumption is warranted based upon the extensive literature discussing the ethic and its framework as expressed in ADRP1. Second, upon taking their Oath members of the Army Profession voluntarily relinquish some of their rights as American citizens. This includes the right to make decisions or take actions that conflict with the Army Ethic.

The origins and foundation for the Army Ethic include a philosophical heritage, based upon the writings of prominent Greeks and Romans; a theological heritage, based largely upon Judeo-Christian writings and teachings; and a cultural and historical heritage — for example, our tradition of the Citizen-Soldier and the All-Volunteer Army. These foundations are enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution and our Bill of Rights. They are also reflected in US Code (e.g., Titles 5, 10, 32; Uniform Code of Military Justice; treaties; status of forces agreements; and the Law of Armed Conflict). They are further expressed in our oaths and creeds.

“It all begins with the oath of office. The ‘profession and ethic’…are inseparable. The oath clearly brings this out. Military professionals incur moral responsibilities, including adherence to treaties governing the ethical application of landpower and respecting the rights of persons. When we take this oath, we are making a…commitment to abide by the values and interests of the American people. We are pledging ourselves to the ethical foundation of our profession and that of the Nation.”39 —LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., Superintendent, US Military Academy

Beyond the law, these ethical and moral principles are expressed in the Declaration of Independence, Western Just War Tradition, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, universal norms (e.g., Golden Rule), Army Values, Creeds, and Mottos.

The Army Ethic must have a pervasive influence throughout the Army Profession. This includes the Essential Characteristics, operations (e.g., Mission Command), the institution (e.g., Education and Training), and Army Culture. It motivates and inspires shared professional identity and an appreciation for the complementary roles of each cohort. When doctrinally captured, it serves as the foundation for the concept and strategy for Character Development and provides ethical standards for certification in Character.

Living the Army Ethic is a commitment and an expectation. Specifically, the Army Ethic informs, motivates, and inspires Army Professionals to:

  • Seek to discover the truth, decide what is right (ethical, effective, efficient), and demonstrate the Character, Competence, and Commitment to act accordingly.
  • Contribute Honorable Service in the conduct of the mission, performance of Duty, and all aspects of life.
  • Stand Strong as Stewards of the Army Profession to uphold the Army Ethic — prevent misconduct and do what is right to stop unethical practices.

The Army Ethic guides the conduct of Army operations as described in Army Doctrine, and applies equally to all environments. In the conduct of our mission, the Army Ethic supports Unified Land Operations (ADP 3-0), through its contribution to the professional development of all Army leaders in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower.40

The Operations Process (ADP 5-0) and Mission Command (ADP 6-0), recognize that military operations are foremost a human undertaking. In this regard, Army Professionals comply with applicable laws, treaties, and host nation agreements. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement.41 Thus, conduct which violates legal and regulatory norms is unacceptable. Beyond that minimum standard, Army Professionals’ decisions and actions must also reflect the moral foundations of the Army Ethic. In doing so, Army Professionals uphold the ethical principles guiding the use of force on behalf of our Nation.42 This is a tenet of Honorable Service revealing an omission in operations doctrine. Those principles of application include “critical and creative thinking,” yet are silent on the imperative of ethical reasoning in the decision process.43

Mission Command requires an environment of mutual Trust, shared understanding, prudent risk, and disciplined initiative. “Trust is assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, and truth” of another.44 Thus, we earn Trust by upholding the Army Values and exercising ethical leadership, consistent with the Army’s leadership principles. Further, Mission Command is enabled through Stewardship, an ethical Duty of Army Professionals.45

The Foreword to ADP 6-22 Army Leadership states, “Leadership is paramount to our profession. It is integral to our institutional success today and tomorrow…..our Army requires…leaders of character.”46 It quotes General Omar Bradley, who observed, “Leadership in a democratic army means firmness, not harshness; understanding, not weakness; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism.”47

This perspective resonates with the earlier guidance provided by Major General John M. Schofield regarding discipline and Soldiers of a free nation:

“The discipline which makes the Soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an Army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the Soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander.”48 —Major General John M. Schofield Address to the US Corps of Cadets, US Military Academy August 11, 1879

These exemplary Army leaders confirmed that Respect, an Army Value, integral within the Army Ethic, is necessary to accomplish the mission.

Leaders of Character must live by the Army Ethic, adhering to Army Values. This Commitment is inherent within their professional identity and demonstrated in the example they set for others.49 Character is required of a leader, recognized in the Leadership Requirements Model (ADP 6-22) and for professional certification (ADP 1).50

The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015 discusses an Army learning model that develops Soldiers and leaders capable of meeting the challenges of operational adaptability in an era of persistent conflict.51 In order to support such leader development, the Army Learning Model (ALM) must include critical, creative, and ethical thinking in its design and implementation. Otherwise, it will not fully serve its purpose, as clearly stated in The Army Capstone Concept.

“To facilitate the necessary level of adaptation, Army forces empower increasingly lower echelons of command with the capabilities, capacities, authorities, and responsibilities needed to think independently and act decisively, morally, and ethically.”52 —TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept

We cannot expect that Army Professionals will be worthy of Trust — through consistent demonstration of Character, Competence, and Commitment — without explicit programs to provide for their professional development. Such programs, including education, training, experience, and opportunities for self-development are a professional expectation within the institutional Army. The Army doctrine on training of units and developing leaders provides the rationale.

“Good training gives Soldiers confidence in their abilities and the abilities of their leaders, forges Trust [emphasis added], and allows the unit to adapt readily to new and different missions.”53 —ADP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders

This observation reveals that “good training” provides for Competence (the ability to perform Duty to Standard) and Character (the Commitment to perform Duty in accord with the Army Ethic).

The recently published Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 (ALDS) is guided by the imperative to develop Competent and Committed leaders of Character.54

“Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process—founded in Army Values—that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of character. Leader development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships. All of these take place in and are influenced by the society the Army is sworn to defend under the Constitution. Our strategy must be all encompassing….”55 —Army Leader Development Strategy 2013

The Army Ethic is central to achieving this goal. The ALDS notes that, “Mastering the fundamentals is a professional obligation and provides the basis by which Army leaders operate effectively [emphasis added] in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment.”56 Recognizing the importance of operating ethically, as well as effectively, makes articulating the Army Ethic imperative. The strategy continues, “The leaders we develop today will meet the security challenges of tomorrow. Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in areas where critical thinking skills [emphasis added] are essential.”57 Explicitly including the imperative of ethical reasoning highlights the need for an articulated Army Ethic. Recognizing this critical component of leader development is particularly relevant to future challenges, especially those created by emerging technologies. 

Joint Doctrine addresses moral and ethical considerations in decision making and in the application of force, embedding moral action within the “Center of Gravity.” It recognizes that legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor, is based on the legality, morality, and rightness of actions.58

The Art of Joint Command includes, “The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, intuition, situational awareness, and the ability to consider contrary views gained over time through training, education, and experience helps commanders make difficult decisions in complex situations.”59 Replacing the word “difficult” with the word “right” (ethical, effective, and efficient) redresses an ambiguity (what makes a decision “difficult”) and provides the opportunity to focus on making right decisions and taking right actions.

Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century

“The Army develops professional leaders who demonstrate the character, competence, commitment, and resilience required, whether operationally deployed or in a training environment. We must foster a climate of trust that respects and protects our Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members. Trust provides the basic ethical building blocks that underpin our profession.”60 —ALDS – Army Leader Development Strategy 2013

This ALDS goal directly supports the strategic vision of, “An Army of competent and committed leaders of character with the skills and attributes necessary to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.”61 Realization of this vision depends upon an articulated, accessible, commonly understood, and universally applicable Army Ethic.

Summary and Solution

The Army Ethic motivates and inspires our shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals, honorably serving the American people, providing military expertise in defense of the nation, and guiding the profession now and for the future through faithful stewardship of the people and resources entrusted to our care. Living by the Army Ethic is our way of life. It requires life-long professional development in Character, Competence, and Commitment. This quest is a duty consistent with our shared identity.

Articulating and living by the Army Ethic:

  • Inspires and strengthens our shared identity as Trustworthy Army Professionals.
  • Expresses Honorable Service as our ethical, effective, and efficient conduct of the mission, performance of Duty, and way of life.
  • Motivates our Duty to continuously develop Military Expertise throughout the Army Profession.
  • Emphasizes Stewardship of our people and resources and enhances Esprit de Corps.
  • Drives Character Development for the Army.
  • Reinforces Trust within the profession and with the American people.
  • Is essential to Mission Command.

We propose the following description of the Army Ethic and its guiding moral principles:


The Army Ethic—The Heart of the Army

Introduction

The Army Ethic defines the moral principles that guide us in the conduct of our missions, performance of duty, and all aspects of life. Our ethic is reflected in law, Army Values, creeds, oaths, ethos, and shared beliefs embedded within Army culture. It inspires and motivates all of us to make right decisions and to take right actions at all times.

The Army Ethic is the heart of our shared professional identity, our sense of who we are, our purpose in life, and why and how we serve the American people. To violate the Army Ethic is to break our sacred bond of trust with each other and with those whom we serve. Failure to live by and uphold the Army Ethic brings dishonor on us all and may have strategic implications for the mission. 

Army Professionals fulfill distinctive roles as honorable servants, military experts, and stewards of our profession. By our solemn oath, we voluntarily incur an extraordinary moral obligation inherent in the identity to which we aspire:


Trustworthy Army Professionals

Honorable Servants of the Nation – Professionals of Character:

By oath, we support and defend the Constitution, subordinate to civilian authority, and obey the laws of the Nation and the orders of those appointed over us; we reject and report illegal or immoral orders or actions.

We take pride in honorably serving the Nation with integrity and demonstrating character in all aspects of our lives.

We recognize the intrinsic dignity and worth of all people, treating them with respect and compassion. 

We demonstrate courage by setting the example for right conduct despite risk, uncertainty, and fear; and we candidly express our professional judgment to subordinates, peers, and superiors.

Military Experts – Competent Professionals:

We commit ourselves to do our duty, with discipline and to standard, putting the needs of others above our own, and accomplish the mission as a team.

We understand the mission may justly require taking the lives of others while courageously placing our own lives at risk. 

We continuously advance our expertise in the knowledge, skills, and abilities of our chosen profession, seeking the truth, and striving for excellence through life-long learning and professional development.

Stewards of the Army Profession – Committed Professionals:

We uphold the standards of the profession and adhere to its values; we lead by example and hold ourselves and others accountable for decisions and actions.

We apply discipline in our use of the resources entrusted to us by the American people; we ensure our Army is well-equipped, well-trained, and well-led; and we care for and develop Soldiers, Army Civilians, and Families.  

We develop and sustain Esprit de Corps and persevere, adapt, and overcome adversity, challenges, and setbacks.


Conclusion

Failure to publish and promulgate the Army Ethic in doctrine continues an omission, which compromises the development and conduct of our future force. 
Therefore, to motivate, inspire, and inform the development of Army Professionals in CharacterCompetence, and Commitment we must articulate and promulgate the Army Ethic.
The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, as the Army modernization proponent (AR 5-22) for the Army Profession, Army Ethic, and Character Development, will lead a cooperative effort to articulate and publish the Army Ethic, no later than 14 Jun 2015, the Army’s 240th Anniversary.

Endnotes
1. McHugh, John M., HON, in paraphrase from interview in CAPE Trust Instructional Video FY14 America’s Army – Our Profession, “Stand Strong,” http://cape.army.mil/aaop/trust/; Discussion Guide: 9; http://cape.army.mil/repository/Discussion%20Guides/Trust_Theme_Video_Discussion_Guide.pdf (accessed 19 Dec 13).
2. Army Profession Campaign-Annual Report-April 2012: General Cone Introduction, 6, 14, 15.
3. Army Profession Campaign-Annual Report-April 2012: 6, 14.
4. ADP 1, The Army (Washington, DC, 17 September 2012): 2-1 – 2-9 (Chapter 2). Hereafter referred to as ADP 1, The Army.
5. ADRP 1- The Army Profession, (Washington, DC, 14 June 2013): Preface,pg iii, 2-3 – 2-5.
6. Cone, Robert W., GEN, “Enduring Attributes of the Profession: Trust, Discipline, Fitness,” Military Review – The Profession of Arms Special Edition (Sep 2011): 6.
7. General John F. Campbell, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army; email, Subject: Message to Army GOs in Joint Assignments; December 01, 2013 1:26 PM.
8. Army Profession Campaign-Annual Report-April 2012: 14.
9. Fischer, David Hackett, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 375-376.
10. Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project website, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp, (accessed 30 May 14).
11. United States Army in the World War. 1917-1919; Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services, Vol. 12; CMH Pub 23-18; 1948 (reprinted 1991): 23.
12. Midwest Book Review of The Armed Forces Officer 2007 edition on Amazon.com. http://www.amazon.com/The-Armed-Forces-Officer-University/product-reviews/1597971677 (accessed on 9 Dec 2013).
13 .The Armed Forces Officer, 2007; in paraphrase from the Foreword: xi-xii; http://books.google.com/books?id=N_hek4msSEMC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=snippet&q=unites&f=false, (accessed 19 Dec 13).
14. Study on Military Professionalism, Army War College, June 1970 (Westmoreland study); Preface: ii, 55 (Incl 2).
15. DA Pam 600-68 – “The Bedrock of Our Profession” White Paper 1986: 2.
16. Jones, David A, Instilling the Army Core Values at the Unit Level: Will FM 22-100 Get Us There?, MMAS, 1999; quoting CSA Dennis J. Reimer: 1998. Army Values Homepage. CSA message at http://wwwcgsc.army.mil/cal/values/values2/csamessage.htm. 10 June 98.
17. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept, (Fort Monroe, VA, 19 August 2010): 36 (Chapter 6, para f).
18. Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, 15 December 2006): 7-1.
19. Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Washington, DC, 13 May 2014): 1-10.
20. An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms, 8 Dec 2010, http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/ProfessionWhite%20Paper%208%20Dec%2010.pdf, (accessed 19 Dec 13).
21. White Paper, The Army Civilian Corps – A Vital Component of the Army Profession, 1 Feb 2012, http://cape.army.mil/Info%20Papers/Army%20White%20Paper.pdf, (accessed 19 Dec 13).
22. America’s Military – A Profession of Arms White Paper, Feb 2012, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-02/022312120752_Americas_Military_POA.pdf, (accessed 19 Dec 13).
23. Copeland, Silas L., SMA, “The NCO Must Grow with the Army” ARMY, (Washington, DC, Oct 72): 24-25.
24. Ewing, Linda, (MAJ), An Objectively Derived Foundation for Military Values, CGSC paper, 1985.
25. Dempsey, Martin E, GEN, Duty, Understanding the Most Sublime Military Value, CGSC, 1988:15.
26. Johnson, James Turner, Review of Moral Issues in Military Decision Making by Anthony e. Hartle; The International History Review, Vol 13, No 4 (Nov 1991): 861-863.
27. Casey, George W., Jr., GEN, Advancing the Army Professional Military Ethic, JFQ, 3rd Quarter 2009: 15.
28. Casey, George W., Jr., GEN, Advancing the Army Professional Military Ethic, JFQ, 3rd Quarter 2009: 14-15.
29. ADRP 1- The Army Profession, June 2013; 1-3(para 1-14).
30. Snider, Oh, Toner; The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict Summary, SSI Monograph, Oct 2009: ix-xi, 3-4.
31. Barrett, Clark C., LTC; “Finding “The Right Way” Toward an Army Institutional Ethic,” Carlisle Papers, Sep 2012.
32. Michelson, Brian M., COL, “Character Development of U.S. Army Leaders: A Laissez Faire Approach,” Military Review (Sep/Oct 2013): 30-38; (also in USAWC Strategy Research Paper of same title).
33. Vermeesch, John A., COL, “Trust Erosion and Identity Corrosion,” Military Review (Sep/Oct 2013): 2-9.
34. Volney Jim Warner and Natalie Liu Duncan, “Army Civilians – Professionals by Any Definition,” Military Review -The Profession of Arms Special Edition (Sept 2011): 56-66.
35. White Paper, The Army Civilian Corps – A Vital Component of the Army Profession, 1 Feb 2012, http://cape.army.mil/Info%20Papers/Army%20White%20Paper.pdf, (accessed 19 Dec 13): 4-5, 13.
36. Imiola, Brian, LTC and Cazier, John Daniel, MAJ; “On The Road to Articulating Our Professional Ethic,” Military Review – The Army Ethic Special Edition (2010): 11-18.
37. Imiola, Brian, LTC; “The Imaginary Army Ethic: A Call for Articulating a Real Foundation for Our Profession,” Military Review (May/June 2013): 2-5.
38. Morrell, Glen E., SMA, “The NCO: More Vital Than Ever to Readiness.” Army magazine (Oct 1983): 28; Morrell, Glen E., “What Soldiering Is All About.” Army magazine (Oct 1986):40,41.
39. Caslen, Robert L., Jr., LTG, “The Army Ethic, Public Trust, and the Profession of Arms,” Military Review – The Profession of Arms Special Edition (Sep 2011):14-15.
40. ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations.
41. ADP 5-0 The Operations Process: ii.
42. ADP 1, The Army: 2-3 thru 2-4 (Chapter 2, para 2-11 thru 2-13).
43. ADP 5-0 The Operations Process: iv, 2, (Figure 1 and para 5).
44. ADP 1, The Army:2-2 (Chapter 2, para 2-1).
45. ADP 6-0, Mission Command: iv, 2; ADRP 1, The Army Profession: 6-1 (para 6-3).
46. ADP 6-22 Army Leadership: Foreword.
47. ADP 6-22 Army Leadership: Foreword.
48. Schofield’s Definition of Discipline, Bugle Notes, http://www.west-point.org/academy/malo-wa/inspirations/buglenotes.html, (accessed 27 Nov 13).
49. ADP 6-22 Army Leadership, in paraphrase: 6 (para 26-27).
50. ADP 6-22 Army Leadership, in paraphrase: 5 (para 22-23); ADP 1, The Army: 2-1 – 2-9 (Chapter 2). 
51. TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015: 5.
52. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: 21.
53 ADP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders: 9.
54 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: Foreword.
55 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: 3.
56 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: 4.
57 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: 4.
58 JP 3-0 Joint Operations: A-4.
59 JP 3-0 Joint Operations: xii.
60 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: 5.
61 ALDS Army Leader Development Strategy 2013: 6.

A SOLDIER’S MORALITY, RELIGION, AND OUR PROFESSIONAL ETHIC: DOES THE ARMY’S CULTURE FACILITATE INTEGRATION, CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT, AND TRUST IN THE PROFESSION?

By Don M. Snider, Ph.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, and Alexander P. Shine, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press. Reprinted by permission of SSI and USAWC. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Foreword
This monograph is the 6th in the Professional Military Ethics Series; it addresses an issue about which little has been written. It intentionally plows new and difficult ground.

The larger issue it addresses is the cultures of the military professions that currently serve our Republic and the role of the Stewards of the Profession in the evolution of those cultures, in particular their moral and ethical core. Since our Armed Forces exist as military professions only by the trust they earn from the society they serve and the trust they engender among professionals who voluntarily serve within them, this issue is of no small import. If the Stewards are unable to lead the professions such that both the external and internal trust relationships are maintained, then the military institution reverts to its alternative organizational character of a big, lumbering government bureaucracy. Since there is no historical record that such government bureaucracies are able to create the expert knowledge or expert practice of a modern, military profession—such as we have enjoyed in the post-Vietnam era—such a situation does not bode well for the future security of the Republic.

Thus, the larger issue has to do with the evolution of the ethics of America’s military professions. Those ethics, however, do not exist nor evolve in isolation of other influences external to the professions. Scholars have established for some time that there are three major influences on the ethics of the military professions: 1) the changing nature of warfare and the associated imperative to prosecute it effectively; 2) the evolving values of the society being defended [both their beliefs as to what is moral or ethical in warfare, and more broadly what they value as a society]; and, 3) the international treaties and conventions to which the United States is a party. It is the second of these influences that is of interest in this monograph—the evolving values of the American society being defended.

Among the evolving values of American society, this research seeks to address the perennial issue of religion, its role in the moral character of individual volunteers, and how, amid a secularizing society, the Stewards of the Professions can maintain an ethical culture that facilitates, indeed fosters, both correct religious expression and military effectiveness. Since the military represents a microcosm of American society, the cultural wars raging outside the professions for several decades on such issues as racial integration, abortion, the service of gays in the military, gender roles, etc., have each migrated in their own time into the military sub-society. This research explores the extent to which that is now the case with religious expression and how the military professions can, once again, lead in overcoming such cultural dysfunction, in this case by facilitating soldiers’ individual integration of diverse personal moralities, faith–based or not, with their profession’s ethic.

—Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press
—Everett Denton Knapp, Jr., Colonel, U.S. Army, Director, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Abstract
The context for this monograph lies in the trust relationships that American military professions must retain with the society they serve if they are to remain professions. Of course, the alternative without such trust is for the Services simply to revert to the character and behavior of a government occupation, a big bureaucracy like the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Agriculture. But to remain professions, one of the constant challenges the Stewards of the Professions must address is “how different and how separate” they are to be from the society they serve. Stated differently, as the values and mores of American society change, the ethics of its military professions must also evolve, but never so much that such evolution diminishes their military effectiveness—their raison-d’être and the source of the trust relationship in the first place.

As noted in the Foreword, as the values of American society have changed in the past, in most cases, e.g., racial integration, abortion, smoking as a health issue, the service of gays in the military, gender roles, etc., those changes have eventually had a strong influence on the culture of the military professions and, in particular, on the core of those cultures—the Services’ Ethics.

The authors of this monograph argue that another such issue has now arisen and is strongly, and not favorably, influencing military cultures—a culture of hostility toward religion and its correct expressions within the military. Setting aside the role of Chaplains as a separate issue, the focus here is on the role religion may play in the moral character of individual soldiers, especially leaders, and how their personal morality, faith-based or not, is to be integrated with their profession’s ethic so they can serve in all cases “without reservation,” as their oath requires.

The authors assert, with cogent examples, that Service cultures have become increasingly hostile to the correct expressions of religion, perhaps to the point that soldiers of faith are now intimidated into privatizing their beliefs . . . and thus serving hypocritically as someone other than who they really are. If the Services really want leaders “of character” as their doctrines so plainly state, then they must maintain professional cultures that allow, indeed foster, authentic moral character whether faith-based or not, and its development as soldiers volunteer and serve.   The Services can ill afford to lose the irrefutable power of soldiers’ personal moralities as they serve in both peace and in war, providing an additional motivation and resilience to prevail in the arduous tasks and inevitable recoveries inherent in their sacrificial service.

After advancing this hypothesis and viewing it from several perspectives, the authors then move downward in hierarchy to address the service they know best—the U.S. Army—and offer recommendations for both Soldiers and the Stewards of the Army Profession as to the best way to maintain such a professional culture. The intent clearly is to start a discussion within the profession on an issue that the Army, at least, has placed for too long in the “too hard” box.

Introduction
In October 2013, the Secretary of the Army directed a halt to all “briefings, command presentations, or training on the subject of extremist organizations until that program of instruction and training has been [re]created and disseminated.” The Secretary acted because:

On several occasions over the past few months, media accounts have highlighted instances of Army instructors supplementing programs of instruction and including information that is inaccurate, objectionable, and otherwise inconsistent with current Army policy.1

Of interest is the fact that during those briefings, Catholics, Evangelical Christians, and several apolitical religious advocacy groups in Washington, D.C., had been labeled by Army instructors as “hate groups.” News of this drew negative reaction from members of Congress who strongly addressed their concerns to the Secretary.”2

How could such unprofessional conduct on the part of Army instructors happen “on several occasions over the past few months” without, apparently, corrective action being taken by uniformed leaders at each location, or even at some higher uniformed level? Why did they stand on the sidelines so long that it took the Secretary of the Army to act? Why did they not recognize what the Secretary did—that such representations are “inaccurate, objectionable, and otherwise inconsistent with Army policy,” not to mention, common sense?

On November 18, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) commended the Secretary by letter for his action noting that: “. . . to the extent these trainings served to dissuade personnel from engaging in lawful associational or expressive activities, they raise serious concerns under the First Amendment . . . jeopardize[ing] other important Army goals and values.”

In an accompanying news article, the same ACLU authors further noted: “The Army did the right thing in halting these trainings until it can get a handle on the curriculum to prevent inaccuracies and ensure that they properly further the program’s goals of treating everyone with dignity and respect. No soldier should fear repercussions because of their personal beliefs. The men and women who volunteer to defend the Constitution deserve its protections, including freedom of association and religion and belief, as well as fair treatment and equal opportunity for everyone.“3 (bold added by authors of this monograph)

We contend that this example, one of several that we shall discuss, highlights a much larger issue—that the Army’s professional culture, as well as those of the other Services, has become increasingly hostile to almost any expression of personal moralities—and particularly those based on religion—so hostile that citizens can rightly wonder whether the conduct of the institutions continues to reflect the legal and moral foundations of the professions’ own ethics. Put another way, in a national culture and political milieu wherein an individual’s personal morality, particularly when it is based on religion, is increasingly contested, can the Services maintain professional cultures that foster the legitimacy of service and sacrifice by men and women of religious faith—or, indeed of no faith—who choose to think, speak, and act, within prescribed limits in accordance with their own personal morality? Can they serve, as noted by the ACLU, without “fear of repercussions because of their personal beliefs . . . enjoying freedom of association and religion and belief as well as fair treatment and equal opportunity?”

It is our understanding that every Soldier has a personal morality that starts with what he or she believes to be good, right, and just. More specifically, it is:
. . . the worldview component of one’s human spirit, or personal essence. This system of beliefs defines who a person is, what the person stands for, serves as a guide for determining behavior—especially in ambiguous and chaotic situations—and also provides the courage and will to act in accordance with one’s beliefs and values.4

In the doctrines of the Army, this is known as the Soldier’s character, a leader attribute that is to be marked by integrity, consistently “doing what is right legally and morally.”5 At a time in the Army’s history when failures caused by lack of individual and institutional character abound—with sexual assault and sexual harassment at the top of the list—this issue could hardly be more important to our leaders.

Understood this way, we believe this issue now presents a direct challenge to the Stewards of our military professions: Can they adapt professional cultures to attract, motivate, and retain volunteers of moral character—including those religiously based—that are compatible with the professions’ ethics, thus enabling our armed forces to remain militarily effective and ethical, earning the trust of those serving as well as that of the American people?

Background and Context
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” —First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. —Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18, United Nations, 1948

The two epigraphs above provide context for this monograph. As they indicate, Americans are privileged, indeed. They enjoy human rights and history teaches us that, elsewhere in the world, others have only aspired to this level of privilege. Among those, as the First Amendment to our Constitution states, they are free to enjoy the priceless liberty of conscience, and with it, the choice of what belief system to follow, religious or nonreligious. Further, as the second epigraph notes, this is not just an American ideal; it is our aspiration in concert with like-minded nations for all of mankind.

Soldiers6 of the nation’s military professions have sacrificed much blood, indeed life, over the two-plus centuries of the Republic’s existence to safeguard its liberty, and with it, the exercise by its citizens of these individual liberties of conscience and belief, including those that are founded on religion. They have also sacrificed in the cause of extending these liberties to citizens of other nations, increasingly so in the last several decades.    Because of these sacrifices, military professionals have an abiding interest in the exercise of these liberties, both by themselves and those
they defend.

However, it is also true that soldiers in service to the Republic give up some of their rights as American citizens for the necessities of an effective and ethical military profession. The regulations of the Departments of Defense (DoD) and the Army state the applicable policies:

  • The U.S. Constitution proscribes Congress from enacting any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective religions. It is DoD policy that requests for accommodation of religious practices should be approved by commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, standards, or discipline. —Department of Defense Instruction Number 1300.17, February 10, 20097
  • The Army places a high value on the rights of its Soldiers to observe tenets of their respective religious faiths. The Army will approve requests for accommodation of religious practices unless accommodation will have an adverse impact on unit readiness, individual readiness, unit cohesion, morale, discipline, safety, and/or health. As used in this regulation, these factors will be referred to individually and collectively as ‘military necessity’ unless otherwise stated. Accommodation of a Soldier’s religious practices must be examined against military necessity and cannot be guaranteed at all times. —Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy, September 2012, para 5–6, Accommodating religious practices8

So the enduring challenge facing the leaders of the Army and the other Services is how to balance the restrictions placed on soldiers’ practice of their liberties—due to what the Army in its regulation calls “military necessity”—with their constitutional rights to hold religious beliefs as the basis of their personal morality and to exercise those beliefs as acts of conscience. How do the Stewards of the Professions establish that necessary balance within the professions’ cultures such that uniformed leaders actually lead with confidence and sensitivity on issues of religion and its expression within their units and commands? Serving under oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” it is logical that young professionals expect their leaders to achieve such balance within the culture of the military professions in which they have volunteered to serve.

Two additional points of perspective need to be included in this section. First, we note that there exists in military professions a mutual responsibility for the moral development—or character development, in doctrinal language—of individual professionals. On the one hand, it is the responsibility of individual leaders within the profession of arms to integrate their personal morality, faith-based or not, with the ethic of their vocation such that they can always execute their military duties “without reservation,” as their oath states. In our own case at least, this was not too difficult, including for each of us who participated in multiple combat tours as leaders in the infantry. But we served at a different time, one where there was less concern than there is today about a Soldier’s personal morality, and there was not the undercurrent of hostility to religious expression that we address in this monograph.

On the other hand, as we will more fully explain in subsequent sections, the profession shares responsibility for a leader’s character development, including his or her successful integration of personal morality with professional ethic. It does so by ensuring that the culture and practices of the institution are not hostile to, or intimidating of, the leaders’ correct expressions of his or her personal morality, whether faith based or not. This is the “. . . no soldier should fear repercussions because of their personal beliefs . . .” of the ACLU discussed earlier. We will discuss this shared responsibility further in Section II.

Second, we note that, while we will address this issue of cultural intimidation within the context of America’s military professions, their ethics, and their leaders, it is also of current interest to other disciplines whose inquiries are germane to our discussion. In particular, among political theorists, moral philosophers, and military ethicists, there has been a lengthy debate over the applicability of the doctrine of religious restraint to decision-making within liberal democracies.

Originally construed to address the proper public role of religion—and more particularly the role religion should play as citizens and elected political officials employ their modicum of political power within a pluralistic, liberal democracy—the doctrine held that religion should not play a decisive role in their choices as to which candidates or policies to support. In short, it is fair to say the doctrine advocates, in essence, that citizens and their elected politicians privatize their religious convictions in their roles as voters or public servants.9

Over the years, the doctrine of religious restraint has remained contentious because many Americans do not accept a distinction between what is morally correct and what is religiously correct; to them, the two are not separable within their world view. They dispute the claim of the doctrine toward privatization of their religious views on the grounds that, in fulfilling their public roles, they (citizens and politicians) should not be denied the grounds (religious) on which to decide the best (morally best) policies and positions to take.

More recently, this debate has been extended to the applicability of the doctrine to the role of military professionals, and particularly to uniformed leaders with command authority. Of interest to our discussion here, two members of the faculty at the U.S. Naval Academy have recently argued against extension of the doctrine of religious restraint to military decision-making. They argue that, just as a citizen ought to support those public policies that he or she believes to be morally correct, so a soldier has a role-specific moral obligation to make only those professional judgments that he or she sincerely believes to be morally correct. And if, for a particular leader of religious faith, the most morally correct discretionary judgment is one based on his or her personal, faith-based morality, then it should be made on that basis. They offer a new doctrine:

Call this understanding The Doctrine of Conscientious Action (DCA): where the relevant legal and statutory constraints leave room for a soldier’s discretionary judgment, then he should use his discretion in a morally responsible manner. He should try to use his discretion in such a way as to get right moral, legal, and operational results. Given the lack of a principled normative difference between the religious and the moral, it follows that he should use his discretion to get the right religious result as well. Given the demographics of the United States, a ‘moral’ military is at one and the same time a religious military.10

As we shall see, given the increases in ethnic diversity and religious pluralism amid a larger trend of secularization that is American society today, the challenge to maintain within our military professions a culture in which personal moralities can be motivational, including those which are religion based, is a challenge of increasing intensity and importance. Our intent in this monograph, then, is to articulate perspectives, analyses, and recommendations that will help civilian and military leaders within the Army and the other Services address this challenge.

We will proceed from here in five sections: First, we will highlight further the growing culture of hostility toward religious expression within the Services. Second, narrowing the focus of the monograph to the Service we know best, the U.S. Army, we will place this issue in the context of the profession’s meritocratic ethic and its use by leaders of all ranks to self-police the military’s culture and behavior. Third, we will offer our perspective of how leaders within the Army whose personal morality is based on religious faith see this growing issue. Fourth, we will present a brief analysis of options to address the issue; and then, fifth, we will offer brief recommendations from an Army perspective.

I. The Evolving Culture of Hostility toward Religious Presence and Expression
As discussed briefly in the introduction, we believe that over the past two decades, coincident with the growing secularization of American society, the culture of our Armed Services has become more hostile to many things religious, including religious expression by individuals in uniform and the application of any sort of religious basis for decision-making. This has created, in perception or reality, a culture hostile to, and perhaps even intimidating for, serving soldiers of religious faith.

We also note that this trend of increasing hostility to religious expression within our Armed Services is not an isolated trend and is not surprising since there are at least three well-recognized societal trends that are occurring along with it:11 First, the general secularization of American society and the cultural wars that this has created over the past several decades; second, the activism of several legal advocacy groups specifically hostile to religious expression within the military; and third, the advancement of America’s cultural wars into the military, particularly by political advocates/reformers focused on individual issues.

Turning now to examples of such hostility to religious expression, we offer the following instances:12

September 2011: Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz issued a Service-wide memo entitled, “Maintaining Government Neutrality Regarding Religion.”It states, “Leaders at all levels must balance constitutional protections for an individual’s free exercise of religion or other personal beliefs and its prohibition against governmental establishment of religion.” For example, they must avoid the “actual or apparent” use of their position to promote their personal religious beliefs to their subordinates. “Commanders . . . who engage in such behavior may cause members to doubt their impartiality and objectivity. The potential result is a degradation of the unit’s morale, good order and discipline.” General Schwartz also warned commanders against open support of chaplain-run events, stating that they “must refrain from appearing to officially endorse religion generally or any particular religion. Therefore, I expect chaplains, not commanders, to notify Airmen of Chaplain Corps programs.”13 Finally, Schwartz advised anyone who has concerns “involving the preservation of government neutrality regarding religious beliefs” to contact a military attorney.

From our perspective, the threatening tone of the final comment is obvious. So is the excessive concern over “apparent” use of commanders’ positions to promote their religious beliefs, and the concern that commanders who are known to be religious may, more than those with other world views, cause subordinates to doubt their impartiality and objectivity. Further, we believe that by precluding commanders from even speaking about the “Chaplain Corps programs” in their own units, such activities, as well as the silenced commanders, are marginalized in the eyes of the very Airmen they have sworn to lead and develop. Ironically, commanders may advertise, and indeed encourage attendance at any  number of voluntary functions but not those of a religious nature, even in cases where they personally believe the function would be desired by, and could be of significant developmental benefit to, many of their Airmen. Such “over the top” reactions by senior military leaders to the cultural intimidation they are facing serve, sadly, as the basis for construal by junior professionals that if they “lead-up” in such situations, they will be seen as insubordinate. Intimidation begets intimidation, eviscerating professional culture.

September 2011: Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, the leading medical institution for the U.S. Armed Forces, issued an official patient and visitor policy banning Bibles (to our understanding the ban was imposed only on Bibles, rather than such authoritative writings of all major faith groups). It stated, “No religious items (i.e., Bibles, reading material, and/or artifacts) are allowed to be given away or used during a visit.” The policy was revoked after a political firestorm erupted in the House of Representatives,14 but its intent cannot be missed. Neither can the fact that such intent runs utterly contrary to decades of understanding within the military professions of the positive role that religion and its various expressions play in the fitness of soldiers for mortal combat and subsequent recovery from combat-related sacrifices.15

May 2013: The DoD issued the following statement: The U.S. Department of Defense has never and will never single out a particular religious group for persecution or prosecution. . . . Service members can share their faith (evangelize), but must not force unwanted, intrusive attempts to convert others of any faith or no faith to one’s beliefs (proselytization).16

If religious expression within military cultures was not at issue, then why was such a directive needed?

June 2013: The House Armed Services Committee adopted an amendment by Representative John Fleming (R-LA) to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Fleming Amendment seeks to ensure protection of the rights of Armed Services members to hold, act upon, and practice freely their religious beliefs as long as they do not interfere with any constitutional liberties of others. As Representative Fleming notes in his press release:
. . .troubling reports indicate that the military may be focused only on protecting beliefs of service members and not the exercise or expression of those beliefs. My amendment is necessary to ensure that men and women of faith will not be discriminated against in the Armed Forces, and will be free to exercise their religious beliefs.17

June 2013: President Barack Obama objected to the Fleming amendment. On June 11, after the House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the NDAA (H.R. 1960) with Representative Fleming’s language, a White House Statement of Administration Policy was issued, indicating that the President’s senior advisers would recommend a veto because they strongly objected to section 530, which would require the Armed Forces to accommodate, except in cases of military necessity, ‘actions and speech’ reflecting the ‘conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of the member.’ By limiting the discretion of commanders to address potentially problematic speech and actions within their units, this provision would have significant adverse effect on good order, discipline, morale, and mission accomplishment.18

But, why would the President’s advisors recommend he veto legislation based exactly on the “military necessity” language in the DoD and Service policies; unless, that is, they did not want accommodation of such actions and speech?

We conclude from these examples that the institutional behavior of our military professions within the DoD manifests cultures that can fairly be described as increasingly hostile to personal moralities and their rightful expression, especially when based on religion. While this is deleterious today to ethical military professions, we must also be mindful of the second order effects occurring in the current development of junior professionals. Simply stated, they take their cues from those above them, making their decisions based on their construal of senior leaders’ priorities, values, guidance, etc. They correctly see the need for everybody in the organization to get on board with current policy. But our concern is that they may then equate dissent or difference in belief with insubordination. If junior leaders make that type of construal regarding their obligations to senior officers and lack the experiences to see the value to the profession of a rich array of personal beliefs (even those that may lead to conflict between soldiers), then they will be more likely to establish in the future their own command climates wherein religion and its influences on character development are not encouraged and perhaps not even welcomed.

While much of the hostility has been directed at the Chaplains’ Corps of our Armed Services, we have excluded all such examples (which are, in fact, far more numerous than those offered here) since the Chaplains’ Corps are not the focus of this monograph. We focus instead on the challenge this cultural hostility presents to the Stewards of our military professions as well as to both uniformed and civilian leaders of all ranks within them whose personal morality is based on one of the world’s major religious faiths.

II. The Army’s Professional Military Ethic
While we have addressed the culture of hostility toward religious expression as it exists throughout the DoD, our focus now shifts downward in hierarchy to the Department of the Army. Here our analysis will focus on the Army as a military profession that, like all professions, uses its ethic as the primary means of social control over institutional policies as well as over its personnel and their professional work.

Fortunately for this discussion, the Army has very recently (June 2013) officially articulated for the first time its understanding of itself as a military profession: Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 1, (ADRP1), The Army Profession.19 Included in the new doctrine is a significant discussion on the leader’s role in building and maintaining trust—the central organizing principle of the profession—by adherence to the Army’s Ethic. That discussion includes a framework for integrating and understanding the many different components of the Army’s Ethic.20 (See Figure 1.)


The Army as Profession (Laws/values/norms for performance of collective institution)

Legal-Institutional: The U.S. Constitution; Titles 3,10,32, U.S. Code; Treaties of which the U.S. is party; Status-of-Forces Agreements; Law of Armed Conflict

Moral-Institutional: The U.S. Declaration of Independence; Just War Tradition; Trust Relationships of the Profession


The Individual as Professional (Laws/values/norms for performance of individual professionals)

Legal-Individual: Oath of Enlistment, Commission, Office; U.S. Code—Standards of Exemplary Conduct; UCMJ; Rules of Engagement; Soldier’s Rules

Moral-Individual: Universal Norms—Basic Rights, Golden Rule; Values, Creeds and Mottos—”Duty, Honor, Country,” NCO Creed, Civilian Creed, 7 Army Values, Soldier’s Creed, Warrior Ethos

NCO   – noncommissioned officer     U.S.     – United States     UCMJ – Uniform Code of Military Justice


Figure 1. The Framework of the Army Ethic.

While it is beyond the scope of this monograph to present the Army Ethic completely, four aspects of it are of interest to the issue we are addressing:

1. The Ethic has two foundations—legal and moral. Since the inception of the Army in 1775, its ethic has had both legal (codified) and moral foundations. War, the practice of the Army Profession by its brutal nature, has long been viewed as a vexing moral challenge. Over the centuries, nations have sought to legitimize some acts of war under certain conditions and to delegitimize others, to constrain the horrors of war as well as the peacetime behavior of martial institutions, by legal code. As the framework shows, these constraints apply today to the Army as an institution, as well as to individual Soldiers, in peace and in war. But there are also the moral foundations of our ethic, which apply in similar manner to both the institution and individual professionals. Of importance to this monograph is the recognition that Soldiers are to be aware that their personal morality, their views on the “Universal Norms”—what they personally believe to be good, right, and just—are to be considered and integrated with other legal and moral norms of interpersonal behavior as they live their lives and fulfill their professional responsibilities. Army professionals are to live and act each day based on both the legal and moral foundations of the profession’s ethic, and a part of those moral norms is their personal morality. No Army professional is ever asked to give up his or her personal morality to become a Soldier; rather their task is integration with the profession’s ethic in order to serve and lead with personal integrity (see further discussion on Aspect 4 later in the monograph).

2. The Motivations of the Army Ethic. As the new doctrine explicates, each of these sets of ethical foundations, legal and moral, tend to produce different forms of motivation in Army professionals. The legal norms produce the motivation of obligation (I have taken an oath and I must do my duty, or I am in violation of my oath and will be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for dereliction of those duties). In contrast, the motivation produced under the moral norms is that of aspiration (I want to do what is right, both legally and morally, because that is what I believe in; it is who I am now and who I am becoming in the future; it authentically reflects my personal character and values and reflects why I am an Army professional).21 While both forms of motivation have their uses, it is common sense, as well as Army doctrine, to prefer transformational leadership that draws on the moral foundations and inspires Army professionals to honorable service over motivation that is based punitively on law and regulations.22

3. The Meritocratic Essence of the Army Ethic based on Certifications by the “three C’s” of Competence, Character, and Commitment. All professions seek to create and maintain a culture, with their ethic at its core, that places extremely high value on the institution’s behavior as a meritocracy. For the Army, this means advancement based on individual merit alone, with no partiality shown to any individual or group. Professions thus ensure that only practitioners fully qualified in competence, character, and commitment are advanced to positions of higher responsibility and service to their client. This is how professions remain effective in their expert work, which in turn maintains the trust of their client—which is the lifeblood of the profession’s existence. Maintaining this essence of their cultural and ethical foundation explains why all professions, including the Army, place such importance on repetitive certification of their individual professionals. Preferential treatment in certifications, or any other benefit of being a member of the profession, is taboo; all must be earned strictly on the basis of individually demonstrated merit.

4. Integration of personal morality with the ethic of the profession is required for Army leaders to be self-aware and integral, and thus authentic leaders “of character.” Army doctrine on leadership is informative here: “Leadership is affected by a person’s character and identity. Integrity is a key mark of a leader’s character. It means doing what is right, legally and morally. . . . Leaders of integrity adhere to the values that are a part of their personal identity and set a standard for their followers to emulate. Identity is one’s self-concept, how one defines himself or herself. . . .” 23

This understanding of authentic leadership—leading by accurately reflecting in words and actions who you are holistically as a person—places the responsibility on the individual professional to integrate his or her personal morality with the other components of the Army’s Ethic, legal and moral, and then to lead consistently from that identity. Army leaders may not identify themselves as one person on duty and another off duty; their character, if authentically displayed, will vary little from situation to situation. Living and leading from an identity that is not integrated, meaning one that places one’s personal morality outside the scope of professional ethics, drawing then on each one on a situational basis, does not comport with Army leadership doctrines and will quickly be recognized by followers as inauthentic. In stark contrast, recent research from Iraq again establishes that in combat, authentic military leaders have high impacts on their followers.24

We conclude this section by noting again that new Army doctrine reaffirms a mutual responsibility, shared between individual professionals and the Army Profession for the development of professionals and their adaptation and implementation of the ethic as a means of social control.25 Put simply, to be an authentic person of character, the individual Soldier and leader must live, on and off duty, consistently with his or her understanding of right and wrong—the individual integration of personal morality and the professional ethic. If it becomes impossible for a Soldier to do so because of hostility to liberty of conscience and legitimate religious expression, then he or she must make a choice (which we will discuss in Section IV).

Before that occurs, however, to fulfill its part of the mutual responsibility, the institution—the Stewards of the Army  Profession—must make every effort consistent with mission effectiveness to avoid such individual-institutional ethical conflicts. Thus, to reiterate the challenge we are discussing in this monograph: The enduring challenge facing the leaders of the Army and the other Services is how to balance the restrictions placed on soldiers’ practice of their liberties—due to what the Army in its regulation calls “military necessity”—with their constitutional rights to hold religious beliefs as the basis of their personal morality and to exercise those beliefs as acts of conscience.

III. The Challenge and Opportunities to the Leader of Religious Faith
As discussed briefly in the introduction and in the previous paragraph, the challenge to the leader of religious faith, regardless of rank, is that of integrating one’s personal morality with the profession’s ethic in order to be a leader of authenticity, not compartmenting a life of faith from a life of service to the Republic.26 Challenges arise because personal moralities based on a religious faith are considered by most adherents to be the higher calling, and thus to take precedence on occasion over a vocational or professional ethic or directive, whether actual or perceived. They can also arise because such moralities generally prohibit compartmentalization of one’s life into personal and vocational spheres, just as Army leadership doctrine requires authenticity and wholeness of one’s character (as discussed in Section II). Instead, integrity and authenticity as a person of faith is required in all roles in life, often requiring a religious presence and expression. Thus, in the event of a clash between a Soldier’s personal morality and his or her understanding of responsibility under the Army’s Ethic or directives, he or she cannot in good conscience simply jettison the personal ethic to support that of the Army.

Even with these two conditions, however, actual clashes have until recently been rare. But the growing hostility towards religious expression or religious-based ethical decisions has, unfortunately and largely unnecessarily, brought such clashes to the fore. In this section, we present a few specific, recent examples of real or potential clashes emanating from the culture of hostility to religious expression.

  • January 24, 2013, Army Removes Cross and Steeple from Chapel. The U.S. military ordered Soldiers to take down a steeple and board up the cross-shaped windows of a chapel at remote Forward Operating Base Orgun-E in Afghanistan. The Soldiers were told the chapel must remain religiously neutral. In 2011, a similar situation occurred where Soldiers were forced to remove a cross at a chapel at Camp Marmal, Afghanistan.27

While there may have been legitimate concerns that Christian symbols visible to the outside could be unnecessarily inflammatory in the context of the particular conflict in Afghanistan, what is particularly disturbing in this instance is the rationale given for the decision; this example highlights how far a policy of “neutrality” toward religion can overstep into traditional and legitimate expression of a particular religious faith group. Historically, houses of worship built with appropriated dollars within the military services have accommodated the need of the Judeo-Christian faith groups, and they are now expanding to accommodate the religious expression of other faith groups, e.g., Muslim. At the time of a religious service of a particular faith group, should not the house of worship reflect the essential icons and artifacts of that particular group?

  • Conflict between the Leader of Faith’s Commitment to Objective Truth and Truth-Telling and the Institution’s Tendency to Sacrifice such Truth and Truth-Telling for Perceived Positive Outcomes for the Army.

There has always been pressure within the military as well as other large institutions to sacrifice objective truth for expediency, a storyline more palatable but less than the full truth.28 Clearly, the culture extent in the Army today that requires extensive use of the Article 15-6, UCMJ, formal investigations, feeds this pressure.29

  • In a recent example reported by an officer in Afghanistan, two Army majors were found, via Article 15-6 investigations, to be responsible for the deaths of Soldiers in their units even though the investigator of the incident had not even queried the majors before passing his conclusions up the chain of command.30 To believe in objective truth suggests that the report should have stated that, though mistakes had been made, they were honest mistakes in a complex and chaotic situation and most likely were made by one of the dead Soldiers, and the actions (or inactions) of the majors were, at worst, a minor contributing factor. However, the culture of the command led the investigating officer to conclude that such a finding would be insensitive to the surviving family members of the dead NCO, and therefore the command sought to find someone else accountable amid the complexities of the situation. Finding someone responsible (other than one of the dead Soldiers) got the command off the hook and presumably kept the issue from blowing up into something bigger, which could have been damaging to the Army and distracting to the larger mission. Such situations are not uncommon, and there are sometimes apparently good reasons for sacrificing objective truth for a “spin” that seems to serve broader strategic or institutional purposes in the short term.

However, as the incident of Army Specialist Patrick Tillman and so many others have shown over the past decade of war, the short-term gain from sacrificing objective truth for some perceived higher good is inconsistent with the Army’s Ethic and most often causes much bigger problems later.31 Because of the strong admonitions against dishonesty in religious teachings, Soldiers of religious faith will find it particularly difficult to sacrifice objective truth even for short-term expediency, unit morale, or perceived institutional gains.32 As such, their approach of “wait a minute, never be content with a half-truth when the whole can be won,” may be just what is needed to check the institutional temptation to sacrifice truth for a more palatable institutional spin.


  • Supporting an Annual DoD-Sponsored Gay Pride Month.

In simple terms, the DoD report for implementation of the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy recommended that soldiers be treated as soldiers, with dignity and respect based on performance without regard to their sexual orientation.33 But, in making their recommendations, the report authors (Honorable Jeh Charles Johnson and Army General F. Carter Ham) were also careful to note the sincerely held “moral and religious objections to homosexuality” of a significant number of service members.34 Regarding these beliefs, they stated:

In the course of our review, we heard a large number of Service members raise religious and moral objections to homosexuality and to serving with someone who is gay. Some feared repeal of [DADT] might limit their individual freedom of expression and free exercise of religion, or require them to change their personal beliefs about the morality of homosexuality. The views expressed to us in these terms cannot be downplayed or dismissed.35

In a later part of the report, the authors further made it clear that “We do not [emphasis in original] recommend that sexual orientation be placed alongside race, color, religion, sex, and national origin as a class eligible for various diversity programs. . . .”36

In their recommendations, the authors were recognizing something that we believe is now being ignored in the follow-on designation by the DoD in June of each year as “Gay Pride Month.” Not all religious Americans consider homosexual behavior to be in violation of their own moral understandings, but many, including within the military, do so for reasons arguably consistent with the theology of their religion. In finally allowing gay soldiers to serve openly without prejudice, the DoD is rightly saying to all soldiers and their leaders that they must accommodate gay soldiers without prejudice regarding their nonduty-related behavior. But in establishing an officially sponsored “Gay Pride” month with related publicity and public functions, the DoD is requiring (or at least strongly encouraging) those soldiers who object on moral grounds to homosexual practices to not just accommodate gay soldiers, but to join in the institutional endorsement and celebration of homosexual behavior. That, many soldiers of religious faith cannot in good conscience do, and we argue they should not be asked to do so.

As can be seen from these examples, for many individuals, their reaction to an increasing number of situations may be particularly intense because of the strength of their personal faith-based beliefs. This can be expected to create critical moral dilemmas for these Soldiers, especially those responsible for leading and developing others, when conflicts arise between their personal conscience and the orders or ethical demands of their work. However, experience has taught us that, for every challenge, there is also an opportunity. In this case, it is the opportunity that is available to all leaders, regardless of personal morality, to leverage Soldiers’ personal beliefs and practices in their professional development and in the development of the climate and culture of the entire organization. We address how the leaders of the Army Profession can address these opportunities in Section IV.

IV. Opportunities for Leaders of Religious Faith
Some have responded that there should be no moral dilemma for Soldiers in such circumstances. Simply stated, in their view, the law rules—volunteers, religious or not, should park their personal morality at the door when they take their oath. We designate this as the legalist view, one which holds that all Soldiers, regardless of personal morality, should simply reconsider their legal obligations as laid out in the Constitution, Federal statutes such as Title 10, their Oath of Service and their Service’s regulations, and do what the law requires. In this view, the Army has no responsibility to preclude or attempt to resolve moral dilemmas other than to keep the legal foundations of its ethic current to the official mandates of the public it serves.37

Perhaps too narrowly characterized, there are nonetheless two obvious difficulties with this view. First, it does not address the dilemma created by recent policies and orders that the leader of religious faith believes to be immoral; in other words, it fails to understand, as discussed in Section II, that the profession’s ethic has moral as well as legal foundations, and that the moral foundation is an essential element of the character of every Soldier and leader of Soldiers. Second, it fails to recognize, also discussed earlier, that the institution does have developmental responsibilities, shared with the individual professional, for preclusion of such moral dilemmas to the extent possible and for their prompt resolution, should they occur.

Contrary to the legalist view, as we see it, there are three opportunities for Soldiers of religious faith when facing what they perceive to be a conflict between their religion-based personal morality and what the institution is expecting of them:

  1. They may choose to compromise their religion-based convictions so as to go along with the prevailing institutional/cultural view. In doing so, however, they will be inauthentic to their core values and thus dishonest; they will be leaders without integrity. They become compartmented leaders and, by their actions, also encourage others to do the same. Lack of integrity in dealing with a known ethical dilemma, particularly by an Army leader, whose every decision and action is carefully watched by his or her followers, will lead to lack of integrity and/or trust by the followers.
  2. They may continue to serve honorably within the Army Profession, but in order to maintain their integrity they will work within the institution to preclude and resolve such moral dilemmas. In other words, they are to get off of the sidelines and “lead-up,” actively engaging and assisting the Stewards of the Profession in their vital role of maintaining, over time, both the effectiveness and the ethical standing of the Army Profession.38 We will return to this theme in our recommendations section.
  3. The Soldier of religious faith could leave the military profession, having decided, presumably, that the cost of compromising one’s personal integrity is too high a price to pay to continue in sacrificial service to the Republic. The tragic loss to the Army and to the Republic of such integrated men and women of character, many with well over a decade of distinguished service in combat, leads logically to a discussion of why this opportunity is to be earnestly avoided by both the individuals and by the Army.

Why Not Just Let Soldiers of Religious Faith Leave the Army?

Our first response to this question is because it is right that the U.S. Army be an institution that as closely as possible reflects the values of the nation it serves. Stated differently, this is the issue of political legitimacy of the institution—Does the Army accurately reflect within its ranks the society that trusts it for security?39 One of the most fundamental of those values is our freedom of belief and conscience and the exercise of conscience which often springs from, and is informed by, a religious faith. American citizens should be free, and feel free, to join the Army, expecting rightly that if their personal morality is faith-based, that fact is not in any way a hindrance to service. When such freedoms are to be restricted by the Army for “military necessity” (see the discussion in the Background section), there should be strong, compelling reasons for doing so, reasons that go beyond current social and cultural trends or the fear that one Soldier’s beliefs may be in conflict with the beliefs or practices of another Soldier.40

Our second response is that the Army has now, once again, the opportunity to lead our nation. In the midst of the stifling cultural wars within American society, wars of mutual disrespect toward citizens who have strong differences on issues that matter to them, the Army can set an example as it has consistently—if imperfectly—done on other issues. The example should be that, for purposes of military effectiveness, the Army is and will continue to be a professional meritocracy. In such a noble institution, Soldiers work together, treat each other with dignity and respect, openly express their deeply held views, and, regardless of differences, evaluate each others’ performances based on the certifications and other standards of the profession, not on their views about ideas and practices not directly related to those duties. This is pluralism, multiculturalism, and diversity rightly leveraged for military effectiveness!

Further, we believe that a culture increasingly hostile toward religious expression will eventually cause some number of good Soldiers of all ranks to leave the Army. A Soldier seriously committed to his or her personal morality, whether grounded in a religious faith or not, is prone more than he or she would otherwise be to live up to the high ethical ideals of the Army Profession not in spite of, but because of his or her personal convictions. For those who ground their convictions in the tenets of the major religions, virtually all emphasize the values of altruism (selfless service); truth-telling; integrity; respect for others; personal humility; moral and physical courage; to mention only some of the personal virtues valuable, indeed necessary, in military professions.

As most all behaviorists agree (if they agree on anything), while it is sometimes difficult to know what is right, it is always far more difficult to do what is right. It is certainly true that the strength of character of an Army professional is always on display in the crucible of making decisions and taking actions to implement those decisions. In such situations, Soldiers of religious faith are motivated more by aspiration than by obligation; they have a strong intrinsic motivation, which reinforces that of the military, to be the leader the Services need them to be and whose actions manifest their personal character with integrity. Religious ethics, then, are a strong reinforcer of military ethics. In our view, it will be self-defeating for the Army to cause men and women imbued with this reinforcing ethical framework to leave the Army because it allowed a culture hostile or intimidating to their beliefs, conscience, and expression of those beliefs.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is simply indisputable that religion is often a key element in the emotional and psychological health of individual Soldiers. While the Army and the other Services have recently struggled with just how to understand and present this spiritual domain of the human, moral essence in all Soldiers, its force in the strength of their personal character and resilience, both on the battlefield and thereafter, is not questioned.41 As one noted researcher in this field recently concluded, “Religion is a tremendous source of strength, inspiration, wisdom, peace, and purpose for many people and religious speech is a vital component of the practice
of religion.”42

V. Recommendations
Our recommendations are stated here in terse form, as we believe they follow logically from the foregoing discussions. They are designed to reinforce the principles in the Army Ethic as discussed in Section II, in particular the understanding that moral leadership is best applied under mission command when the profession’s culture is meritocratic and self-policing at each level rather than imposed from above, and when a broad diversity of personal moralities is leveraged to the effectiveness of the profession.

For senior leaders, the Stewards of the Army Profession:

  • By policy and personal leadership, maintain the essential meritocratic nature of the Army’s Ethic and culture, while celebrating and leveraging the diversity of religious (as well as nonreligious) presence within the profession.
  • By policy and personal leadership, rid the profession’s culture of any real or perceived hostility or intimidation towards religion and its correct expression. Maintain a culture in which Soldiers and their leaders can live and serve with individual authenticity consistent with “military necessity” as expressed in Army regulations. In most all cases, they should be free to express and apply their religious faith and the moral convictions that spring from that faith.

For Soldiers of religious faith, all ranks, uniformed and civilian:

  • Be knowledgeable of, and scrupulously follow, your rights to religious expression as well as the limitations to those rights. We recommend a remarkably helpful article by retired Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer and current faculty member at the Air Force Academy David Fitzkee, “Religious Speech in the Military: Freedoms and Limitations.”43
  • At the same time, do not overstep your bounds. While serving as integrated leaders of character, and including your moral understanding in all discretionary decision-making, remember that you are not called by the Republic in your role as military leader either to be an evangelist for your faith, or to insert your religiously based morality into situations where doing so is improper. So, effectively integrate your personal morality of faith with the profession’s ethic: be an integral, authentic leader of character; model the same and develop the same in your subordinates. You have no call to hide your faith or to ignore it in decision-making; but your professional call is to integrate your faith-based worldview and morality with the Army’s Ethic, not to redefine the latter.
  • Do not be intimidated in the current culture; do not allow the Army’s Ethic and culture to be eroded. Get off the sidelines and get engaged. Challenge through official channels all policies/attempts that are hostile to the freedoms of thought, belief, conscience, and correct expression of those convictions, whether based on religion or not.
  • Lead up: Expect, remind, and assist the Stewards of the Profession to be the Guardians of the Ethic and the profession’s military effectiveness.

About the Authors: Don M. Snider is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at West Point, NY, from which he retired in 2008. He is now a Senior Fellow in the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) at West Point and an Adjunct Research Professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. In a previous military career, Dr. Snider served three combat tours in Vietnam as an infantryman; after battalion command, he served as Chief of Plans for Theater Army in Europe, as Joint Planner for the Army Chief of Staff, as Executive Assistant in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on the staff of the National Security Council in the White House. He retired from the Army in 1990. Dr. Snider’s research examines American civil-military relations, the identities and development of the American Army officer, military professions, and professional military ethics. He was research director and co-editor of The Future of the Army Profession, (2d Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), and Forging the Warrior’s Character (2d Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008). More recent publications include, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of Military Professions” (Orbis, 2008), The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict (co-author, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008) and, co-editor with Suzanne Nielsen, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in the New Era, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). His opinion editorials appear on the website of the Strategic Studies Institute; his most recent contribution was, “What Our Civilian Leaders Do Not Understand about the Ethic of Military Professions: A Striking Example of the Current Gap in Civil-Military Relations.” Dr. Snider holds M.A. degrees in economics and public policy from the University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Maryland.

Alexander P. Shine is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and educator. His military service included tours of duty in Korea and Vietnam, infantry command at the company and battalion level, and teaching assignments at the U.S. Military Academy, New York (U.S. History); Wheaton College, IL (Military Science); and the U.S. Army War College (National Security Strategy). Following retirement from the Army, he served a decade as Commandant of Cadets and Professor of History at Culver Military Academy in Culver, IN. Colonel Shine currently does contract editing for the Strategic Studies Institute and teaches about World War II and the Civil War for a travel agency. His articles have appeared in Command, Infantry, Air Power Journal, Parameters, and Armed Forces Journal. Colonel Shine holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. in history from Harvard University.

Note: The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ENDNOTES
1. Todd Starnes, “Exclusive: Army halts training program that labeled Christians as extremists,” Fox News, October 24, 2013, available from www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/10/24/exclusive-army-halts-training-program-that-labeled-christians-as-extremists/.
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Dena Sher and Gabriel Rottman, “Army Right to Halt ‘Extremist’ Training,” Defense One, available from www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/11/army-right-halt-extremism-training-protect-first-amendment-rights/74102/#.Uouj2OK52HY.twitter?oref=d-interstitial-continue?oref=d-interstitial-continue.
4. Patrick J. Sweeney, Sean T. Hannah, and Don M. Snider, “The Domain of the Human Spirit,” Chap. 2, Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Mathews, eds., Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer, New York: McGraw Hill, 2008,
pp. 28-29.
5. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership, Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army, p. 6,
paras. 5 and 6.
6. The term “soldiers” will be used to refer to all members of America’s military professions, regardless of Service or rank, uniformed or civilian. Later in the monogaph, a capitalized “Soldiers” will be used to refer to all members of the Army, uniformed or civilian.
7. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1300.17, Washington, DC: DoD, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130017p.pdf.
8. Army Regulation (AR) 600-20, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, available from www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_20.pdf.
9. See, Robert Audi, “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics,” Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Religion in the Public Square, Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1997; as well as his more recent book, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
10. Christopher J. Eberle and Rick Rubel, “Religious Conviction in the Profession of Arms,” Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 171-180, quotation from p. 179.
11. See Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 9, 2012, available from
www.pewforum.org; and Charles Murray, Coming Apart: the State of White America 1960-2000, New York: Crown Publishing, 2012, particularly Chap. 11.
12. See Family Research Council, “A Clear and Present Danger: The Threat to Religious Liberty in the Military,” Washington, DC (undated report), available from www.frc.org.
13. Norton A. Schwartz, “Maintaining Government Neutrality Regarding Religion,” memo published on September 1, 2011, available from msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/z_Personal/Huus/gen_schwartz_letter_religion_neutralilty%5B1%5D.pdf; and Markeshia Ricks, “Schwartz: Don’t Endorse Religious Programs,” Air Force Times, September 16, 2011, available from www.airforcetimes.com/article/20110916/NEWS/109160334/Schwartz-Don-t-endorse-religious-programs.
14. Chief of Staff C. W. Callahan, Commander, Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, “Subject: Wounded, Ill, and Injured Partners in Care Guidelines,” Policy Memo 10-015, September 14, 2011, p. 4; “Whoops! Walter Reed Temporarily Bans Bibles,” NBC Washington News, December 19, 2010, available from www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Whoops-Walter-Reed-Temporarily-
Bans-Bibles-135853463.html; and Liz Farmer, “Walter Reed Accidentally Bans Bibles,” Washington Examiner, December 18, 2011, available from washingtonexaminer.com/article/151247.
15. See John Brinsfield and Peter A. Batkis, “The Human, Spiritual, and Ethical Dimensions of Leadership in Preparation for Combat,” Chap. 21, Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Ed., New York: McGraw Hill, 2005, pp. 463-490.
16. Todd Starnes, “Pentagon: Religious Proselytizing is Not Permitted,” Fox News Radio, April 30, 2013, available from radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/pentagon-religious-proselytizing-is-not-permitted.html.
17. Ken Klukowski, “Amendments Protecting Soldiers’ Religious Rights Approved by Committee,” Breitbart, June 7, 2013, available from www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/06/07/Congressional-Committee-Protects-Religious-Rights-of-Military-Members; and, Rep. John Fleming and Senator Mike Lee Press Release, “Fleming Applauds Passage of Religious Liberty Amendment in Senate Committee,” June 17, 2013, available from fleming.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=339355.
18. Ken Klukowski, “Breaking: Obama Threatens Veto of Religious Protection for Military,” Breitbart, June 12, 2013,
available from www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/06/12/Breaking-Obama-Threatens-Veto-of-Religious-Protection-for-Military; and, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, “Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1960—National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014,” Washington, DC: The White House, June 11, 2013, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr1960r
_20130611.pdf.
19. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) No. 1, “The Army Profession,” Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
20. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
21. Peter L. Jennings and Sean T. Hannah, “The Moralities of Obligation and Aspiration: Towards a Concept of Exemplary Military Ethics and Leadership,” Military Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2011.
22. See ADP 6-22.
23.  Ibid., p. 6, paras. 26 and 27.
24. See Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, “High-Impact Military Leadership: The Positive Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers,” Chap. 5 in Snider and Mathews, Forging the Warrior’s Character, pp. 91-116.
25. ADRP1, p. 6-2, para. 6-8.
26. See Paul T. Berghaus, and Nathan L. Cartegena, “Developing Good Soldiers: The Problem of Fragmentation in the Army,” Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (forthcoming); and, Paul T. Berghaus, “Developing Virtuous Soldiers: Mitigating the Problem of Fragmentation in the Army,” M.A. thesis submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University, August 2013.
27. Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 3, 2009, available from www.chapnet.army.mil/pdf/165-1.pdf; and Todd Starnes, “Army Removes Crosses, Steeple from Chapel,” Fox News Radio, January 24, 2013, available from radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/army-removes-crosses-steeple-from-chapel.html.
28. Lieutenant Colonels Peter Fromm, Douglas Pryor, and Kevin Cutright, “The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves,” Military Review, September-October 2013, pp. 57-68.
29. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 procedures generally govern investigations requiring detailed fact gathering and analysis and recommendations based on those facts. An “investigation” is simply the process of collecting information for the command, so that the command can make an informed decision. AR 15-6 sets forth procedures for both informal and formal investigations. Informal investigations usually have a single investigating officer who conducts interviews and collects evidence. In contrast, formal investigations normally involve due process hearings for a designated respondent before a board of several officers.
Definition available from www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/SJA/Documents/
15-6_IO_%20Guide.pdf.
30. Authors’ discussion with an anonymous Army Officer, September 2013.
31. See Mary Tillman and Narda Zacchino, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: My Tribute to Pat Tillman, New York: Rodale Books, 2008.
32. From the Judeo-Christian tradition, consider the 9th Commandment, and the Levitical basis of the West Point Honor Code [Lev. 19:11].
33. The Honorable Charles Johnson and General Carter F. Ham, “Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with the Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’,” Executive Summary, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 30, 2010, p. 2, available from www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130(secure-hires).pdf.
34. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p 13.
37. We say “official,” meaning those policies of an ethical nature adopted by the Congress and the Executive under constitutional based processes, such as the repeal of DADT.
38.  ADRP1, p. 2-2, para 2-8; and p. 6-2, paras. 6-5 to 6-8.
39. Ibid., Chap. 2, “Trust—The Bedrock of our Profession”; and James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” Chap. 2 in Snider and Mathews, The Future of the Army Profession, pp. 39-60.
40. Jay Allen Sekulow and Robert W. Ash, “Religious Rights and Military Service,” Chap. 6, James E. Parco and David A. Levy, eds., Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply About Diversity in the US Armed Forces, Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, pp. 99-138.
41. For one such effort, see Patrick J. Sweeney, Jeffrey E. Rhodes, and Bruce Boling, “Spiritual Fitness: A Key Component of Total Force Fitness,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 66, 3rd Quarter, 2012, pp. 35-41.
42. David E. Fitzkee, “Religious Speech in the Military: Freedoms and Limitations,” Parameters, August 2011, p. 66.
43. Ibid.

RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE IN AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

by R.R. Reno, Ph.D., Editor, First Things: America’s Most Influential Journal of Religion and Public Life (www.firstthings.com) This essay is adapted from a speech delivered on February 20, 2013, at a Hillsdale College National Leadership Seminar in Bonita Springs, Florida.

What we’re seeing today is a secular liberalism that wants … to silence articulate religious voices and disenfranchise religiously motivated voters, and at the same time to narrow the scope of free exercise so that the new secular morality can reign over American society unimpeded. —an excerpt from this speech RELIGIOUS LIBERTY is being redefined in America, or at least many would like it to be. Our secular establishment wants to reduce the autonomy of religious institutions and limit the influence of faith in the public square. The reason is not hard to grasp. In America, “religion” largely means Christianity, and today our secular culture views orthodox Christian churches as troublesome, retrograde, and reactionary forces. They’re seen as anti-science, anti-gay, and anti-women—which is to say anti-progress as the Left defines progress. Not surprisingly, then, the Left believes society will be best served if Christians are limited in their influence on public life. And in the short run this view is likely to succeed. There will be many arguments urging Christians to keep their religion strictly religious rather than “political.” And there won’t just be arguments; there will be laws as well. We’re in the midst of climate change—one that’s getting colder and colder toward religion.

Recent court cases and controversies suggest trends unfriendly to religion in public life. In 2005, a former teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Michigan, filed an employment lawsuit claiming discrimination based on disability. The school fired her for violating St. Paul’s teaching that Christians should not bring their disputes before secular judges. The subsequent lawsuit revolved around the question of whether a religious school could invoke a religious principle to justify firing an employee. The school said it could, drawing on a legal doctrine known as the ministerial exception, which allows religious institutions wide latitude in hiring and firing their religious leaders. It’s in the nature of legal arguments to be complex and multi-layered, but in this case the Obama administration’s lawyers made a shockingly blunt argument: Their brief claimed that there should be no ministerial exception.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument in a unanimous 9-0 vote. But it’s telling nonetheless that lawyers in the Justice Department wanted to eliminate this exception. Their argument was straightforward: Government needs to have broad powers to address the problem of discrimination—in this case disability—as well as other injustices. Conceding too much to religious institutions limits those powers. Why should the theological doctrines of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, or of any other church, trump the legal doctrines of the United States when the important principle of non-discrimination is at stake? It is an arresting question, to say the least—especially when we remember that the Left is currently pushing to add gay marriage to the list of civil rights.

Concerns about the autonomy of religious institutions are also at work in the Obama administration’s tussle with the Catholic Church and her religious allies over the mandate to provide free contraceptives, sterilization, and abortion-inducing drugs. After the initial public outcry, the administration announced a supposed compromise, which has been recently revised and re-proposed. The Obama administration allows that churches and organizations directly under the control of those churches are religious employers and can opt out of the morally controversial coverage. But religious colleges and charities are not and cannot. To them, the administration offers a so-called “accommodation.

“The details are complex, but a recent statement issued by Cardinal Dolan of New York identifies the key issue: Who counts as a religious employer? It’s a question closely related to the issue in the Hosanna-Tabor case, which asks who counts as a religious employee. Once again the Obama administration seeks a narrow definition, “accommodating” others in an act of lèse majesté, as it were. The Catholic Church and her allies want a broad definition that includes Catholic health care, Catholic universities, and Catholic charities. The Church knows that it cannot count on accommodations—after all, when various states such as Illinois passed laws allowing gay adoptions, they did not “accommodate” Catholic charities, but instead demanded compliance with principles of non-discrimination, forcing the Church to shut down her adoption agencies in those jurisdictions.

Cardinal Dolan’s statement went still further. For-profit companies are not religious in the way that Notre Dame University is religious. Nonetheless, the religious beliefs of those who own and run businesses in America should be accorded some protection. This idea the Obama administration flatly rejects. By their progressive way of thinking, economic life should be under the full and unlimited control of the federal government.

Religious liberty is undermined in a third and different way as well. For a long time, political theorists like John Rawls have argued that our laws must be based on so-called public reason, which is in fact an ambiguous, ill-defined concept that gives privileged status to liberalism. In 2010, Federal District Court Judge Vaughn Walker overturned Proposition 8—the ballot measure that reversed the California Supreme Court’s 2006 decision that homosexuals have a right to marry—citing the lack of a rational basis for thinking that only men and women can marry. “The evidence shows conclusively,” he wrote, “that Proposition 8 enacts, without reason, a private moral view that same-sex couples are inferior to opposite-sex couples.” He continues by observing that many supporters of Proposition 8 were motivated by their religious convictions, which—following Rawls—he presumes should not be allowed to govern public law.

This line of thinking is not unique to Judge Walker. The influence of Rawls has been extensive, leading to restrictions on the use of religious reasons or even religiously-influenced reasons in public debate. In striking down Texas sodomy laws, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that moral censure of homosexuality has “been shaped by religious beliefs.” The idea seems to be that moral views historically supported by religion—which of course means all moral views other than modern secular ones—are constitutionally suspect.

Here we come to the unifying feature of contemporary challenges to religious freedom—the desire to limit the influence of religion over public life. [emphasis added] In the world envisioned by Obama administration lawyers, churches will have freedom as “houses of worship,” but unless they accept the secular consensus they can’t inspire their adherents to form institutions to educate and serve society in accordance with the principles of their faith. Under a legal regime influenced by the concept of public reason, religious people are free to speak—but when their voices contradict the secular consensus, they’re not allowed into our legislative chambers or courtrooms.

Thus our present clashes over religious liberty. The Constitution protects religious liberty in two ways. First, it prohibits laws establishing a religion. This prevents the dominant religion from using the political power of majority rule to privilege its own doctrines to the disadvantage of others. Second, it prohibits laws that limit the free exercise of religion. What we’re seeing today is a secular liberalism that wants to expand the prohibition of establishment to silence articulate religious voices and disenfranchise religiously motivated voters, and at the same time to narrow the scope of free exercise so that the new secular morality can reign over American society unimpeded.

Rise of the Nones
This shift in legal thinking on the Left reflects underlying religious trends. As the religious character of our society changes, so do our assumptions about religious freedom. The main change has been the rise of the Nones. In the 1950s, around three percent of Americans checked the “none” box when asked about their religious affiliation. That number has grown, especially in the last decade, to 20 percent of the population. And Nones are heavily represented in elite culture. A great deal of higher education is dominated by Nones, as are important cultural institutions, the media, and Hollywood. They are conscious of their power, and they feel the momentum of their growth.

At the same time, the number of Americans who say they go to church every week has remained strikingly constant over the last 50 years, at around 35 percent. Sociologists of religion think this self-reported number is higher than the actual one, which may be closer to 25 percent. In any event, the social reality is the same. As the Nones have emerged as a significant cohort, the committed core of religious people has not declined and in fact has become unified and increasingly battle tested. Protestants and Catholics alike know they’re up against an often-hostile secular culture—and although a far smaller portion of the population, the same holds for Jews and Muslims as well.

These two trends—the rise of the Nones and the consolidation of the committed core of believers—have led to friction in public life. The Nones and religious Americans collide culturally and politically, not just theologically.

For a long time, the press has reported on the influence of religious voters, especially Evangelicals. Polling data shows that religiosity has become increasingly reliable as a predictor of political loyalties. But what’s far less commonly reported is that this goes both ways. In their recent book, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us, Robert Putnam and William Campbell focused on the practice of saying grace before meals as an indication of religious commitment and found a striking correlation. Seventy percent of those who never say grace before meals identify as Democrats, compared to slightly more than 20 percent who identify as Republicans. Nones are extremely ideological. Meanwhile, among those who say grace daily, 40 percent identify as Democrats and 50 percent as Republicans. Religious people are more diverse, but they trend to the political right, and the more religious they are the more likely they are to vote Republican.

Other data also suggests a growing divide between the irreligious and religious. A recent Pew study confirms that Nones are the single most ideologically committed cohort of white Americans, rivaled only by Evangelical Protestants. They overwhelmingly support abortion and gay marriage. Seventy-five percent of them voted for Barack Obama in 2008, and they played a decisive role in his victory in 2012. In Ohio, Obama lost the Protestant vote by three percent and the Catholic vote by eleven percent—and both numbers rise if we isolate Protestants and Catholics who say they go to church every week. But he won the Nones, who make up 12 percent of the electorate in Ohio, by an astounding 47 percent.I think it’s fair to say that Obama ran a values campaign last fall that gambled that the Nones would cast the decisive votes. For the first time in American political history, the winning party deliberately attacked religion. Its national convention famously struck God from the platform, only to have it restored by anxious party leaders in a comical session characterized by the kind of frivolity that comes when people recognize that it doesn’t really matter. Democratic talking points included the “war on women” and other well-crafted slogans that rallied their base, the Nones, who at 24 percent of all Democrat and Democratic-leaning voters have become the single largest identifiable cohort in the liberal coalition.

This presents the deepest threat to religious liberty today. It’s not good when the most numerous and powerful constituency in the Democratic Party has no time for religion. This is all the more true when its ideology has the effect of encouraging the rest of the party to view religion—especially Christianity—as the enemy; and when law professors provide reasons why the Constitution doesn’t protect religious people.

Religious Liberty Under the Gun
From the end of the Civil War until the 1960s, the wealthiest, best educated, and most powerful Americans remained largely loyal to Christianity. That’s changed. There were warning signs. William F. Buckley, Jr. chronicled how Yale in the early ’50s could no longer support even the bland religiosity of liberal Protestantism. Today, Yale and other elite institutions can be relied upon to provide anti-Christian propaganda. Stephen Pinker and Stephen Greenblatt at Harvard publish books that show how Christianity pretty much ruins everything, as Christopher Hitchens put it so bluntly. The major presses publish book after book by scholars like Elaine Pagels at Princeton, who argues that Christianity is for the most part an invention of power hungry bishops who suppressed the genuine diversity and spiritual richness of early followers of Jesus.

One can dispute the accuracy of the books, articles, and lectures of these and other authors. This is necessary, but unlikely to be effective. Experts savaged Greenblatt’s book on Lucretius, The Swerve, but it won the National Book Award for non-fiction. That’s not an accident. Greenblatt and others at elite universities are serving an important ideological purpose by using their academic authority to discredit Christianity, whose adherents are obstacles not only to abortion and gay rights, but to medical research unrestricted by moral concerns about the use of fetal tissue, to new reproductive technologies, to doctor-assisted suicide, and in general to liquefying traditional moral limits so that they can be reconstructed according to the desires of the Nones. Books by these elite academics reassure the Nones and their fellow travelers that they are not opposed to anything good or even respectable, but rather to historic forms of oppression, ignorance, and prejudice.

I cannot overstate the importance of these ideological attacks on Christianity. [emphasis added] Our Constitution accords us rights, and the courts cannot void these rights willy-nilly. But history shows that the Constitution is a plastic document. When our elite culture thinks something is bad for society as a whole, judges find ways to suppress it. The First Amendment offered no protection to Bob Jones University, which lost its tax-exempt status because of a policy that prohibited inter-racial dating. As the Supreme Court majority in 1983 wrote in that case: “Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . which substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [the University’s] exercise of their religious beliefs.

”In recent years the Supreme Court has been largely solicitous of religious freedom, sensing perhaps that our cultural conflicts over religion and morality need to be kept within bounds. But the law professors are preparing the way for changes. Martha Nussbaum, who teaches at the University of Chicago Law School, has opined that the colleges and universities run by Catholic religious orders that require their presidents or other leaders to be members of the order should lose their tax exempt status, because they discriminate against women. She allows that current interpretations of the First Amendment don’t support her view, but that’s not much comfort. All Nussbaum is doing is applying the logic of the Bob Jones case to the feminist project of eradicating discrimination based on sex.

Former Georgetown law professor Chai Feldblum—who is also a current Obama appointee to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—has written about the coming conflicts between gay rights and religious liberty. With an admirable frankness she admits, “I’m having a hard time coming up with any case in which religious liberty should win.” Again, the Bob Jones case is in the background, as are other aspects of civil rights law designed to stamp out racial discrimination. For someone like Feldblum, when religious individuals and institutions don’t conform to the new consensus about sexual morality, their freedoms should be limited.

It is precisely the possibilities evoked by Nussbaum and Feldblum that now motivate the Obama administration’s intransigence about allowing places like Notre Dame to be classified as religious employers. In the Bob Jones case, the justices were very careful to stipulate that “churches or other purely religious institutions” remain protected by the First Amendment’s principle of free exercise. By “accommodating” rather than counting Notre Dame and other educational and charitable organizations as religious employers, secular liberalism can target them in the future, as they have done to Catholic adoption agencies that won’t place children with homosexual couples.

A recent book by University of Chicago professor of philosophy and law Brian Leiter outlines what I believe will become the theoretical consensus that does away with religious liberty in spirit if not in letter. “There is no principled reason,” he writes, “for legal or constitutional regimes to single out religion for protection.” Leiter describes religious belief as a uniquely bad combination of moral fervor and mental blindness, serving no public good that justifies special protection. More significantly—and this is Leiter’s main thesis—it is patently unfair to afford religion such protection. Why should a Catholic or a Baptist have a special right while Peter Singer, a committed utilitarian, does not? Evoking the principle of fairness, Leiter argues that everybody’s conscience should be accorded the same legal protections. Thus he proposes to replace religious liberty with a plenary “liberty of conscience.

”Leiter’s argument is libertarian. He wants to get the government out of the business of deciding whose conscience is worth protecting. This mentality seems to expand freedom, but that’s an illusion. In practice it will lead to diminished freedom, as is always the case with any thoroughgoing libertarianism.

Let me give an example. The urban high school my son attended strictly prohibits hats and headgear. It does so in order to keep gang-related symbols and regalia out of the school. However, the school recognizes a special right of religious freedom, and my son, whose mother is Jewish and who was raised as a Jew, was permitted to wear a yarmulke. Leiter’s argument prohibits this special right, but his alternative is unworkable. The gang members could claim that their deep commitments of loyalty to each other create a conscientious duty to wear gang regalia. If everybody’s conscience must be respected, then nobody’s will be, for order and safety must be preserved.* * *The Arabic word dhimmi means non-Muslim. Under Muslim rule, non-Muslims were allowed to survive only insofar as they accepted Muslim dominance. Our times are not those times, and the secularism of the Nones is not Islam. Nevertheless, I think many powerful forces in America would like to impose a soft but real dhimmitude. The liberal and libertarian Nones will quarrel, as do the Shi’a and Sunni, but they will, I think, largely unify against the public influence of religion.

What can be done to prevent them from succeeding?
First and most obvious—defend religious liberty in the courts. Although I have depicted deep cultural pressures that work against religious liberty, we live in a society governed by the rule of law. Precedent matters, and good lawyering can make a substantive difference.

Second—fight against the emerging legal theories that threaten to undermine religious liberty. This is a battle to be carried out in the law schools and among political theorists. For decades, legal activists on the Left have been subsidized by legal clinics and special programs run in law schools. Defenders of religious liberty need to push back.

Third—fight the cultural battle. Legal theory flexes and bends in accord with the dominant consensus. This Brian Leiter knows, which is why he does not much worry about the current state of constitutional law. He goes directly to the underlying issues, which concern the role of religion in public life.

We must meet the challenge by showing that religion is indeed special. Religious people are the most likely Americans to be involved in civic life, and the most generous in their charitable contributions. This needs to be highlighted again and again. Moreover, we need to draw a contrast with the Nones, who tend to outsource their civic responsibilities and charitable obligations to government in the form of expanded government programs and higher taxes.

There is another, deeper argument that must be made in defense of religion: It is the most secure guarantee of freedom. America’s Founders, some of them Christian and others not, agreed as a matter of principle that the law of God trumps the law of men. This has obvious political implications: The Declaration of Independence appeals to the unalienable rights given by our Creator that cannot be overridden or taken away. In this sense, religion is especially beneficial. As Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI both emphasized, it gives transcendent substance to the rights of man that limit government. Put somewhat differently, religion gives us a place to stand outside politics, and without it we’re vulnerable to a system in which the state defines everything, which is the essence of tyranny. This is why gay marriage, which is sold as an expansion of freedom, is in fact a profound threat to liberty.

Finally, we must not accept a mentality of dhimmitude. The church, synagogue, and mosque have a tremendous solidity born of a communion of wills fused together in obedience to God. This gives people of faith the ability to fight with white fury for what they perceive to be a divine cause, which is of course a great force for righteousness—but also a dangerous threat to social peace, as early modern Europe knew only too well.

In conclusion, I want to focus not on fury but on the remarkable capacity for communities of faith to endure. My wife’s ancestors lived for generations in the contested borderlands of Poland and Russia. As Jews they were tremendously vulnerable, and yet through their children and their children’s children they endured in spite of discrimination, violence, and attempted genocide. Where now, I ask, are the Russian and Polish aristocrats who dominated them for centuries? Where now is the Thousand Year Reich? Where now is the Soviet worker’s paradise? They have gone to dust. The Torah is still read in the synagogue.

The same holds for Christianity. The Church did not need constitutional protections in order to take root in a hostile pagan culture two thousand years ago.

Right now the Nones seem to have the upper hand in America. But what seems powerful is not always so. If I had to bet on Harvard or the Catholic Church, Yale or the Mennonites in Goshen, Indiana, the New York Times or yeshivas in Brooklyn, I wouldn’t hesitate. Over the long haul, religious faith has proven itself the most powerful and enduring force in human history. [emphasis added]

R. R. Reno is the editor of First Things, a journal of religion in public life. He received his B.A. from Haverford College and his Ph.D. in religious studies from Yale University, and taught theology and ethics at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska, for 20 years. He is the author of Fighting the Noonday DevilSanctified Vision, and a commentary on the Book of Genesis, as well as a number of other books and essays.

Copyright © 2011 Hillsdale College. The opinions expressed in Imprimis are not necessarily the views of Hillsdale College. Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College. Subscription free upon request. The original title of this speech, published in the April 2013 edition of Imprimis, was “Religion and Public Life in America.”

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY

By Margaret Hilda Thatcher (13 October 1925 – 8 April 2013), Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven, LG, PC, OM, FRS, Former Prime Minister of Great Britain

In November 1994 at Hillsdale College in Michigan, USA, Lady Thatcher delivered the concluding lecture at the seminar, “God and Man: Perspectives on Christianity in the 20th Century,” before an audience of 2,500 students, faculty, and guests. In this edited version of that lecture, she explores the truth that the Judeo-Christian faiths have served as the primary source of the moral foundations of America, Great Britain and other nations in the West—and explains why they are essential to the future freedom, prosperity and security of free peoples.

The Moral Foundations of the Ame rican Founding
History has taught us that freedom cannot long survive unless it is based on moral foundations. The American founding bears ample witness to this fact. America has become the most powerful nation in history, yet she uses her power not for territorial expansion but to perpetuate freedom and justice throughout the world.

For over two centuries, Americans have held fast to their belief in freedom for all men—a belief that springs from their spiritual heritage. John Adams, second president of the United States, wrote in 1789, “Our Constitution was designed only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other.” That was an astonishing thing to say, but it was true.

What kind of people built America and thus prompted Adams to make such a statement? Sadly, too many people, especially young people, have a hard time answering that question. They know little of their own history (This is also true in Great Britain.) But America’s is a very distinguished history, nonetheless, and it has important lessons to teach us regarding the necessity of moral foundations.

John Winthrop, who led the Great Migration to America in the early 17th century and who helped found the Massachusetts Bay Colony, declared, “We shall be as a City upon a Hill.” On the voyage to the New World, he told the members of his company that they must rise to their responsibilities and learn to live as God intended men should live: in charity, love, and cooperation with one another. Most of the early founders affirmed the colonists were infused with the same spirit, and they tried to live in accord with a Biblical ethic. They felt they weren’t able to do so in Great Britain or elsewhere in Europe. Some of them were Protestant, and some were Catholic; it didn’t matter. What mattered was that they did not feel they had the liberty to worship freely and, therefore, to live freely, at home. With enormous courage, the first American colonists set out on a perilous journey to an unknown land—without government subsidies and not in order to amass fortunes but to fulfill their faith.

Christianity is based on the belief in a single God as evolved from Judaism. Most important of all, the faith of America’s founders affirmed the sanctity of each individual. Every human life—man or woman, child or adult, commoner or aristocrat, rich or poor—was equal in the eyes of the Lord. It also affirmed the responsibility of each individual.

This was not a faith that allowed people to do whatever they wished, regardless of the consequences. The Ten Commandments, the injunction of Moses (“Look after your neighbor as yourself”), the Sermon on the Mount, and the Golden Rule made Americans feel precious—and also accountable—for the way in which they used their God-given talents. Thus they shared a deep sense of obligation to one another. And, as the years passed, they not only formed strong communities but devised laws that would protect individual freedom—laws that would eventually be enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.

Freedom with Responsibility
Great Britain, which shares much of her history in common with America, has also derived strength from its moral foundations, especially since the 18th century, when freedom gradually began to spread throughout her society. Many people were greatly influenced by the sermons of John Wesley (1703-1791), who took the Biblical ethic to the people in a way that the institutional church itself had not done previously.

But we in the West must also recognize our debt to other cultures. In the pre-Christian era, for example, the ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle had much to contribute to our understanding of such concepts as truth, goodness, and virtue. They knew full well that responsibility was the price of freedom. Yet it is doubtful whether truth, goodness, and virtue founded on reason alone would have endured in the same way as they did in the West, where they were based upon a Biblical ethic.

Sir Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, wrote tellingly of the collapse of Athens, which was the birthplace of democracy. He judged that, in the end, more than they wanted freedom, the Athenians wanted security. Yet they lost everything—security, comfort, and freedom. This was because they wanted not to give to society, but for society to give to them. The freedom they were seeking was freedom from responsibility. It is no wonder, then, that they ceased to be free. In the modern world, we should recall the Athenians’ dire fate whenever we confront demands for increased state paternalism.

To cite a more recent lesson in the importance of moral foundations, we should listen to Czech President Vaclav Havel, who suffered grievously for speaking up for freedom when his nation was still under the thumb of communism. He has observed, “In everyone there is some longing for humanity’s rightful dignity, for moral integrity, and for a sense that transcends the world of existence.” His words suggest that in spite of all the dread terrors of communism, it could not crush the religious fervor of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

So long as freedom, that is, freedom with responsibility, is grounded in morality and religion, it will last far longer than the kind that is grounded only in abstract, philosophical notions. Of course, many foes of morality and religion have attempted to argue that new scientific discoveries make belief in God obsolete, but what they actually demonstrate is the remarkable and unique nature of man and the universe. It is hard not to believe that these gifts were given by a divine Creator, who alone can unlock the secrets of existence.

Societies without Moral Foundations
The most important problems we have to tackle today are problems that, ultimately, have to do with the moral foundations of society There are people who eagerly accept their own freedom but do not respect the freedom of others—they, like the Athenians, want freedom from responsibility. But if they accept freedom for themselves, they must respect the freedom of others. If they expect to go about their business unhindered and to be protected from violence, they must not hinder the business of or do violence to others. They would do well to look at what has happened in societies without moral foundations. Accepting no laws but the laws of force, these societies have been ruled by totalitarian ideologies like Nazism, fascism, and communism, which do not spring from the general populace, but are imposed on it by intellectual elites.

It was two members of such an elite, Marx and Lenin, who conceived of “dialectical materialism,” the basic doctrine of communism. It robs people of all freedom—from freedom of worship to freedom of ownership. Marx and Lenin desired to substitute their will not only for all individual will but for God’s will. They wanted to plan everything; in short, they wanted to become gods. Theirs was a breathtakingly arrogant creed, and it denied above all else the sanctity of human life.

The 19th century French economist and philosopher Frederic Bastiat once warned against this creed. He questioned those who, “though they are made of the same human clay as the rest of us, think they can take away all our freedoms and exercise them on our behalf.” He would have been appalled but not surprised that the communists of the 20th century took away the freedom of millions of individuals, starting with the freedom to worship. The communists viewed religion as “the opiate of the people.” They seized Bibles as well as all other private property at gun point and murdered at least 10 million souls in the process. Thus 20th century Russia entered into the greatest experiment in government and atheism the world had ever seen, just as America several centuries earlier had entered into the world’s greatest experiment in freedom and faith.

Communism denied all that the Judeo-Christian tradition taught about individual worth, human dignity, and moral responsibility. It was not surprising that it collapsed after a relatively brief existence. It could not survive more than a few generations because it denied human nature, which is fundamentally moral and spiritual. (It is true that no one predicted the collapse would come so quickly and so easily. In retrospect, we know that this was due in large measure to the firmness of President Ronald Reagan who said, in effect, to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, “Do not try to beat us militarily, and do not think that you can extend your creed to the rest of the world by force.”)

The West began to fight the moral battle against communism in earnest in the 1980s, and it was our resolve—combined with the spiritual strength of the people suffering under the system who finally said, “Enough!”—that helped restore freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—the freedom to worship, speak, associate, vote, establish political parties, start businesses, own property, and much more. If communism had been a creed with moral foundations, it might have survived, but it was not, and it simply could not sustain itself in a world that had such shining examples of freedom, namely, America and Great Britain.

The Moral Foundations of Capitalism
It is important to understand that the moral foundations of a society do not extend only to its political system; they must extend to its economic system as well. America’s commitment to capitalism is unquestionably the best example of this principle. Capitalism is not, contrary to what those on the Left have tried to argue, an amoral system based on selfishness, greed, and exploitation. It is a moral system based on a Biblical ethic. There is no other comparable system that has raised the standard of living of millions of people, created vast new wealth and resources, or inspired so many beneficial innovations and technologies.

The wonderful thing about capitalism is that it does not discriminate against the poor, as has been so often charged; indeed, it is the only economic system that raises the poor out of poverty. Capitalism also allows nations that are not rich in natural resources to prosper. If resources were the key to wealth, the richest country in the world would be Russia, because it has abundant supplies of everything from oil, gas, platinum, gold, silver, aluminum, and copper to timber, water, wildlife, and fertile soil.

Why isn’t Russia the wealthiest country in the world? Why aren’t other resource-rich countries in the Third World at the top of the list? It is because their governments deny citizens the liberty to use their God-given talents. Man’s greatest resource is himself, but he must be free to use that resource.

In his encyclical, Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II addressed this issue. He wrote that the collapse of communism is not merely to be considered as a “technical problem.” It is a consequence of the violation of human rights. He specifically referred to such human rights as the right to private initiative, to own property, and to act in the marketplace. Remember the “Parable of the Talents” in the New Testament? Christ exhorts us to be the best we can be by developing our skills and abilities, by succeeding in all our tasks and endeavors. What better description can there be of capitalism? In creating new products, new services, and new jobs, we create a vibrant community of work. And that community of work serves as the basis of peace and good will among all men.

The Pope also acknowledged that capitalism encourages important virtues, like diligence, industriousness, prudence, reliability, fidelity, conscientiousness, and a tendency to save in order to invest in the future. It is not material goods but all of these great virtues, exhibited by individuals working together, that constitute what we call the “marketplace.”

The Moral Foundations of the Law
Freedom, whether it is the freedom of the marketplace or any other kind, must exist within the framework of law. Otherwise it means only freedom for the strong to oppress the weak. Whenever I visit the former Soviet Union, I stress this point with students, scholars, politicians, and businessmen—in short, with everyone I meet. Over and over again, I repeat: Freedom must be informed by the principle of justice in order to make it work between people. A system of laws based on solid moral foundations must regulate the entire life of a nation.

But this is an extremely difficult point to get across to people with little or no experience with laws except those based on force. The concept of justice is entirely foreign to communism. So, too, is the concept of equality. For over seventy years, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had no system of common law. There were only the arbitrary and often contradictory dictates of the Communist Party. There was no independent judiciary. There was no such thing as truth in the communist system.

And what is freedom without truth? I have been a scientist, a lawyer, and a politician, and from my own experience I can testify that it is nothing. The third century Roman jurist Julius Paulus said, “What is right is not derived from the rule, but the rule arises from our knowledge of what is right.” In other words, the law is founded on what we believe to be true and just. It has moral foundations. Once again, it is important to note that the free societies of America and Great Britain derive such foundations from a Biblical ethic.

The Moral Foundations of Democracy
Democracy is never mentioned in the Bible. When people are gathered together, whether as families, communities or nations, their purpose is not to ascertain the will of the majority, but the will of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, I am an enthusiast of democracy because it is about more than the will of the majority. If it were only about the will of the majority, it would be the right of the majority to oppress the minority. The American Declaration of Independence and Constitution make it clear that this is not the case. There are certain rights which are human rights and which no government can displace. And when it comes to how you Americans exercise your rights under democracy, your hearts seem to be touched by something greater than yourselves. Your role in democracy does not end when you cast your vote in an election. It applies daily; the standards and values that are the moral foundations of society are also the foundations of your lives.

Democracy is essential to preserving freedom. As Lord Acton reminded us, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” If no individual can be trusted with power indefinitely, it is even more true that no government can be. It has to be checked, and the best way of doing so is through the will of the majority, bearing in mind that this will can never be a substitute for individual human rights.

I am often asked whether I think there will be a single international democracy, known as a “new world order.” Though many of us may yearn for one, I do not believe it will ever arrive. We are misleading ourselves about human nature when we say, “Surely we’re too civilized, too reasonable, ever to go to war again,” or, “We can rely on our governments to get together and reconcile our differences.” Tyrants are not moved by idealism. They are moved by naked ambition. Idealism did not stop Hitler; it did not stop Stalin. Our best hope as sovereign nations is to maintain strong defenses. Indeed, that has been one of the most important moral as well as geopolitical lessons of the 20th century. Dictators are encouraged by weakness; they are stopped by strength. By strength, of course, I do not merely mean military might but the resolve to use that might against evil.

The West did show sufficient resolve against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. But we failed bitterly in Bosnia. In this case, instead of showing resolve, we preferred “diplomacy” and “consensus.” As a result, a quarter of a million people were massacred. This was a horror that I, for one, never expected to see again in my lifetime. But it happened. Who knows what tragedies the future holds if we do not learn from the repeated lessons of history? The price of freedom is still, and always will be, eternal vigilance.

Free societies demand more care and devotion than any others. They are, moreover, the only societies with moral foundations, and those foundations are evident in their political, economic, legal, cultural, and, most importantly, spiritual life.

We who are living in the West today are fortunate. Freedom has been bequeathed to us. We have not had to carve it out of nothing; we have not had to pay for it with our lives. Others before us have done so. But it would be a grave mistake to think that freedom requires nothing of us. Each of us has to earn freedom anew in order to possess it. We do so not just for our own sake, but for the sake of our children, so that they may build a better future that will sustain over the wider world the responsibilities and blessings of freedom.

Margaret Hilda Thatcher earned a degree in chemistry from Somerville College, Oxford, as well as a Master of Arts degree from the University of Oxford. For some years she worked as a research chemist and then as a barrister, specializing in tax law. Elected to the House of Commons in 1953, she later held several ministerial appointments. She was elected leader of the Conservative Party and thus leader of the Opposition in 1975. She became Britain’s first female prime minister in 1979 and served her nation in this historic role until her resignation in 1990. In 1992, she was elevated to the House of Lords to become Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven. She has written several books, including The Downing Street Years (1995)The Path to Power (1996), and Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (2003). Her last book, Margaret Thatcher in Her Own Words, was published in 2010.

Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College. Copyright 1994 by Hillsdale College. In this monthly publication, the College distributes an edited version of a significant speech delivered on-campus. It is available online at: http://www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis.asp
You may also request a free subscription to the print version at the same online address.

Selected Quotations:
“For over two centuries, Americans have held fast to their belief in freedom for all men—a belief that springs from their spiritual heritage. John Adams, second president of the United States, wrote in 1789, ‘Our Constitution was designed only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any other.’ That was an astonishing thing to say, but it was true.”

“Sir Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, wrote tellingly of the collapse of Athens, which was the birthplace of democracy. He judged that, in the end, more than they wanted freedom, the Athenians wanted security. Yet they lost everything—security, comfort, and freedom. This was because they wanted not to give to society, but for society to give to them. The freedom they were seeking was freedom from responsibility. It is no wonder, then, that they ceased to be free. In the modern world, we should recall the Athenians’ dire fate whenever we confront demands for increased state paternalism.”

“Why isn’t Russia the wealthiest country in the world? Why aren’t other resource-rich countries in the Third World at the top of the list? It is because their governments deny citizens the liberty to use their God-given talents. Man’s greatest resource is himself, but he must be free to use that resource.

“Capitalism is not, contrary to what those on the Left have tried to argue, an amoral system based on selfishness, greed, and exploitation. It is a moral system based on a Biblical ethic. There is no other comparable system that has raised the standard of living of millions of people, created vast new wealth and resources, or inspired so many beneficial innovations and technologies.”

“We who are living in the West today are fortunate. Freedom has been bequeathed to us. We have not had to carve it out of nothing; we have not had to pay for it with our lives. Others before us have done so. But it would be a grave mistake to think that freedom requires nothing of us. Each of us has to earn freedom anew in order to possess it. We do so not just for our own sake, but for the sake of our children, so that they may build a better future that will sustain over the wider world the responsibilities and blessings of freedom.”

CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: THE DIFFERENCES IN THE SOCIETIES THEY CREATE

By  Bruce Sidebotham, D.Min, Director of Operation Reveille and Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel), Ret. U.S. Army Reserve

Excerpts from this essay:

If religions are different, and they lead to different moral convictions and values, then civic structures are not interchangeable between societies with different majority religions. In that case, it is absolutely essential for peacekeeping and stability operations to understand and accommodate religious differences;otherwise they are doomed to failure.

* * * * *

The cultural momentum in America towards denying the relevance of religion is causing military leaders and diplomats to treat democratic civic structures as if they are plug-and-play components between different societies. But they are not, and blindness to this reality is sabotaging efforts to facilitate democratic reform in the Muslim world.

Introduction
The faith of “no-religious-affiliation” is the fastest growing segment of the American population.1 Its power over our peoples’ perceptions of spiritual truth undermines national security and sabotages peacekeeping among Muslims.

Here is how that undermining works. Civic structures cannot survive without underlying values that are based upon popular beliefs. Structure for government, justice, education, public works, civil defense, marriage, and family must connect to underlying values, which in turn are based upon spiritual beliefs. If religious affiliation is deemed irrelevant, then all religions are viewed as basically the same. If all religions are viewed in that way, then different religions are not the source of relevant differences in values. Viewed from that perspective, civic structures become interchangeable between societies that have different majority religions. Therefore, peacekeeping and stability operations do not need to accommodate values that are rooted in religion; a wholly secular methodology will suffice to bring about the desired result. But if religions are different, and they lead to different moral convictions and values, then civic structures are not interchangeable between societies with different majority religions. In that case, it is absolutely essential for peacekeeping and stability operations to understand and accommodate religious differences; otherwise they are doomed to failure. This may well be the flaw in our strategy in Iraq over the past ten years that is leading to great concern today.

This essay will explore six areas of theology to demonstrate that significant differences exist between Islam and Christianity. It will also show how those differences impact spiritual and moral behaviors that ultimately lead to vastly different, and even philosophically opposed types of civic-structures. Those structures are not amenable to the efforts of Westerners to enact a plug-and-play methodology between societies that have such widely different religious heritages, convictions and values.

The First Major Difference: What is God?
The Christian concept of God is three persons in one essence, while the Muslim God is a single, autonomous unity. The English technical term for the three-in-one Christian God is “trinity.”2 The Arabic technical term for the solitary singularity of the divine essence is tawhid.3

Muslim scholars claim that tawhid is the most important article of Muslim faith and that all other Muslim doctrine springs from it. Tawhid means not simply that there is only one God (one person who alone is the true God, not three-in-one); it also means that nothing in creation can be associated with God, and God cannot associate himself with anything in creation. Allah is entirely separate from creation and isolated from the material world. The dominant position of tawhid in Muslim thinking generates a spiritual void among the common people filled by Sufism, folk Islam, and rampant witchcraft.

In chapter one of He Is There and He Is Not Silent, Francis Schaefer writes,

The Persons of the Trinity communicated with each other and loved each other before the creation of the world…. This is not only an answer to the acute philosophic need of unity in diversity, but of personal unity and diversity. The unity and diversity cannot exist before God or be behind God, because whatever is farthest back is God. But with the doctrine of the Trinity, the unity and diversity is God Himself — three Persons, yet one God.

Honor, glory, love, integrity, morality, and truth demand relationships. These qualities cannot exist within a singularity. However, they can exist in a trinity. Eternity for glory, honor and love is possible because the persons of the trinity have been glorifying, honoring, and loving each other for eternity. Eternity for integrity, morality and truth is possible because the persons of the trinity have been holding each other accountable for eternity.

But if God is a singularity, then no interpersonal relationships exist within God, and moral qualities that depend upon relationships cannot be eternal. In that view, honor, glory, love, integrity, morality, and truth must be created. Therefore, God’s glory and honor are not eternally innate to him but depend upon his relationship with creation. If God has no innate honor, then he cannot potentially have innate shame. If God can potentially do nothing by himself to shame himself, then his behavior has no moral boundaries. He can lie, cheat, and steal without shame because God is only accountable to himself. If there are no relationships within God, then God has no accountability.

Now, how do these two beliefs about God affect civic structures?

In Christian society, nothing and no one can embarrass or dishonor God. His honor and glory remain intact no matter how people treat him. They are part of his eternal essence and depend on nothing other than God himself. Nothing in creation can ever change or diminish God’s honor and glory — even if God becomes a man and dies a humiliating death on a cross. Only God himself could even potentially shame himself, because the trinity has accountability within itself.

But in Muslim society, people must guard and protect God’s glory. Nowhere on earth and at no time in history (even when theocratic governments had anti-blasphemy laws) do we find Christians violently protesting in the streets when people insult God, his prophet, or his holy books. People in Christian societies know that God does not need his honor protected. But Muslims around the world and throughout history are paranoid about the glory of God. “Allah Akhbar,” the Arabic words for “God is Great,” are constantly on their lips. Insulting the prophet receives a death penalty in many Muslim countries. Defiling a Qur’an instigates murderous protests around the world.4

In Christian societies, God’s honor is certain and his integrity is an innate attribute. Christian doctrine holds that God’s integrity constrains his behavior so that he cannot lie. If God were to lie, then he would shame himself. Therefore, in Christian societies, integrity is more important than honor, and society expects people to tell the truth even if it means embarrassing themselves, their families, their business, or their leaders.

But in Muslim societies the relative esteem for integrity and honor is reversed. According to Muslim doctrine and according to the Qur’an itself, “Allah is the best deceiver.”5 In Islam, God’s honor depends upon how creation treats him, and integrity is not an innate part of his eternal essence.

Power, as an attribute, can be independent of relationships. Not surprisingly, therefore, power rather than integrity is the most vaunted attribute of the Muslim God. As a result, in Muslim societies, honor is more desirable than integrity, and people are expected to deceive in order to protect themselves, their families, their businesses, or their leaders from shame. Among Muslims, the notion that God would stoop to become a man and suffer at the hands of men is one of the most offensive blasphemies to comprehend.6

Because of tawhid, the Muslim God can only be dishonored by his creation, and he cannot dishonor himself. However, because of the trinity the Christian God can only be dishonored if He choses to permit it, and He cannot be dishonored by creation. For example, no level of disobedience or idolatry in mankind can ever bring shame upon God, but Jesus became sin (2 Corinthians 5:21), a curse (Galatians 3:13), forsaken (Mark 15:35), and shame (Hebrews 12:2) for us. As a result, Christian societies do not worry about protecting God’s honor and care more about truth than honor, but Muslim societies are paranoid about God’s honor and care more about honor than truth.

The Second Major Difference: What is man?
Tawhid has implications for the nature of man as well as the nature of God. It means not only that there is one God, but also that nothing in creation can be associated with God and that God cannot associate himself with anything in creation. It means that the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ is metaphysically impossible. It also means that there can be no image of God in human beings.

Since the Christian God is a trinity with eternally relational moral attributes like integrity and love, when God bestows those attributes upon part of His creation, then that part of creation becomes “made in the image of God.” But the Muslim God, as a singularity without eternal relational attributes, cannot bestow moral attributes upon any creatures as any portion of his own nature.

How does belief about man affect civic structures?
In Christian anthropology, the moral attributes of human beings participate in the infinite and eternal qualities of God. This makes each human life equally sacred and valuable with each other human life. God is infinite, so the likeness of God in mankind is also infinite. Compared to the infinity of God’s likeness in mankind, other differences between people (like gender, race, status, intelligence, disability, or religious affiliation) disappear into relative insignificance. Compared to infinity, anything else that is not also infinite resolves to zero. Therefore, before God all people are not only equal, but also significant because they participate in infinity. If human beings are “made in the image of God,” then laws against oppression based on race, or persecution based on religion, or discrimination based on disability, or disadvantage based on gender, are rooted in the eternal nature of God.

But in the Muslim theology of mankind, nothing in man can be anything like God. This means that mankind’s worth and moral attributes are part of creation and have no part in God or in eternity. Therefore, anti-discrimination laws in Muslim societies cannot be rooted in values associated with God’s nature, but must be rooted in values associated with creation. No part of human essence is either divinely sacred or joined to infinity in a way that by comparison eclipses physical and social differences. Islam does teach that God has created human beings with higher dignity than the rest of creation (Qur’an 17:70). However, in Islam, differences in gender and religious affiliation matter. In most versions of Muslim law, a man’s testimony has more weight than a woman’s.7 Even in its most liberal interpretations, Muslim law has different citizenship categories for Muslims and non-Muslims.8 Furthermore, in Muslim law, only non-Muslims have the freedom to change their religion. Non-Muslims may convert to any faith they choose, but Muslims are not free to leave Islam.9

Because of tawhid, in Islam, human dignity for Muslims flows from the specific, concrete ways that people are created or from the way that people behave rather than from any infinite likeness of God in mankind. As a result, human dignity varies from person to person depending upon physical characteristics, behaviors, and social affiliations. Because of the trinity, in Christian thought human dignity for each person flows from his infinite likeness to God  rather than from specific varieties of created characteristics or chosen behaviors. As a result, human dignity is the same among all people regardless of their differences or affiliations. Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians are all worth the same as human beings created in the image of God. Gender, race, and interfaith relations are a challenge in all societies, but gender, race, and religious discrimination pose much greater problems in societies with Muslim majorities such as Egypt than in societies with Christian  majorities, all because of different beliefs about the image of God in man.

The Third Major Difference: How does man relate to nature?
The image of God in man makes people different from everything else that God created, and it results in a divine expectation for people to be stewards of the rest of creation. In the Christian Scriptures it is written that on the sixth day of creation God said, “Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground” (Genesis 1:26).

Furthermore, in the Christian gospels it is written that Jesus healed the sick, raised the dead, and calmed the storm (Acts 2:22). For Christians, Jesus is the behavior (way), character (truth), and will (life) of God incarnated into human flesh (John 14:6). Therefore, Jesus demonstrates the will of God for mankind (John 20:21). As a result, Christians believe that fighting against sickness, death, and natural disasters is fighting against evil and is according to the will of God.

How does belief about nature affect civic structures?

Western civilization has a rich heritage of struggling to improve and prolong human life with medical care, emergency services, community development, and disaster relief. However, most of the world, and particularly most of the Muslim world, does not share the Christian passion for excellence and constant improvement in medical care, emergency services, community development, and disaster relief. A natural disaster anywhere in the Muslim world almost always kills far more people than an equivalent disaster somewhere in the Western world.

When I was living among Muslims in Indonesia, I saved a man from drowning by performing mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration on him. The lifeguards at the pool had been performing the long discredited back-pressure-arm-lift method of resuscitation. I got him breathing again but not back to full consciousness, so he had to be taken to the hospital where the doctors and nurses thought that I had sucked the water out of his lungs in order to revive him. An article in the paper the next day said that fortunately for the young man a foreigner happened to be there to give him assisted breathing while removing the water that he had swallowed.10

While serving among embedded military advisors in Iraq, I observed that it was very difficult for American advisors to persuade Iraqi soldiers and military leaders to wear protective equipment, like eye protection, body armor, and helmets during security operations. The Iraqi response was always, “Insyallah.” They seemed to be saying that whether they lived or died was God’s will, so  they did not need to bother with wearing protective equipment. Of course they will take cover behind walls or sandbags from direct fire, but bullets that are flying differ from those that might never fly. They perceive a difference between a bullet that is flying and one that only might fly. Potential hazards are left in God’s hands, but when active combat ensues a Muslim soldier seeks cover and concealment.

Wearing protective equipment or trying to resuscitate a drowned man reveals a lack of spirituality and a lack of submission to God’s will. From the Muslim perspective, every phenomenon in the world, other than man, is administered totally by God-made laws. All natural events obey God and submit to his will. They are said to be in the “State of Islam.”11 That is very different than the Christian view. The apostle Paul writes in his letter to the Romans that all of creation is in bondage to decay and waits patiently for restoration through the ones who are becoming children of God (Romans 8:20-22).

The word “Islam” comes from the Arabic root word “Salema” which means peace, purity, submission and obedience. At its essence, Islam is submission to the will of God and obedience to His law.12 If nature is in a state of submission to the will of God, then that means that sickness, death, and natural disasters are according to his will. According to Muslim thinking, only human beings have the capacity to rebel against the will of God. Mankind is invited to submit to the will of God and to obey God’s law through the religion of Islam. Islam teaches that submission to the good will of God, together with obedience to his beneficial law, is the best safeguard for man’s peace and harmony.

At its logical conclusion, this thinking means that resisting the forces of nature that manifest themselves in sickness, death, and natural disaster is equivalent to resisting the will of God. In the Christian view, nature itself has been disturbed by evil, and one of God’s purposes for humanity is not only to struggle against evil in oneself, but also to struggle against evil in nature. In the Muslim view, however, God completely controls all of nature.

Islam does call upon humanity to struggle. The word for struggle is jihad.13 Muslims are called to jihad against everything that sets itself up against the will and law of God. Jihad can be an internal personal struggle against sin, and it can be an external communal defense of Islam. But Muslims are not called to jihad against death, sickness, and natural disasters the way that Christians are.14 Nature, for the Muslim, is still under the control and will of God.

The Fourth Major Difference: How do people get to heaven?

In both Christianity and Islam, salvation depends upon an exclusive faith-based identity. Muslims believe that forgiveness comes exclusively through Islam,15 and Christians believe that forgiveness comes exclusively through Jesus (John 14:6). But the similarity stops there.

Muslims believe an angel on the right shoulder records good deeds, and angel on the left shoulder records bad deeds. Going to heaven instead of hell depends upon being a Muslim and upon God’s mercy in evaluating one’s good and bad deeds.16

In Christianity, people cannot mitigate their own sins with words and deeds. Only God can mitigate sin. Theologians call the process “atonement.”17 It happens through the historical sacrificial death of Jesus Christ. God forgives sins, people repent, and a broken relationship gets restored.

Repentance for Christians involves confessing and taking responsibility for sins, and then turning away from sin through the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. Christians call this “salvation by grace through faith, not of works” (see Ephesians 2:8-9). It means salvation is not affected by good deeds but is a free gift to all who reconcile with God through a faith allegiance to the identity and work of Jesus Christ. Because forgiveness starts with God and is guaranteed, Christians have assurance that God won’t punish them when they confess and repent of their sins (1 John 1:9). From a relational point of view, forgiveness is not yet a relationship. Forgiveness merely forgoes the right to demand justice, punishment, or restitution. Forgiveness and repentance are both essential to a restored relationship.

How does belief about salvation affect civic structures?

The concept that people relate to one another based upon the way that they relate to God is part of Christian tradition. Jesus taught his followers that they were to forgive one another just as graciously as their heavenly Father had forgiven them (Matthew 6:12-15). In societies that follow the pattern for reconciliation set by God in Jesus Christ, people expect to be forgiven when they repent – that is when they take responsibility and promise to change. They expect mitigated consequences when they sincerely apologize.

In my experience among Muslims, people in Muslim societies rarely apologize as an initial step towards reconciliation. Rather, the offender will usually work on restitution and try to reestablish relationship first. If forgiveness from God is affected by merit, then forgiveness from one’s neighbor will be too. The more responsibility one accepts for an offense, then the higher the price of restitution. Muslims will often ask for forgiveness without admitting responsibility. Muslims who want to be in relationship will often mutually blame uncontrollable circumstances, someone else, or even God as a way to reduce the price for restoring the balance of good and bad deeds between them.

Apologizing for accidentally burning Qur’ans18 or for the existence of videos and cartoons that insult Muhammad19 is a mistake. So is apologizing for past offenses like the Crusades or Colonialism.20 It’s like a doctor apologizing for accidentally sewing his scissors into a patient after removing an appendix. It just increases liability and the cost of settlement. Islam is a legal system as well as a religion. Forgiveness is earned. It may or may not follow restitution. Apologizing admits responsibility, so the more abject the apology, then the greater the admission of responsibility, and the greater the admission of responsibility, then the costlier the settlement.

Also, among Muslims, potential for reconciliation is higher for insiders than for outsiders. In the Christian theology of salvation, people reconcile with God first, and then they become “true” Christians. In Muslim salvation, people become “true” Muslims first, and then they can be reconciled with God. The Christian God treats everyone the same. He offers forgiveness to everyone who will receive it, whether Christian or non-Christian. The Muslim God treats Muslims and non-Muslims differently. Like their God, Muslims categorize insiders and outsiders differently.

Actually, Muslims often ask each other for forgiveness. In fact, requesting forgiveness from friends and relatives is an important part of Muslim holiday celebrations.21 In my experience of Muslim cultures, however, personal maturity and good character don’t require admitting faults or taking personal responsibility for mistakes. Offenses are often forgiven without anyone ever admitting guilt. It’s like a legal settlement out of court, or no-fault insurance where money changes hands but no one admits that they were wrong.

From a Muslim perspective, it is the Christian pattern for reconciliation that miscarries justice. It requires that the offended party be ready and willing to forgive once a sincere apology is offered. It means people don’t actually need to do anything in order to be forgiven. It means that even the wickedest person can reconcile with God and have absolute certainty of eternal salvation. It puts the offender rather than the offended in control. It turns justice and divine sovereignty upside down.

Christians believe that salvation to eternal life flows from a restored relationship with God through repentance and forgiveness, and that makes one a Christian. Muslims believe salvation into paradise happens only for Muslims as God mercifully considers their good and bad deeds. In interpersonal relationships, Christians are expected to grant forgiveness for sincere apologies while Muslims grant forgiveness when it is earned. These differences profoundly influence human relationships, resulting in different behaviors and social structures.

The Fifth Major Difference: What is the ideal future?

Muslims believe that Muhammad established an ideal society under Muslim law when he ran the government in Medina and eventually in Mecca. Most Muslims desire to return to that ideal by implementing Muslim law as closely as possible to the way that Muhammad would apply it under conditions that exist today.22

Christians, on the other hand believe that, since the rebellion of mankind against God by Adam and Eve in the long-gone Garden of Eden, ideal civilization is impossible unless God establishes it himself. Christians believe Jesus is God, and they believe that Jesus will return to earth from heaven some day. Therefore, Christians believe that God will establish the ideal society on earth through Jesus. Christian waiting for Jesus is patient but not idle. Christians believe that while Jesus is gone they should do their best to follow Jesus’ example, but they do not believe it is possible to have an ideal society without Jesus.

How does belief about a future ideal government affect civic structures?

These different visions for the ideal future lead to different ways that Christians and Muslims engage in politics. Christians try to influence government and politics, but they no longer try to establish a theocratic government as the Byzantine emperors attempted from the fourth to the eleventh centuries. Jesus taught that his dominion was spiritual and non-material. He told the Roman governor who ordered his crucifixion that if his kingdom had been of this world his followers would have been fighting for him (John 18:36). He told the Jewish leaders who wanted to rebel against Rome to pay their Roman taxes. He said give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s (Matthew 22:17-21). This teaching from Jesus establishes the concept in Christian theology for of a separation of powers between church and state.23

Muslim theology has no such church-state separation paradigm. The Muslim ideal strives for uniting political and religious power rather than separating those powers.

Christianity grew and thrived for over three centuries as a persecuted religion in both Roman and Persian empires. But, as Bernard Lewis writes in his book, What Went Wrong (published by Oxford University Press in 2002):

Muhammad achieved victory and triumph in his own lifetime. He conquered his promised land, and created his own state, of which he himself was supreme sovereign. As such, he promulgated laws, dispensed justice, levied taxes, raised armies, made war, and made peace. In a word, he ruled, and the story of his decisions and actions as ruler is sanctified in Muslim scripture and amplified in Muslim tradition. (p. 101)

Lewis also notes:

The idea that any group or persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought. There is, for example, no distinction between cannon law and civil law, between the law of the church and the law of the state, crucial in Christian history. There is only a single law, shari’a, accepted by Muslims as of divine origin and regulating all aspects of human life: civil, commercial, criminal, constitutional, as well as matters more specifically concerned with religion in the limited, Christian sense of that word. (p. 100)

Both Christianity and Islam are idealistic and triumphalistic; however, Christians believe that only Jesus can establish an ideal society, while Muslims strive for an ideal civilization on the earth through Muslim government and law. The results of these theological differences play out everywhere on the world stage. Politicians and diplomats ignore or minimize these differences to their peril.

The Sixth Major Difference: What is divine revelation?

Both Christianity and Islam believe in angels and prophets and in a God who communicates through Holy Scriptures, but their prophets and scriptures are functionally opposite to each other.

In Muslim theology, the Qur’an is a verbatim incarnation of God’s word. It is an extension of divine essence and a part of eternity.24 In Christian theology, Jesus fulfills that role. While to most Christians the original manuscripts of the Bible were divinely inspired and thus without error, they do not believe it to be an extension of God’s essence. The Bible quotes God, but it is not word for word, in every word, a direct quote from the mouth of God.

Christians believe that Jesus is divine (John 10:30-33), so that every word of Jesus is a word straight from the mouth of God. That is how Muslims view the Qur’an. Christians believe that the Bible is divinely provided and protected in order to show us Jesus (John 5:39). Muslims believe that about Muhammad. They believe Muhammad was divinely provided and protected in order to give us the Qur’an.25

How does belief about revelation affect civic structures?

As a result, in Muslim theology, burning a Qur’an would be like crucifying Christ or desecrating the Eucharist. Burning a Qur’an is exponentially more explosive than burning a Bible. In Indonesia, I saw a man die in a hospital from a beating after he’d been arrested for allegedly burning some verses of the Qur’an that were supposedly mixed in with some magic charms that he was destroying. In Christian theology, burning the Bible is like burning a valuable and special book, but it is nothing to Christians like burning a Qur’an is to Muslims. Functionally, for their respective groups, the Bible and the Qur’an are different, so the responses of the respective groups are different as well.

Functionally, the Muslim equivalent to the Christian Bible is the prophet Muhammad as he is known through the hadith and sunnah.26 The hadith are written records of the sayings and actions of Muhammad. The sunnah is the “way” of Muhammad that the hadith reveals. Without knowing the “way” of Muhammad, there can be no authoritative application of the Qur’an. Similarly, without the Bible, there can be no authoritative knowledge of Christ.

Muslims do not study the Qur’an devotionally the way that Christians study the Bible. Rather, what Muslims study devotionally is the life of Muhammad. Muslims find life lessons in the way that Muhammad talked, ate, drank, slept, washed, and even had sex. Muhammad for Muslims is devotionally equivalent to the Bible for Christians. Functional equivalence between Christianity and Islam is between book and person and not from book to book or person to person.

Muslim clerics are legal scholars as well as theological ones. Muslim people leave interpreting the Qur’an to trained clerics the way that Americans leave interpreting the Constitution to trained lawyers. Muslims often memorize large portions of the Qur’an. But memorizing the Qur’an does not give one authority to interpret and apply it any more than memorizing the U.S. Constitution gives one credentials for practicing Constitutional Law.

For Christians, their political ruler is Jesus. Though he rules a heavenly rather than an earthly kingdom, he still rules. Christians call Jesus their Lord as well as their Savior. The Muslim equivalent to Jesus is the Qur’an. Muslims are devoted to the Qur’an the way that Christians are devoted to Jesus, and they treat it legally the way that Americans treat the U.S. Constitution. The Qur’an is a Muslim’s highest sovereign in the same way that Jesus is a Christian’s highest sovereign.

Both Christianity and Islam have prophets and scriptures; however, those prophets and scriptures don’t correlate with one another. Christians revere the man Jesus as the essence of God, whom they receive and understand through the Bible. Muslims revere the Qur’an as an essence of God, which they receive and understand through their prophet Muhammad. Functionally Muhammad correlates to the Bible and the Qur’an correlates to Jesus. Correlating Jesus with Muhammad and the Bible with the Qur’an is a mistake for Muslims trying to understand Christianity and for Christians trying to understand Islam.

Conclusion

Many more comparisons beyond these on God, man, salvation, nature, the future, and revelation could be made. Islam and Christianity are very different from each other. We must not embrace the logical consequence of having no religious affiliation, which is that all religions are essentially the same. Western civic structures are founded in a Judeo-Christian religious heritage. Conversely, Middle Eastern and Central Asian civic structures are founded in a Muslim heritage. Structures for government, justice, education, public works, civil defense, marriage, and family are connected to the corresponding, underlying beliefs and values of these two very different religious systems.

If all religions are basically the same, then civic structures would be interchangeable between societies regardless of different religious heritages. But Islam and Christianity are not the same. Their belief and values systems are different, and those differences result in vastly different behaviors and different civic structures. The cultural momentum in America towards denying the relevance of religion is causing military leaders and diplomats to treat democratic civic structures as if they are plug-and-play components between different societies. But they are not, and blindness to this reality is sabotaging efforts to facilitate democratic reform in the Muslim world.

Blindness to these spiritual realities not only undermines world peace, but it threatens religious freedom in America as well. If Christianity and Islam are essentially the same, then their fundamentalists are also the same. A potential challenge to religious freedom in America will likely come from people with no religious affiliation. These people may well begin to treat Evangelicals as if they were the same threat to civic order as their fundamentalist counterparts in Islam.

Bruce Sidebotham spent seven years doing cross-cultural ministry in Indonesia. The son of a Navy chaplain, he is a geologist, a civil engineer, and a former officer in the Army Corps of Engineers. He has a Master’s degree in Intercultural Studies and Teaching English as a Foreign Language (TEFL) from Columbia International University, and a Doctor of Ministry degree from New Geneva Theological Seminary.

Bruce and his wife, Lynn, have raised four boys. Their youngest son was born in Indonesia. As a chaplain (major) in the U.S. Army Reserves, Bruce spent a year in Iraq (2008-09), where he provided pastoral care to 39 different teams of embedded advisors throughout the province of Nineveh. Bruce directs Operation Reveille, a ministry that helps service personnel with cross-cultural relations. Contact information: bside@oprev.org


Endnotes

1. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/26/whats-the-fastest-growing_n_88540.html

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity

3. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/584517/tawhid

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blasphemy_law

5. http://www.wikiislam.net/wiki/Allah_the_Best_Deceiver

6. http://www.answering-christianity.com/crucified.htm

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status_of_women’s_testimony_in_Islam

8. http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/the-khilafah/non-muslims/499-dhimmi-non-muslims-living-in-the-khilafah

9. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/01/16/egyptian-court-sentences-entire-family-to-15-years-for-converting-to/#ixzz2IAgic2Lz

10. http://www.oprev.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/singgalang-article.png

11. http://www.patheos.com/Library/Islam/Beliefs/Human-Nature-and-the-Purpose-of-Existence.html

12. http://www.barghouti.com/islam/meaning.html

13. http://www.thewaytotruth.org/jihad/meaning.html

14. http://www.justislam.co.uk/product.php?products_id=2

15. http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-433-3143.htm

16. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiraman_Katibin

17. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atonement_in_Christianity

18. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/23/us-afghanistan-korans-obama-idUSTRE81M13W20120223

19. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogk2dgSQETA

20. http://www.soon.org.uk/page15.htm

21. http://barefootmel.com/?p=2343

22. http://www.islamicbookstore.com/b9563.html

23. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state

14. http://www.iqrasearch.com/the-quran/the-quran-is-the-uncreated-speech-of-god.html

25. http://www.islam-guide.com/ch3-8.htm

26. http://www.quranexplorer.com/Hadith/Default.aspx

ISLAM JIHAD IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By Reverend Wylie W. Johnson, D.Min., M.Div., M.S.S.; Chaplain (Colonel) U.S. Army Reserve (retired), Senior Pastor of Springfield Baptist Church, Springfield, Pennsylvania, and until his retirement in June 2012 the first Command Chaplain for the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Readiness Command.

Quotations from this paper
Modern Muslims are faced with a nagging conundrum which we might put this way: ‘How is it that Islamic people, who are the possessors of the only true religion and who ought to be the most powerful people on earth, are now so poor, backward and powerless?’

Like most social movements, there have been many thinkers contributing to the Islamist idea. A Sunni Pakistani, Syed Abul A’ala Maududi (1903-1979), linked the ancient faith with the revolutionary fervor of the present. Maududi‘s experience was in the Indian conflict between Hinduism and Islam. He also developed a worldwide jihadistic vision for imposing a new Islamic order. Maududi, as many of his contemporaries, melded the political rhetoric of communism and fascism into a revolutionary Islamic ideology. The goal of such an insurrectionist religious vision is global hegemony.

Introduction: Threads of Understanding

To begin understanding the modern phenomenon of radical Islam, one must have a working knowledge of Muslim history, theology and contemporary events. In this article, I will knit together these three threads in order to contribute towards such an understanding.

For the purposes of this project, Islamic Radicalism, Salifism, and Islamism are used as interchangeable terms. Islamists hold to a literal interpretation of the Qur’an. They condemn all who differ as kafir1 (hypocritical or heretical) and repress all divergence from their narrow view. The radical agenda includes a rejection of any form of civil law and strict adherence to Shari‘a law.2 I would further add that my concentration in this project is specifically upon those various groups that have declared jihad3 on the United States at home and abroad, and are actively pursuing future operations.

Many Muslims feel that they have successively been defeated, resulting in the loss of power to other nations; the loss of authority within their own nations; and finally through the loss of “mastery in his own house from emancipated women and rebellious children”4 who model their behavior and expectations on the ‘Christian’ West. The following story simply explains Middle Eastern feelings and motivations.

One day an elderly Bedouin man discovered that by eating turkey he could restore his virility. So he bought himself a turkey and he kept it around the tent, and every day he watched it grow. He stuffed it with food, thinking, Wow, I am really going to be a bull. One day, though, the turkey was stolen. So the Bedouin called his sons together and said, “Boys, we are in great danger now – terrible danger. My turkey‘s been stolen.” The boys laughed and said, “Father, what do you need a turkey for?” He said, “Never mind, never mind. It is not important why I need the turkey, all that is important is that it has been stolen, and we must get it back.” But his sons ignored him and forgot about the turkey. A few weeks, later the old man‘s camel was stolen. His sons came to him and said, “Father, your camel‘s been stolen, what should we do?” And the old man said, “Find my turkey.” A few weeks later, the old man‘s horse was stolen, and the sons came and said, “Father, your horse was stolen, what should we do?” He said, “Find my turkey.” Finally, a few weeks later, someone raped his daughter. The father went to his sons and said, “It is all because of the turkey. When they saw that they could take my turkey, we lost everything.”5

This ancient story amply illustrates the Muslim community‘s sense of loss and vulnerability in a hostile world. Modern Muslims are faced with a nagging conundrum that we might put this way: ‘How is it that Islamic people, who are the possessors of the only true religion and who ought to be the most powerful people on earth, are now so poor, backward and powerless?’6

Muslims believe that ultimately all of humanity must accept Islam, which will eventually become the only worldwide faith. The Islamic Umma7 (the middle nation) is perfectly conceived and not prone to religious extremes of asceticism or depravity. “The Umma is the ‘assembly’ of the ‘party of God.’ It is the best nation and has a mission to be a witness over the nations.”8

Many Muslims hold an ideal in common with Christians—that of becoming the only world religion. In many ways, we may compare the Islamic notion of one world religion with the Christian Great Commission: Christ‘s imperative to “make disciples of all nations” (Matthew 28:19-20). For both religions the individual believer is responsible for global mission. However, there are fundamental differences in method and purpose. Christianity, propagating a redemptive gospel, is essentially a non-state religion. Even when the Christian faith becomes entangled with political authority, it usually remains distinct from the state. Islam is a nomocratic (law-based) state with imperialistic pretentions. Islam has “combined the dualism of a universal religion and a universal state.”9

The mission of Islam comprises both da’wah (witness and invitation) and dawlah (political and territorial mission).10 In Islam, mission and the establishment of Islamic social order are nearly synonymous, since “extending Islamic authority over peoples and territory was the same as extending God‘s rule.”11 Islamic rule has historically been extended by military conquest. In the Islamic faith, personal religion is ideally a matter of conscience, for the Qur’an teaches that, “There is no compulsion in religion” (Surah 2, 256). However, Muslim societies have been structured so that it is a burden to believe in any faith other than Islamic. The history of Islam has been an uneven balance between da’wah and dawlah over subject peoples.

It is not surprising that religious faiths come into conflict, particularly since each is convinced of its own exclusive veracity and its unique mandate for social unity. Religious conflict has intensified in the contemporary era. Benjamin R. Barber has declared that modern forms of traditional monotheistic religion “are parochial rather than cosmopolitan, angry rather than loving, proselytizing rather than ecumenical, zealous rather than rationalist, sectarian rather than deistic, ethnocentric rather than universalizing.”12 Formerly peaceful (or generally peaceful) comity arrangements have deteriorated into hostility and outright conflict around the modern world.

Adam Garfinkle attributes the phenomenon of modern political Islam to “a condition of blocked or distorted modernization.”13 He sees Islamic societies negatively reacting to Western cultural-imperialism that requires radical change from traditional to modern methods and mores. Traditional societies are strained by globalized social pressures as well as urbanization, pluralism, lack of education and economic opportunity. Such influences alter established mores and behaviors.14 Many Muslims, proud of their faith and heritage, resent the pressures of Western (especially Christian) culture-driven modernization that undermines the functioning basis of their society.

Religious responses to such forces are often chiliastic, that is, understanding the current cultural drift as clear signs of the end-of-time demise of society. One sort of cultural religious response is to become quietist (e.g., the Sufis)—seeking retreat from society to develop isolated communities that preserve the old ways and values.15 Another response may be a turning to authoritarian rule in an attempt to restore the status quo (e.g., Taliban). Others, like bin Laden, developed a vision of worldwide conquest for the establishment of the true faith and moral attitudes. “At such times, believers usually think that violence is part of a divine plan to hasten the end of the world, bring the Mahdi; re-establish the Caliphate, or whatever the theology requires.”16

Middle Eastern cultures are structured with an endogamous family construct, meaning arranged marriages within the family. Such relationships define family within the tribal structure. This retains wealth and property in the family, as well as undergirding patriarchal authority.

In most Arab societies, everyone knows where they fit into the overall structure. Loyalty is to extended family, individual agency is weak, and the entire structure tends to resist outside influence. Religion is organic to birth and reinforces the authority of the patriarchal system. However, it is the social structure, which predated Islam that comes first. Assaults to tribe and family, real or imagined, are therefore assaults against religion, and vice versa. Endogamous social organization helps explain why these societies tend to split into factions when they come under pressure. The Taliban, which most Westerners consider motivated by religion, are as much driven by concern over their tribal structures‘ viability. Westerners divide politics from religion and religion from social structure by second nature, but these divisions have no parallel in the Middle East.17

Chronically impoverished Arab peoples have not shared in the economic prosperity that the developed world enjoys—“per capita income has been virtually unchanged since 1980; in some countries, including oil-rich Saudi Arabia, it has actually fallen. Real wages and labor productivity are about where they were thirty years ago.”18 Oil wealth in each Middle Eastern nation resides in the hands of a tiny ruling clique, while regional development remains minimal at best. “Outside the energy sector, trade is at a standstill: the entire region‘s non-oil exports are smaller than those of Finland….The Arab world has, in effect, disengaged from the world economy.”19

Traditional population distribution within the region has rapidly changed from a rural to an urban majority. Combine this with a populace where more than half are under age twenty. “High concentrations of young people in a society, especially teenagers, correlates well with violence and poorly with stability…“youth bulges” have accompanied many of history‘s most dramatic upheavals.”20

Islamist Theoreticians

However, it is not the unwashed masses who are the ideologues and leaders of Islamist movements. While the foot soldiers of Islamic radicalism come from the economically disadvantaged, by contrast Islamist leadership originates from money, power and advanced educational status.21 These are the leaders who so clearly articulate the hopelessness of the Muslim masses by identifying their powerful enemy in the Great Satan (dajjal) – the USA, and life‘s answers in fundamentalist Islam. Religious fundamentalism always flourishes in an environment where its adherents perceive its beliefs and way of life are under attack. The modernist assault on Islam, “westoxification,”22 is popularly seen not only as confirmation of Islamist ideology but substantiation of the need for Muslims to return to a purer practice of their religion.

Al-Qaeda brought together strands of Arab Nationalism and Islamist fundamentalism as interpreted by an Egyptian philosopher, Sayyid Qutb.23 Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden‘s organization, is representative of the current worldwide Islamist movement. The organization was created in the late 1980s by an affiliation of three armed factions—bin Laden’s circle of ”Afghan” Arabs, together with two factions from Egypt, the Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s top theoretician.24

Qutb was a leading thinker of the Islamic Brotherhood founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna. The Brotherhood is a nationalist, social and political movement highly critical of the Egyptian and other Middle Eastern governments during the 1950‘s and 1960‘s.

In a famous book, al-‘Adala al-ijtima‘iyya fi‘l-islam (Social Justice in Islam), Sayyid Qutb put forward a powerful interpretation of the social teaching of Islam. For Muslims, as distinct from Christians, there was, he suggested, no gap between faith and life. All human acts could be seen as acts of worship, and the Qur‘an and Hadith provided the principles on which action should be based. Man was free only if he was released from subjection to all powers except that of God: from the power of priesthood, fear, and the domination of social values, human desires and appetites.25 314

Egyptian authorities used Qutb‘s book, Milestones, to condemn him at his sedition trial. His execution in 1966 (interpreted by Islamists as martyrdom) by the Egyptian authorities gave his works credibility, creating interest throughout the Middle East. Milestones became a “classic manifesto of the terrorist wing of Islamic fundamentalism.26

Qutb called “for a renewal of Islamic life, a life governed by the spirit and the law of Islam, which alone can produce that form of Islam that we need to day, and which is in conformity with the genuine Islamic tradition.”27 While this sounds innocuous enough to the Western ear, Qutb is calling for nothing less than a radical reorientation and reform of present day Islamic social order. For Qutb, Islam teaches that there is a unity between the spiritual and temporal.

For the center of its being and the field of its action is human life in its entirety, spiritual and material, religious and worldly. Such a religion cannot continue to exist in isolation from society, nor can its adherents be true Muslims unless they practice their faith in their social, legal, and economic relationships. And a society cannot be Islamic if it expels the civil and religious laws of Islam from its codes and customs, so that nothing of Islam is left except rites and ceremonials.28

Such a radical reformation necessitated the overthrow of the existing Islamic order as well as the need to militantly confront the remainder of the world through jihadist conquest. Qutb radically critiqued the settled orthodoxy that Islam had become. His was no less than a clarion call to overthrow what he perceived as pernicious Christian domination of the entire Islamic world.29

Qutb‘s purpose was to politically reunify all Muslims worldwide under a restored, rightly guided Islamic Caliphate. His is a complete rejection of the Christian West and a reactionary view toward the progressiveness of the Islamic schools. “Qutb and the Islamists…pictured the resurrected caliphate as a theocracy, strictly enforcing Sharia, the legal code of the Koran.”30 This required a total rejection of all things non-Muslim.31

Qutb held that every Muslim lived in direct relationship with Allah. There is no priesthood or other intermediary between “creature and the Creator”.32 This becomes the basis for his rejection of the religious hierarchy (the jurists of the orthodox schools). Qutb accused the orthodox legal schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali) of syncretism – combining Christian and pagan philosophies with the teaching of Islam. He thought this syncretism was an affront, because Islam is perfect as received from Allah through the Prophet. “Islam has one universal and integrated theory which covers the universe and life and humanity; a theory in which are integrated all the different questions….”33 However, Qutb wrote that the “Islamic concept” was corrupted when, “Islamic philosophers borrowed certain concepts from Greek philosophy and terms from Aristotle, Plotinus and the Christian theologians, and merged them with the Islamic concept.34 This dilution of the pure faith had profound consequences for the Muslim community.

When the life of the Muslims became free of the concerns of jihad and they surrendered to comfort and affluence; and when at the same time different opinions and schools of thought came into existence, largely because of political problems going back to the well-known conflict between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya, they began to concern themselves with Greek philosophy and theological discussions relating to Christianity, which were then translated into Arabic.35

Further, Qutb asserted that the reality of modern Muslim society is not Islamic in any sense. He proclaimed that as long as Muslims adhered to the purity of Islam, not only was there was no weakness in society but there would be no subordination to non-Muslim powers. He charged that when the Umma departed from true Islam, Muslim society lost its rightful place and authority in the world.36 This state of affairs starkly contrasted with the belief that Islam ought to be – “ever in the forefront.” “You are the best nation which has been brought forth for men; you enjoin the good, and you forbid the evil.” (3:10)37

Qutb was highly critical of domination of Muslim peoples by Europeans and their subsequent acceptance of Christian culture, values and mores. He interpreted European colonialization as a Christian desire to put an end to the entire Islamic culture. Qutb links the collapse of Islamic power with a Christian ascendancy that resulted in establishing cultural, economic and religious hegemony over Muslim lands.38

…he traced the ‘new jahiliyya’ to the disintegration of the first Umma and that the creation of the Umayyad and Abbasid empires, where the notion of Allah‘s universal sovereignty succumbed to the reality of human kingship and hereditary rule in their most decadent and un-Islamic forms. In the following millennium the House of Islam would fluctuate between various levels of attainment, from the low ebbs of the Mongol and crusader invasions to the apogee of the Ottoman expansion. Yet it would never manage to rid itself of the new jahiliyya, let alone come anywhere near the lofty heights of the first Umma.39

Qutb‘s remedy for this disastrous situation is to reinstitute a thoroughly Islamic society based upon Quranic teaching, and the strict observance of the Sharia. He wrote that three foundational principles are necessary for the establishment of justice – absolute freedom of conscience; the equality of all men; and the upholding of a mutual responsibility for society.40

Like most social movements, there have been many thinkers contributing to the Islamist idea. A Sunni Pakistani, Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, linked the ancient faith with the revolutionary fervor of the present. Maududi‘s experience was in the Indian conflict between Hinduism and Islam. He also developed a world-wide jihadistic vision for imposing a new Islamic order. Maududi, like many of his contemporaries, melded the political rhetoric of communism and fascism into a revolutionary Islamic ideology. The goal of such an insurrectionist religious vision is global hegemony.41

Islam: A Religion of Both Peace and War

It is commonly asserted that Islam is a religion of peace—a fundamental belief for all of those faithful residing in the dar al-Islam (house of peace). However, the remainder of the world‘s population is believed by Muslims to live in the dar al-harb (house of war). Those peoples outside the dar al-Islam are, according to the administration of Islamic law, under an enduring jihad (struggle) with the faithful until all come into submission to Allah. “Any community which prefers to remain non-Islamic—in the status of a tolerated religious community accepting certain disabilities—must submit to Islamic rule and reside in the dar al-Islam or be bound as clients to the Muslim community.”42 Such a worldview leads those outside of Islam to be skeptical and uneasy concerning Islamic intentions.

No single teaching of Islam has engendered more misunderstanding, mistrust and outright confrontation than the idea of jihad.43 Muhammad is thought44 to have initially developed the concept of jihad to redirect Arab society‘s predilection for raiding and marauding into a religious duty supporting the spread of Islam.45 “He developed and amplified this concept with the expansion of his political ambitions until it became a rallying cry for world domination.46 The Prophet subordinated his culture‘s mindset with a moral and religious vision for a utopian future. “From the first Arab-Islamic Empire of the mid-seventh century to the Ottomans…the story of Islam has been the story of the rise and fall of universal empires and, no less important, of never quiescent imperialist dreams.47

Muhammad died in June 632. His followers immediately began the work of religiously motivated world conquest that within 12 years overthrew the Iranian Sassanid Empire and seized Syria and Egypt from Byzantium. Islam‘s empire grew in the early eighth century, encompassing central Asia and India to the frontiers of China, consumed North Africa, even laying siege to Constantinople.48 “The Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732”49 and at India‘s Indus River on the east. Incomplete world domination brought with it the unanticipated issue of relations with non-Muslim communities. This was thought to be a temporary state of affairs that would be resolved when Islam finally became the one world religion.50

The early Caliphate‘s ruling class used Islam as a tool for legitimizing their efforts of building and unifying empire. Over time, the later Caliphs demonstrated less interest in inculcating the faith51 within the empire and little appetite for expanding Islam. In the modern era the Islamic mission passed by default from rulers to political activists, marking the rejection of traditional authority and the rise of Islamic individualism. “The Islamists, by contrast, modeled themselves on Islam‘s early conquerors, and aspired to nothing less than the substitution of Allah‘s universal empire for the existing international system.52

Conflict continues between the tectonic plates of Islam and Christianity to the present day. In response to centuries of Islamic aggression, a series of Roman Catholic Crusades during the 11th to 13th centuries reclaimed the Holy Lands for Christianity. Ottoman Turks (14th – 17th centuries) countered by restoring the Levant to Islam then capturing Constantinople, seizing the Balkans and, in the process, twice attempting to reduce Vienna, in 1529 and in 1683. In recent times, the frontiers of Islam have increasingly been areas of bloodshed.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia….”53

Islam has not only contended with European Christianity. In Africa “the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and increasingly Christianized peoples to the south.”54 Modern examples of this conflict are raging in Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, Mali and Chad, as well as intermittent clashes with Christian Copts in Egypt and Abyssinians in Ethiopia. To the East and South Islam contends with Asian people in historically Hindu and Buddhist regions as well as those adherents to a wide variety of Oriental religions.55 When Pakistan and India were partitioned in 1947, millions of Muslims and Hindus were displaced resulting in about one million deaths. These two nations remain mutually hostile.

However, of all American actions in the region over the past 300 years, the Restorationist Movement56 was to have the most profound impact. Restoration is the religiously motivated idea that the Jewish Diaspora should returned to the Holy Land to reestablish the nation of Israel, thus ushering in the return of the Messiah. Evangelical churches in the colonial era were strongly supportive of this popular movement, which subsequently “penetrated the mainstream” of American Christianity.57 Ultimately, this Restorationist movement culminated in the 1948 UN Mandate establishing the modern state of Israel.

Over all, Islam has been in retreat since the second siege of Vienna (1683)—more than three hundred years ago. During that time Christian and post-Christian civilization has profoundly affected the economics, government, mores, society, and culture of the entire Muslim world.58 These developments have brought forth overwhelming discontent and resentments throughout the Islamic world. While there are numerous causes for Islamic grievance against the West, none is more pronounced or focused than the existence of the modern state of Israel. Islamic fundamentalism has given voice to and demanded redress for the angry passions of the Muslim civilization.59

The Islamic Law of War

In the initial centuries, Mujahidin60 found astonishing success in all directions of the compass as they spread the faith by conquest. It is one thing to have a religion of personal piety but quite another to acquire an empire. The nascent Islamic state soon required a body of laws to regulate conduct with neighboring communities and with internally tolerated religious communities. “The special branch of the sacred law—the siyar–developed by the Muslim jurists to meet the need that may aptly be called the Islamic Law of Nations.”61 Islamic practice and laws of war developed from the example of the Prophet Mohammed‘s 27 battles and the commentaries testifying of his immediate successors Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.62 Kadduri notes that the law “precedes the state: it provides the basis of the state.”63 It is therefore not God, but God‘s law which really governs; and, as such, the State should be called nomocracy, not theocracy.64

In the Muslim view, Allah is ineffable and therefore not tainted by human interactions. What makes Islam a nomocracy is that a human ruler enforces the perfect, divinely-given law.65 The state exists solely to enforce the divine law, and if it fails in that duty, the state “obviously forfeits its raison d’etre—the believer still remained under the obligation to observe the law even in the absence of any one to enforce it.”66 Islamic law consists of faraid (obligations) illuminating the Sharia (the right path) to salvation. Sharia distinguishes between religious obligation (fard) and the religiously forbidden (haram). Between these two poles, Muslims have the freedom to express their faith positively (mandub) and to refrain from the unacceptable (makruh). There is also the category of jaiz, to which the law is indifferent and the believer has full freedom of action.67

Kadduri notes there are three vital characteristics of the divine law. First, the law is permanent and applicable in all times and places. Secondly, the primary concerns of the law are the common interest of the Umma, thus the individual is protected only as long as the individual‘s rights coincide with the wellbeing of the Islamic community. Thirdly, the law must be sincerely followed in good faith.68

Traditional Islamic culture rests upon a religion of laws and thus requires religious lawyers, or jurists, to interpret that law. Four centuries after Mohammed, four orthodox legal schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali) became recognized mainstream interpreters of Sunni Islam. Their legal opinions became the standard of orthodoxy, and any departure from these established legal opinions were “denounced as innovation (bida). As a result ijtiha69 was gradually abandoned in favor of taqlid (literally, “imitation” or “submission”) to the canons of the four schools, and the door of ijtihad was shut.70

The issue of ijtihad gains increasing importance when consideration of current Islamist thought is taken into account, because Salifists discard standard interpretations for innovative understandings. Modern Islamic Radicals, contrary to accepted doctrine, teach that only violent confrontation with the dar al harb and kafir (hypocritical or heretical Muslims) will save Islam. Islamist pronouncements are considered by traditional Islamic jurists as originating from the unlearned and condemned as innovation (bida). Some have identified this trend toward independent Quranic interpretation as the equivalent of the “Protestant Reformation” in Islam. For instance, bin Laden issued a 1998 fatwa, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” which legitimated subsequent attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa. Neither bin Laden nor any of his lieutenants are recognized clerics with alim (interpreter of Islamic law) credentials. These self-appointed interpretations are framed in traditional fatwa form to provide a perception of authenticity with Muslim masses.71

As originally formulated, the Muslim law of nations was a temporary situation—the institution of an Islamic nation(s) in relationship with non-Islamic nations. It is universally believed within Islam that “all people, except perhaps those of the tolerated religions, would become Muslims.”72 The entire world will be subordinated to the complete authority of the Caliph. The Muslim law of nations is a triumphalist worldview that recognizes no other legitimate authority.73

Ibn Khaldun (AD 1332-1406) was one of the most prominent scholars to develop Muslim thought concerning war—naming “man‘s will-to-revenge” as its primary cause. Wars were not “casual social calamities”; rather, the causes were rooted from creation in the anger, avarice, emotions, guilt or jealousy of mankind. Thus groups or nations would conspire against one another and then make war.74 War is an unnatural state entered into “because of man‘s carelessness and sins. Ibn ‘Abd-Allah…described wars as diseases…their frequency …arising from the very nature of man, makes their recurrence as permanent as social life itself.”75

Islamic writers wrestle with the same sorts of just war issues that Christians have: i.e., varieties of conflicts, treatment of the defeated, establishment of (Islamic) law. ‘Umar ibn Ibrahim al-Awasi al-Ansari penned a 14th century work, The Dispelling of Fears in the Management of Wars, the 1961 edition of which “mentions over 40 classical Arabic texts on warfare written between the 8th and 15th century.”76 A more recent text focusing upon Islamic international law is, The Book of the Law of Nations, by Shaybani.

Islamic jurists admit no legitimate cause for war except jihad. “Only a war which has an ultimate religious purpose, that is, to enforce God‘s law or to check transgression against it, is a just war. No other form of fighting is permitted within or without the Muslim brotherhood.”77 The jihad concept set strict limits on the Arabic cultural proclivity for internecine conflict. Tribes could not go to war with Muslim coreligionists and justify this as jihad.

“In Muslim legal theory, the objective of war is neither the achievement of victory nor the acquisition of the enemy‘s property; it is rather the fulfillment of a duty—the jihad in Allah‘s path—by universalizing the Islamic faith.78 Thus Hamas‘ declaration of “victory”79 following the recent devastating three-week attack by Israel in the Gaza Strip has little to do with their military debacle and everything to do with the Islamic faith of the Palestinians.80 Jihad is religiously-justified war, “not as an instrument of policy but as an emblem of identity, an expression of community, an end in itself.”81

Understanding Jihad

The word jihad, in English, literally means “struggle.” It is popularly translated as, “holy war, but that is only one of its derivative meanings. Kadduri philologically notes that the verbal form, jahada carries the meaning “exerted.“  “Its juridical-theological meaning is exertion of one‘s power in Allah‘s path, that is the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world.”82 For the individual to sincerely make jihad is to be rewarded with Allah‘s salvation, the direct path to the Islamic paradise. Jihad is almost universally regarded by jurists as ‘a collective obligation of the whole Muslim community.’83

Believe in Allah and His Apostle and carry on warfare (jihad) in the path of Allah with your possession and your persons. That is better for you. If ye have knowledge, He will forgive your sins, and will place you in the Gardens beneath which the streams flow, and fine houses in the Gardens of Eden: that is the great gain. [Q.LXI, 10-13]

Islamic Jurists have recognized four different manners in which the true believer may accomplish the obligation for jihad. The greater jihad (identified as such by the Prophet Mohammed) is that spiritual path whereby the believer submits one‘s heart to the will of Allah. The second and third manner of jihad, submission of the tongue and hands, are for the support of society by enforcing justice and correction of evil. All of Islam recognizes great worth in these spiritual devotions, observation of personal piety and communal obedience to Allah. The lesser jihad is accomplished by the sword, or by the conduct of war that defends or enlarges Islam. The fourth form of jihad, the conduct of holy war, “is concerned with fighting the unbelievers and the enemies of the faith. The believers are under the obligation of sacrificing their ‘wealth and lives‘ (Q.LXI, 11) in the prosecution of war.”84

It is this lesser jihad, appropriately named “holy war,” that concerns the world community and is of primary concern to the Christian warrior both for the implications of that belief and for the real-world actions of Islamists. “In the words of Ibn Khaldun: ‘…the jihad is a religious duty because of the universalism of the Islamic mission and the obligation [to convert] everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.’”85

Muslims view Scripturaries, Jews and Christians, as people who responded to Allah‘s Prophets but tragically not to Mohammed. These “People of the Book” are subject to a limited jihad that renders three choices—convert to Islam; pay jizyah (the poll tax) and be allowed to live in the community as second-class citizens (dihimini); or receive the full consequence of jihad. The polytheists (a generic term for the remainder of the world‘s population) are given the choice either to convert or be subject to the sword. Any convert to Islam is granted full citizenship.86 Kadduri remarks that jihad is a sanction or a punishment against those at variance with Islam. “The jihad, therefore, may be defined as the litigation between Islam and polytheism; it is also a form of punishment to be inflicted upon Islam‘s enemies and the renegades from the faith.” He goes on to assert that jihad is bellum justum—a just war.87 Thus the jihad, reflecting the normal war relations existing between Muslims and non-Muslims, was the state‘s instrument for transforming the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam.88

The practice of lesser jihad against believers was permitted by Al-Mawardi against those apostatizing from the faith (al-ridda); against Muslims creating dissension in the Islamic community (al-baghi); and against those fomenting secession from Islamic rule (al-muharibun). Some other jurists concluded that protecting the frontiers of Islam (al-ribat) was also permitted.89 378

Much legal reflection has gone into defining qualifications for a Muslim waging jihad (holy war). The Shafii School identified seven tests to determine if a person was under obligation to perform the lesser jihad. The Jihadist must be a (1) believer in Islam; (2) mature and of sound mind; (3) male; (4) economically independent; (5) receive his parent‘s permission; (6) be of good intention; (7) fulfill certain spiritual duties while serving as a jihadi.90

Jihad is divinely initiated war that is completely different from war initiated by humans for their own devices. Islamic nations or entities are fully convinced that they wage holy war at the instigation of God. “Islam, in its all-embracing creed, is imposed on the believers as a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political if not strictly military.”91 Kadduri notes that although jihad is the undeviating foundation for Islamic relations with its neighbors, it did not necessitate continual strife and that the jihad against Islam‘s neighbors could be accomplished by non-violent methods.92

James Turner Johnson describes characteristics of holy war that are common across the monotheistic religious continuum. Holy War is conducted at God‘s command by his commissioned leadership, but the primary warrior is God who wages war against unfaithfulness inside and outside the people of God. Holy war is conducted to protect and purify the faith of nation and its society, to bring about true devotion and punish disobedience. In the conduct of holy war, human warriors are seen as morally righteous even in killing that is necessary during battle. Holy war is both an aggressively violent and nonviolent struggle for the accomplishment of God‘s purposes managed by spiritual leaders resulting in divinely miraculous results.93

For the Islamic community, jihad “delivers a different set of virtues: a vibrant local identity, a sense of community, solidarity among kinsmen, neighbors, and countrymen, narrowly conceived.94 However, this worldview, which necessarily excludes all except coreligionists, results in a constricted and un-accepting culture made secure by an attitude of conflict against outsiders. This sort of solidarity “often means obedience to a hierarchy in governance, fanaticism in beliefs, and the obliteration of individual selves in the name of the group.”95 The principle of jihad is the basis of Islamic intolerance toward others and loyalty to the UmmaJihad engenders “deference” to communal leadership and a corresponding suspicion about liberal-democratic values which teach that both men and women are “capable of governing themselves.”96

Muslims are promised divine rewards for faithful service to this communal duty. Traditionally recognized authorities gave extravagant promises to martyrs of “eternal life in paradise immediately and without trial on the resurrection and judgment day for those who die in Allah‘s path. Such martyr remains were not ceremonially washed but were buried where they fell on the battlefield.97

Who may legitimately declare jihad against others? Among the Sunna, the obligation for calling the faithful to war belongs to the state. “As a collective duty, the jihad is a state instrument; the imam, accordingly, as head or deputy head of the state, is charged with the duty of declaring it.”98 The Shii regard this authority as belonging to the Rightful Imam (who has disappeared) leaving that duty without a proper declaratory authority.

Opinion differed as to the capacity of the mujtahids to act in the name of the imam in fulfilling the jihad obligation; but since the duty of calling the believers to battle is a matter in which an infallible judgment is necessary – since the interest of the entire community would be at stake – only an imam is capable of fulfilling such a duty. Further, it is deemed impossible to combat evil during the absence of the imam; the jihad, accordingly, is regarded as inconsequential. Thus in the Shii legal theory, the jihad has entered into a dormant stage – it is in a state of suspension. In contrast to the Sunni doctrine which requires the revival of the dormant jihad when Muslim power is regained, the resumption of the jihad in the Shii doctrine would be dependent on the return of the imam from his ghayba (absence), in the capacity of a Mahdi, who will triumphantly combat evil and reestablish justice and righteousness.99

The Kharijis sect, distinct from both Sunna and Shii, holds that jihad is the sixth pillar of the Islamic faith and is compulsory for the entire community. Theirs is a jihad of compulsion by violence. Islam ought to be imposed on the unbeliever by the sword. “This is based on a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: ‘My fate is under the shadow of my spear.’”100

Radical Islam and Holy War

A few months after moving his organization to Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden published his first fatwa, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” in al-Quds al-Arabi, the Arabic language newspaper based in London.101 A fatwa is an Islamic religious opinion normally issued by an acknowledged scholar, and its importance depends upon the communally recognized status of that jurist. His work, known as the Ladenese Epistle, “is an endless list of charges…The most prominent grievance is bin Laden‘s hallmark: the ‘Zionist-Crusader Alliance,’ that amalgam of world infidelity, is waging a war against the people of Islam.”102 His declaration of war caught the attention of the entire Muslim world on two counts. First, bin Laden is not a recognized Quranic authority even if he might popularly speak for the masses. Secondly, as all Muslims know, ―the declaration of jihad creates a legal state of hostilities.103 His subsequent attacks on the U.S. “stem from a pervasive fear—in the minds of bin Laden and many other Muslims—that American culture is crushing theirs.”104 Bin Laden exploited the fact that there “is no ‘clear, decisive, and unequivocal’ religious authority [in Islam] able to declare that the killing of innocents by terrorist attacks is contrary to Islam….”105

Bin Laden did not act within a vacuum; there were historical predecessors teaching radical interpretations of jihad. Ibn Taymiyya (1263 – 1328) was an early Islamic jurist who became a precursor for Islamist philosophers. Unlike most clerics, he added jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.106 Historically, most clerics didn‘t consider jihad (holy war) as essential to personal piety. Ibn Taymiyya noted that both prayer and the practice of jihad were “God‘s two essential requirements for all conscientious, able-bodied Muslims. The goal of jihad is God‘s victory; anyone who opposes jihad is therefore an enemy of God.”107 He did not recognize a distinction between a greater and lesser jihad. “Along with his contemporaries, he considered the superior form of jihad to be combat against infidels. Spiritual jihad was important as preparation for the more physically demanding kind of jihad.”108 Ibn Taymiyya’s stress upon holy war is taken as an article of faith for contemporary Islamists, rejecting an emphasis upon the spiritual without war making. He taught that religion was not subordinate to the state, but rather there must be agreement between the ruler and clerics. Further, if a ruler was not personally pious and would not enforce Sharia he was to be considered apostate and Muslims were obligated to depose him. Obedience to such a ruler was against one‘s religion.109

Among modern Islamists, where there are few clergy, there is a rejection of orthodox religious opinion in favor their version of a return to an older, “purer” form of Islam. “Implicit in this is a disregard for generations of learning and religious authority, a repudiation that goes beyond the insistence of ibn Taymiyya on the individual struggle with the Quran and hadith.”110 Islamic scholars consider Islamist teaching ijtihad—the error of innovation. Bin Laden is a businessman who studied economics and business administration at a Saudi Arabian university. Yet he boldly rejected accepted scholarly judgment and issued an independent and ‘binding‘ religious opinion to the world Islamic community.

For Western minds it is difficult to understand that there is no separation of church and state in Islam. As currently practiced in Muslim society (except perhaps in Iran), official religion is subordinate to but inseparable from the state. (It must be noted that in Islamic nations, everything is conditioned by religion even if individual national leaders sometimes act out of seemingly non-religious motives). However, the Islamist world-view is quite opposite. Religion is primary over all things in the Salafist view; it directs the workings of government. Entirely within the context of Islamist thought, radical leaders like Ayman al-Zawahri “stress the requirement to achieve political power and control: the ‘victory of Islam will never take place until a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world.‘”111 The Islamist goal is to establish the political unity of the Umma—a caliphate headed by a “Rightly Guided Caliph.”112 Initially, the Caliphate must be restored in the heart of the Islamic world—the Levant, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq. From that position of moral and political strength the new Islamist revolution would be spread throughout the world.

The traditional Islamist position rejects all modern Muslim governments as counterfeits of the Islamic ideal. This is not a novel teaching, but dates from the thirteenth century. Ibn Taymiyya refused to acknowledge any primacy of the state over Islam. In his view, there was an authentic unity between the sovereign and the clergy. This was a vision to recreate the lost reality of the Prophet Mohammed‘s time. “His were serious demands: a ruler who did not enforce sharia or exhibit scrupulous personal piety would be no better than an apostate, and under Islamic law, Muslims were obligated to rebel against such a leader.”113 Obedience to an apostate monarch, especially one who violated the principles of the faith, was to be considered equivalent to rejection of the Qur’an and committing apostasy.

The modern Umma is confronted with the choice of adapting to a globalized existence of nation-state interdependence that has been created by the West or seeking some Islamic alternative. Existing national leaders in Muslim nations are often dictatorial, insular and grossly out of touch with their populations. The majority of Muslims are caught in a cycle of hopelessness, poverty and lack of opportunity. Radical Islam has given voice to popular Muslim grievances and because of that gained great popularity. Islamists also offer a hope of a unified Umma in a region that remains divided by tribal, religious, and political divisions, in which continued instability is inevitable.114

Islamism is a twenty-first century phenomenon that has emerged as an evolving insurgency “having broad appeal among the global Muslim community.”115 The primary objective of Islamist groups is to overthrow the existing nation-state structure within the Islamic world and to reconstitute a unified and worldwide Umma of Islamic piety and power. However, the overthrow of Muslim governments proved too great a task for the present. “In national struggles, the jihadists were overmatched by the security apparatus of the state.”116 Thus the enemy at hand—the governments of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, etc.—proved to be too powerful, even if the source of that power could be conveniently blamed upon the United States. Islamist attention shifted to the “far enemy,” the Christian West, and especially the USA.

The question debated in Islamist circles centered upon a strategy for confronting the far enemy. How could the movement successfully achieve its primary goal by defeating the Christian West? Abu Bakr Naji theorized a strategic vision for attaining Islamist ideological goals. He noted that Muslim governments were propped up by either of the superpowers (the Soviet Union or the USA). If a superpower could be “provoked” into an invasion of the Middle East it would facilitate a propaganda victory for four reasons.

…the people will 1) be impressed that the jihadis are directly fighting a superpower, 2) be outraged over the invasion of a foreign power, 3) be disabused of the notion that the superpower is invincible the longer the war goes on, and, 4) be angry at the proxy governments allied with the invading superpower. Moreover, he argues, it will bleed the superpower‘s economy and military. This will lead to social unrest at home and the ultimate defeat of the superpower.117 406

Radical Islamic movements have conspired to implement variations on this strategy by patiently attacking American interests, including the following: Iran Embassy Hostages (1979); – Beirut, Lebanon, Embassy and Lebanon Marine Barracks (1983); – Lockerbie, Scotland, Pan-Am flight to New York (1988); – First New York World Trade Center attack (1993); – Dhahran , Saudi Arabia, Khobar Towers Military complex (1996); – Nairobi, Kenya, U.S. Embassy (1998); – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, U.S. Embassy (1998), and Aden, Yemen, the USS Cole (2000).118

Ineffective and tepid American responses encouraged the Islamists to regard the USA as a degenerate society unable to overcome their righteous cause. For this reason, the American responses to the September 2001 attacks on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon were completely unanticipated by Islamists. However, though unforeseen, the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq brought the West into the Middle East where it could be confronted.

Such a shift in strategy from the near to the far enemy, a far more powerful opponent, meant a radical change in operational design. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak. If it were possible to confront and defeat the enemy directly, much time and effort could be saved. To directly confront America was simply out of the question. Dramatic terrorist attacks taking noncombatant lives would accomplish two objectives: gaining support from the – “Arab street,” – and striking fear into the U.S. population. Ayman al-Zawahri, writing in “Knights under the Prophet‘s Banner,” (2001) declared:

If the successful operations against Islam‘s enemies and the severe damage inflicted on them do not serve the ultimate goal of establishing the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world they will be nothing more than disturbing acts, regardless of their magnitude, that could be absorbed and endured even if after some time and with some losses.119 408

Fanaticism usually leads to the justification of terrible and forbidden actions on the basis of the results obtained. Thus we find the modern advent of the Islamic suicide bomber—whether the bomb is strapped to the person, carried in a vehicle, or loaded on an airplane. Traditional Muslim scholars argue that suicide is not Islamic, that it is an unpardonable sin and not a true martyrdom. “Naming a martyr is the business of Allah, the scholar Amir Taheri reminds us, not of those ‘in pursuit of political goals’…Muslims who implicitly condone terror know they cannot smuggle a new concept into Islamic ethics.”120 On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri noted that: “…the method of martyrdom operations [is] the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahidin in terms of casualties.”121 Suicide bombers are inexpensive, and they leave no one behind to implicate accomplices while achieving a maximum of killing and terror.

“Taheri argues that ‘not a single reputable theologian anywhere’ endorses the new trick word that has been added to the Islamic lexicon by those who are trying to get around restrictions against suicide bombings.”122 Declaring such suicide bombers as “martyrs” is to knowingly contravene 1,600 years of Islamic teaching and to glorify forbidden actions. “Radical clerics do not educate suicide-bombers and would-be jihadists on these finer points of Islamic law and its complexity.”123 Further, such persons are made promises of paradise, common in popular Islamist cultural lore that “the martyr who kills for the faith and perishes in the process is given seventy-two black-eyed women to serve him. His reward will come ten minutes after his ‘martyrdom.’”124 Many Islamic experts, such as Georgetown University Professor Yvonne Haddad, dispute this notion as “nowhere to be found in Islamic writings.”125

Other excesses of religion have appeared in the recent past that are contrary to Quranic just war teaching. Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, the chief cleric of Iran, issued a fatwa that permitted children as young as nine years old to fight a jihad against Iraq during the decade of the 1980s. Iranian propaganda was aimed at school children encouraging passion for martyrdom. “Competing legal traditions on the age of adulthood grant it at puberty, which could occur at age 12 in boys and age 9 in girls.”126 Hezbollah and other radical Islamic movements encourage the making of martyrdom videos, manipulating the jihadist impulse in the Muslim community.127 The Taliban, among others, have taken and beheaded hostages contrary to the clear teachings of the Qur’an (Q. Sur. 5, al-Maida).

Conclusion: The Islamists Will Continue to Present a Grave Threat to Free Peoples

Terrorism depends upon the sudden and random killing of innocents to gain political advantage. Zuhur references numerous texts from the Qur’an and hadiths that expressly forbid the indiscriminate killing of innocents.128 Islamic radicals defend such wholesale tactics by asserting that “their victims are not innocent people” but collectively responsible for the affronts to Islam.129 Others argue that these earlier verses protecting innocents are “abrogated’ by subsequent “sword verses.” Further, radicals blame Muslim governments for not acquiescing to Islamist demands, leaving them no other options against a more powerful foe. The claim that such actions are, in reality, a recompense for the sufferings of Muslims, and that this is war and in war innocent people die.130

Islamists have rejected or radically reinterpreted orthodox teaching. Jihad is practiced as unrestrained warfare against both non-Muslim and apostate Muslims alike. Terror methodologies are a necessity in the confrontation of injustice. It is an “obligation that Muslims cannot ignore…assassinations, deception, kidnappings – these acts which are either justified or excused by the realities of the struggle that contemporary Muslims are commanded to undertake.”131

Zuhur points out that such doctrine, which labels a “Muslim as a non-Muslim (takfiri),” denies the legitimacy of the entire Muslim world (jahili, non-Muslim condition), and that the sole solution of jihad (holy war) “factionalizes‘ the Umma. “It distorts the classical definitions of war against apostates, unbelievers, rebels, and brigands, and misdirects the debate over the nature of the collective or individual duty to jihad.132

Islamism is, depending upon the observer, both a natural outgrowth of Muslim theology and a heretical mutation of the true faith. What is abundantly clear to non-Muslims is that Islam is not a monolith with a univocal expression. There exists today a multitude of voices and organizations within the Islamic religion, all claiming to speak for the world’s 1.7 billion Muslims.

This has been a necessarily brief summary of the Islamic and Islamist concept of war, and of the current practice of Islamist terrorism. In it, I have attempted to contrast the orthodox and the Islamist positions and their views on the practice of jihad as war. I have also sought to cite important voices in the development of the Islamist ideal. In order to respond effectively to this very serious threat, we in the West need to become much more aware that the phenomenon of global Islamist aggression will continue to consume the attention of military and political leaders, our peoples, and much of our energy and resources, for the foreseeable future.


Wylie W. Johnson has served as the Senior Pastor of The Springfield Baptist Church, Springfield, Pennsylvania, since May 1997. Ordained in 1982, he served five years as Assistant Pastor at First Baptist Church, Metuchen, New Jersey; followed by 10 years in the active Army Chaplaincy prior to coming to Springfield. His education includes a D.Min. (Lutheran Theological Seminary of Philadelphia); M.Div. (Denver Seminary); MSS (U.S. Army War College), and a B.A. (The King’s College, New York).

He retired in 2012. His last assignment was service as the Command Chaplain for the Military Intelligence Readiness Command of the U.S. Army. He is a veteran of five conflicts and a master parachutist. In his Army career, Chaplain Johnson served in Honduras, Korea, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as numerous locations in the continental United States.


ENDNOTES

1.  In the Arabic language, kafir means “hypocritical or heretical“; a verbal variant, taqfir, is “to declare someone a hypocrite or heretic.”

2.  Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 3.

3.  Literally, “struggle”

4.  Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage” (The Atlantic, September 1990, accessed February 03, 2009) available from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage; internet.

5.  Friedman, Thomas L. From Beirut to Lebanon (New York: Anchor Books, NY 1989); p. 89.

6.  Muslims cite their scripture: “you are the best of all nations.” Qur’an 3:110 [also used by Bin Laden] which Muslims believe is absolutely true but incongruent with their present circumstances.

7.  Umma – all Muslim people of faith regardless of nationality.

8.  Shenk, David W. Journeys of the Muslim Nation and the Christian Church: Exploring the Mission of Two Communities (Waterloo, Ontario: Herald Press, 2003); p.24.

9.  Kadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam (New York: AMS Press, 1979); p. 63.

10. Ibid, Shenk, p. 225.

11. Ibid, p. 49.

12. Barber, Benjamin R. “Jihad vs. McWorld” in Conflict After The Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. updated 2nd edit. Richard K. Betts, edit. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005); p. 623-24.

13. Garfinkle, Adam. “How We Misunderstand Terrorism.” (E-Note from FPRI. 11 Sep 2008. Foreign Policy Research Institute, accessed 08 March 2009).

14. Ibid, Garfinkle.

15. Exemplified by Shi‘i Ayatollahs Abul Qasim al Khu‘I, Mirza Hosein Na‘ini, and Ali al-Sistani.

16. Ibid, Garfinkle.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon. p. 177-178.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid, p. 176-177.

21. Ibid, p. 79.

22. Ahmad, Jala Al-i & Hamid Algar Occidentosis: A Plague From the West (North Haledon, NJ, Mizan Press, 1984). The term ‘westoxification‘ originated in this book also, ‘Occidentosis.‘

23. Berman, Paul. “The philosopher of Islamic Terror” in the New York Times, March 23, 2003.

24. Ibid, Berman.

25. Hourani, Albert. A History Of The Arab Peoples (New York: MJF Books, 1991); p. 398.

26. Ibid, Berman.

27. Qutb, Sayyid. Social Justice in Islam (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2000); p. 261.

28. Ibid, p. 26.

29 Ibid, Berman.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid, Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, p. 19.

32. Ibid, p. 30.

33. Ibid. p. 37.

34. Qutb, Sayyid. Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview, Islamic (North Haledon, NJ: Publications International, 2006); p. 97

35. Ibid, p. 6.

36. Ibid, Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, p. 262.

37. Ibid, p. 35.

38. Ibid, Qutb, p. 269-70.

39. Ibid, Karsh, p. 215-216.

40. Ibid, Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, p. 52.

41. Ibid, Benjamin, p. 60.

42. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 64.

43. Jihad – literally, “struggle”

44. This statement is from a Christian perspective only, Muslims regard the Qur’an to have been handed down from God in a complete and perfect form that admits no human motivations.

45. Karsh, Efraim. Islamic Imperialism: A History (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2007); p. 5.

46. Ibid, Karsh, p. 5.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid, Karsh, p. 23.

49. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations? Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, updated 2nd edit. Richard K. Betts, edit. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005); p. 38-39.

50. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 52.

51. In fact, non-Islamic peoples (dihimini) were obliged to pay the jizyah (the poll tax) which was a very lucrative income for the empire.

52. Ibid, Karsh, p. 212.

53. Ibid, Huntington, p. 40.

54. Ibid, p. 40.

55. Ibid.

56. Christian Zionism, an offshoot of this movement, militantly supports the (Jewish) Zionist ideal and radically opposes any Palestinian claim to the land of Israel.

57. Ibid, Oren, p. 141.

58. Ibid, Lewis.

59. Ibid.

60. Muslim warriors whose primary motivation is to either defend or expand the Islamic faith.

61. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 3.

62. Zuhur, Sherifa D., Youssef H Aboul-Enein. Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, accessed Feb. 3, 2009, p. 1.); available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=588; internet.

63. Kadduri omits mention that the Muslim Law of Nations (Siyar) was not articulated for some 200 years after Muhammad, although it was founded upon Muhammad‘s example and the Qur’an.

64. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 16.

65. Ibid, p. 14.

66. Ibid, p. 24.

67. Ibid, p. 25.

68. Ibid, p. 26-7.

69. Ijtihad – making an independent interpretation of texts in the Quran or Sunnah.

70. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 36.

71. Benjamin, Daniel & Steven Simon. The Age Of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002); p. 117.

72. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 44.

73. Ibid, p. 44-5.

74. Ibid, p. 69-70.

75. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 71-72.

76. Ibid, Zuhur, p.2.

77. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 69.

78. Ibid, p. 102.

79. January 30, 2009.

80. In Islamic Just War teaching, this is the defense of Islam as a religious duty.

81. Ibid, Barber, p.623.

82. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 55-56.

83. Ibid, p. 60.

84. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 56-57.

85. Ibid, Karsh, p.66.

86. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 80.

87. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 59.

88. Ibid, p. 53-54.

89. The outstanding case of apostasy was the secession of the tribes of Arabia after the death of Muhammad. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, warned them first to return to Islam, and those who did not return were severely fought, especially by Khalid ibn al-Walid, who burned a great number of them in spite of objections raised regarding the penalty of burning. The leaders of the apostated tribes were severely punished and most of them were slain. An eminent chronicler, al-Baladhuri, reports that nobody escaped death save those who returned to Islam. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 74.

90. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 84-87.

91. Ibid, p. 64.

92. Ibid.

93. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea In Western And Islamic Traditions (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); p. 37-39.

94. Ibid, Barber, p. 625.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 59-60. [Q.IX,74].

98. Ibid, p. 94.

99. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 67.

100. Ibid, p. 67-8.

101. The Two Holy Places are Medina and Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

102. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon, p. 140-141.

103. Ibid, Kadduri, p. 94.

104. Johnson, Douglas V. and John R. Martin, “Terrorism Viewed Historically,” Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses. John R. Martin, ed. (Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002, 1-5); p. 3.

105. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 133.

106. The other five pillars of Islam are shahadah (profession of faith), salah (ritual prayer), zakat (almsgiving), sawm (fasting during Ramadan) and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).

107. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon. p. 49-50.

108. Ibid, p. 48.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid, p. 79-80.

111. al-Zawahri as cited in Kiras, James D. “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency” Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Eds. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin S. Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); p.164.

112. This is the title given to the first four successors to Mohammad.

113. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon, p. 48.

114. Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (United States Joint Forces Command, November 2008); p. 35.

115. Roper, Daniel S. Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War (Carlisle PA: Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, Autumn 2008); p. 99.

116. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon, p. 120.

117. Brachman, Jarret M. & William F. McCants. “Stealing al-Qaida’s Playbook.” (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 2006. p. 7, accessed August 03, 2009); available from http://www.ctc.usma.edu/pdf/Stealing%20Al-Qai’da’s%20Playbook%20–%20CTC.pdf; internet.

118. Many lesser known or remembered additional attacks were accomplished in a wide variety of nations over this same period.

119. Mahnken, Thomas G. Strategic Theory and Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Eds., John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colins S. Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007. 66-81); p. 70.

120. Ibid, Elshtain, p. 11.

121. Ibid, Benjamin & Simon, p. 29-30.

122. Ibid, Elshtain, p. 11.

123. Ibid, Zuhur, p. 13.

124. Ibid, Elshtain, p. 43.

125. Ibid, p. 43.

126. Ibid, Zuhur, p. 13.

127. Ibid, p. 13.

128. Ibid, p. 22.

129. Evans, Ernest. The Mind of a Terrorist: How Terrorists See Strategy and Morality (World Affairs, Washington, Spring 2005, Vol. 167, Issue 4, p. 175-180).

130. Ibid, Evans, p. 175-180.

131. Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study In Comparative Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster: John Knox Press, 1993); p. 106-107.

132. Ibid, Zuhur, p. 29.

JUST WAR OVER CYBER NETWORKS

By Reverend Wylie W. Johnson, D.Min., M.Div., M.S.S.; Chaplain (Colonel), U.S. Army Reserve (Retired), Senior Pastor of Springfield Baptist Church, Springfield, Pennsylvania

Cyber is the fifth domain of warfare. It is an anonymous, global, instantaneous, virtual world not physically inhabited by persons. In cyberspace, machines are autonomous proxies for people. Humanity is removed from cyberspace by one or more orders of magnitude. It is a frontier of pure pragmatism – if it can be done, do it with a machine. Therefore the natural tendency is to view actions occurring within cyberspace as virtual and without moral content or responsibility. However, the entire field of cyberspace is a place of human endeavor that also brings with it individual and corporate human responsibility to conduct all activities ethically. All cyber actions, even second/third/fourth/etc. order effects must be evaluated for morality. Cyber War must be waged justly. Just War categories have not been rendered obsolete because the Cyber War domain is new, exponentially expanding and little understood. Rather, Just War categories are supple and comprehensive for all human undertakings in the conduct of warfare.

It is not possible to write law that anticipates every instance of human action. Enforcement of law goes a long way toward curbing the darker urges of humanity, requires highly disciplined militaries, and a national will to be virtuous. To wage a Just War requires leaders and warriors of virtue, principle and integrity. Virtue Ethics may become integral to a human being’s soul, but the Law will always be an exterior value.

NEW IS OLD AND OLD IS NEW

New is old and old is new. Information has always been at the heart of warfare. What is now novel is that information is collected, transmitted and communicated at the speed of light along digital networks. The emerging field of Cyber War (CW) is rapidly developing in a largely unregulated arena where new avenues of action,effects and possibilities are routinely being developed.

Cyber is the fifth domain of warfare.2 It is a largely anonymous, global, instantaneous, virtual world—not physically inhabited by persons. In cyberspace, machines are autonomous proxies for persons. Humanity is removed from cyberspace by one or more orders of magnitude. It is a frontier of pure pragmatism. Therefore the natural tendency is to view cyberspace actions as virtual, amoral and without assignable responsibility. Cyber War is truly seductive, relatively inexpensive,3 and increasingly available to second and third tier nations. It has potential to harm an enemy anonymously with little chance of being identified for retribution.

 Many scholars regard Cyber War as a force multiplier and not a venue for decisive warfare such as land or sea. To date this assessment is probably correct, in that without the application of conventional power a cyber-contest would not conclude hostilities.4 However, given the immediacy, reach and relatively low cost of cyber weapons the “destructive capacity for poor and weak states is unprecedented.”5 Cyber weapons have the potential to wreak catastrophic economic, infrastructure, and military losses while the attacking nation is insulated from retribution.

Some persons claim that Just War morality is obsolete.6 Various arguments are put forth based upon the increasing complexity of modern warfare; or the anonymity of cyberspace; or because of the apparent demise of the Westphalian state; or because of the horrific potential of various weapons systems. Others reject the notion that Christian morality is possible. The world also recognizes the hypocrisy and frustrating futility of enforcing a morality that is reduced to a series of legal checklists.

JUST WAR APPLICABLE TO MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIONS

Just War morality, however, has not become passé. It is a matter of living virtue for both individuals and nations.7 Virtue reaches far deeper into the human soul than professional ethics or complicity with existing laws. Virtue, or the lack of it, describes humanity. Regardless of secular optimism, human nature has not evolved beyond its fallenness. Reinhold Niebuhr wrote prolifically concerning humanity’s fallenness as the appalling cause of humanity‘s troubles.8 There continues to reside within the heart of every person and the people of every nation the propensity to do evil. Therefore, virtue as personal character and moral codes guiding public and private action are essential for the maintenance of civil order. Humanity’s critical social need is for a virtuous populace and leadership.

Secular societies attempt to fashion virtue and morality through the rule of law. It is not possible, however, to write law that anticipates every instance of human action. Nor is it possible to write law that changes the fundamental condition of man. At best, national and international law can only be a guide for persons and nations that are dedicated to moral behaviors. In any case, the modern habit of substituting law for internalized morality results in a “check list” mentality and increasing disparity between the ideal and the normative. Granted, law enforcement goes a long way toward curbing the darker actions of humanity. But law is not a stand-alone; it requires a virtuous national will and an ethically disciplined military to make any meaningful difference in wartime. Virtue Ethics may become integral to a human being’s soul, but the Law will always be an exterior value. To wage a Just War necessitates leaders and warriors of virtue, principle and integrity.9

Just War morality is a mature and comprehensive guide for conduct of human affairs during hostilities. It is eminently applicable for the uncharted domains of Cyber War. Human beings have not somehow evolved beyond ordinary morality with the advent of the cyber domain. In fact, the reverse is true. The temptations and abilities now gathered to humanity through digital means require renewed understanding and application of moral convictions to overcome these enticements. Just War teaching demands that moral actions expressed in a networked world must be given deep thought as to their intent, content and the effects to be achieved. All human actions, cyber or otherwise, express some level of morality. To theorize that the cyber domain is amoral is a fatuous proposition.

 Cyber War must be waged justly. Just War categories have not been rendered obsolete because the domain is new, exponentially expanding and little understood. The entire field of cyberspace is a place of human endeavor that also brings with it individual and corporate human responsibility toward the rest of the human race. All cyber actions, even second/third/fourth/etc. order effects must be carefully evaluated for ethical outcomes. Just War categories are supple and comprehensive for all human warfare.

TECHNOLOGICAL HERESY

Cyberwarfare supports the American war-heresy: technology supersedes all. This heresy is evidenced by commanders who focus upon information flow while ignoring the purely human element, which results in battles that are won but wars that are lost. Transactional analysis of the battlespace ignores the lessons of the past. Great Commanders of the past labored to understand their opponents and anticipate nuances that cannot be quantified.

Technological capabilities too often predetermine how they will be understood and used. Digital communication is flat and devoid of the thickness of true humanity. Complex technology lowers human attention to an unsophisticated, primal level. Concentration upon data develops commanders and formations that are unimaginative, heartless, amoral, and culturally inept warriors. America’s overwhelming cyber advantage and superior intelligence production is also its most glaring weakness. Perhaps this is the primary reason Americans have consistently won battles but lost wars in the modern era. Our opponents focused upon the man, we focused upon the numbers.

Americans are in love with their technology to the point of unreality. This has to do with a faulty understanding about the nature of humanity. In spite of various science fiction fantasies, machines will never be more than tools wielded by people. Layers of complexity and function do not replace the human element, but must always guided by it. This is not deus ex machina, that is, personality introduced to provide a contrived solution to an apparently insoluble difficulty. Understanding the humanity of one’s opponents is an honest recognition of the realities of being human.

Metaphysics and cyber war are compatible and inseparable. Ultimately the cyber effort is an expression of the human will. Imposing one’s will10 on another is a near-divine trait devolving from our creation in the imago dei. Remove the spiritual from the human being, and we reduce mankind to animal mechanism. Modern Western society fundamentally misunderstands the true nature of humanity. It underestimates the ontological uniqueness of homo sapiens. Only human beings can act morally or immorally, to do good or to do evil.

REMINDING OURSELVES ABOUT WHAT IS MORAL

The entire cyber domain is global in its reach, transcending sovereign borders while redefining international security.11 It encompasses political, military, commercial, telecommunications, and civil infrastructure networks.

Cyberspace refers to the fusion of all communication networks, databases and information sources into a global virtual system and cyber-conflict is defined as cyberspace-based attacks on the civilian and military infrastructures (transportation, power, communications and financial infrastructures) upon which societies and armed forces increasingly depend.12

This article explores potential ways that a Just War may be conducted over cyber networks, distinguishing between Cyber War, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Attacks. Cyber War is the declared state of conflict or hostilities between two or more nations or other entities, such as an insurgent movement that is conducted over information domains. Cyber Espionage is the act of covert and unauthorized access by one nation to anther nation’s computer systems, usually accomplished in a period of professed peace. Cyber Attacks13 are the actions of a variety of non-state actors to gain unauthorized access to computers for malicious purposes.

The advent of Cyberwar (CW) is an incredible tactical development exponentially expanding the battlefield and the domain of military interest and action. What CW is not is an evolutionary leap forward that negates all that preceded it. The practitioner of the military arts must not become confused (as it were) by roiling clouds of technological smoke that obscure the effects of digital innovations. Again and again, we must remind ourselves of two principles of life. First, Christ’s admonishment concerning personal culpability: “You are defiled by what comes from your heart.” 14 Second, Clausewitz’s dictum about taking care to act on the fundamental of war: “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”15 New technologies for waging war can easily be mistaken for essential changes in the nature of warfare, but this is simply not so. The fundamentals of morality and the conduct of war have not changed but expanded in scope. What has changed are our ways and means of managing conflict.

 Just War ethics are critical for the moral conduct of warfare. However, Western post-Christian society is increasingly without a metaphysical basis for making moral choices. Faith and war are not just compatible but inseparable. The Christian faith informs us about not only what is, but what ought to be. Morality and moral authority is always sought by humanity because we are spiritual beings; embodied souls accountable to our Creator. Faith in God gives us clear ethical reference points in the material world.

Ethical confusion arises when something like game theory16 is substituted for ontological morality. Various choices in game theory17 implicitly contain a consequentialist morality while attempting to substitute rationalized social mechanisms for ethical choices. Whether one chooses to allow all to win or self to win is a moral choice made for larger reasons than the tactics of the moment.

Technology easily disguises moral realities. Rather than letting technology separate humanity from itself, we must more closely examine what it means to be truly human. One must always be careful to cut through the epistemological clutter. Pragmatism’s fundamental mistake is to misconstrue the ontological reality of humanity. Further, refusal to recognize the necessity of universal moral principles inevitably undercuts any ethical basis for positive law. All of mankind is thus reduced to its animal state and life is conceived as purely functional.

CYBERWAR

What is Cyberwar?18 This evolving form of conflict encompasses all digital means of information delivery that are used to attack another. CW is anonymous, autonomous, and global in its reach. The cyber realm is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA); it creates an environment filled with traps, false repositories of information, misdirection, and counterfeit identities, and severe hazards. CW is like a detective novel that mysteriously cloaks perpetrators, motives and means with a convoluted narrative. Attacks are conceived in secret, crafted in thousands of lines of code before being installed on a machine which then acts autonomously. CW is a “fire and forget” technology in which machines accomplish the bidding of absent humans.

 Who wages Cyberwar? The CW realm contains a kaleidoscope of players, all acting simultaneously in the cyber drama. On low levels of the art we can identify an ill-defined cadre of independent hackers, “hacktivists” and pranksters seeking to crack various systems with malicious code, to spoof the unwary, and to steal things of worth like personal identity or trade secrets. Such persons are the matter of legend—usually portrayed as laboring over laptops in dark rooms assembling code that will bring the wicked global system to its knees.

While individual hackers can be dangerous or disruptive, they are not the real threat. Hackers are those who are picking plentiful, low-hanging digital fruit. “The majority of hackers do not have the motive or requisite tradecraft to threaten critical U.S. networks.”19 It is well past time that we move beyond romantic notions about solitary individuals having a digitally bestowed, god-like power. Waging high-level CW today requires enormous computational power and legions of skilled code writers whose products are researched, vetted and tested in isolated networks.

CW has become the domain of well-funded nations, transnational business entities, and wealthy criminal or ideological actors. We note that CW weapons, while costly, are far more accessible and affordable than nuclear weapons or major conventional weapons systems. Further the risk of exposure for various actions, even the most egregious, is minimal unless the perpetrator reveals what was done.20

 A limited number of nation states and well financed others have the resources to recruit well trained professionals, acquire advanced equipment and assemble enough esoteric knowledge to effectively pursue CW. A recent example of a cyber-attack made the international media. In 2010, the Chinese are widely suspected of having stolen the source code for the Google system.21 Ordinarily, offended organizations do not publicize such thefts in order to maintain an aura of security. Public estimates of 15K (or more) daily cyber-attacks on US government systems are the visible “tip of the iceberg.” These probes and attacks come from a wide variety of sources and may simultaneously target multiple computer networks and digital systems.

A particularly nasty bit of already proliferating malicious code named STUXNET22 infected clandestinely-acquired Iranian centrifuges that were used in the production of nuclear weapons. STUXNET involves a highly sophisticated programmable-logic-controller (PLC) rootkit23 specifically targeting Siemens Industries equipment and is commonly understood to be a product of U.S.-Israeli collaboration. More recently, FLAME24, a Trojan-Horse25 like program, was also discovered on Iranian computers. Again the U.S .and Israelis are generally suspected as the source for this malicious software.

The capability to go beyond the merely invasive to world-class espionage on highly secure systems is steadily proliferating around the globe. Commercial interests are involved, seeking to uncover their rival’s plans, trade secrets, and technologies. As their financial powers have exponentially grown, some criminal/ideological/religious elements are functioning in the collective CW enterprise. The obvious lure is an amazing payoff that might result in vast sums of wealth for those who successfully invade financial systems; or ruining the legitimacy of one’s opponent by revealing inconvenient secrets; or causing havoc or ruin in machinery or processes; or simply identifying weaknesses to be exploited by other means.

 Computational systems have gone through rapid technological development that routinely makes software and hardware superannuated in a matter of a year or less. Staying current requires an expensive and continuing parade of new software, new hardware, and new cyber-defenses. Unfortunately, government and civil infrastructure rarely keep up with this frenetic pace. Mid-to-small sized commercial interests cannot afford to stay current. Risk and vulnerability abound in essential services such as water, power generation and delivery, medical, food delivery systems and emergency services. Disruption of such delivery systems would be disastrous to any modern civilization.


AN UNREGULATED FRONTIER

The Cyber domain  is a wild frontier that is governed by few laws.26 Recently, Senator McCain led an abortive effort to pass a critical cyber-bill that would have standardized cybersecurity requirements throughout the USA.27 It is an largely unregulated arena of human endeavor with a pervasive mentality that “anything goes.” One is tempted to assume that the entire cyber world is a place where normal ethical-moral-legal boundaries do not apply.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a vocal proponent for International Humanitarian Law (IHL)28 that addresses attacks upon civilian infrastructure. Currently IHL only attends to the legality of cyber-attacks upon civilian infrastructure during declared conflict,29 but not during periods of ostensible peace. There is, therefore, a gaping hole in international law concerning Cyber-attacks during undeclared hostilities. Looking forward, it is unlikely that there will be much international appetite for effective international or national cyber legislation in the near future. The process of developing international law and treaties is a painfully slow process, regardless of the fact that the cyber-world moves at the speed of light.

“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”30 Theorists have discussed and debated the reality of new generations of warfare. The simple fact is that insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and various combinations of high and low intensity conflict have been present throughout human history. CW does not somehow afford a military commander the luxury of ignoring the essentials of war. If anything, the strategic commander must renew his focus upon the essentials of warfighting. CW adds additional layers of complexity that easily obscures Clauswitzian simplicity with both overwhelming capability and sheer information overload.

While CW encompasses a whole new set of ways (methods, tactics, and procedures) and means (various resources) for waging warfare, the ends (strategic outcomes) of war remain largely undisturbed. One must be very careful not to mistake technological advance for evolutionary changes in the fundamentals of warfare. However, CW encompasses an entirely new set of tools and heretofore unimagined possibilities for globally engaging an opponent. With these new tools comes the responsibility to use them wisely and morally.

CW is an exponential expansion of the battle-space. It offers new ways and means to engage the enemy. Gigapixel cameras31 now under development portend a future of Orwellian oversight of entire populations. Drones and robots populate battlespace, communication is satellite enhanced, computers process information at speeds far beyond human capacity—but all these things continue to be directed by human beings. Further, it is estimated that in the next dozen years there will be “5.5 billion people online using 25 Zetabytes (trillion gigabytes) of data.”32 All of these persons will soon be in the cyber cross hairs.

CW was formerly a bloodless arena of conflict but is rapidly becoming weaponized.33 New technologies come online every day. Many of them now expand information warfare into aggressive and deadly realms. Cyber weapons currently have a deterrent value that is leveling out one-sided conflicts by increasing the transactional costs of war.34 After all, how many nations would consider starting a conflict with another while facing the prospect of vital power plants being shut down, with a loss in production that could lead to a 10% (or greater) loss in GDP? Increasingly, CW is more attractive to non-state actors who have no population to please or infrastructure to protect.

Cyber-conflict is primarily disruptive, rather than destructive; and its low entry cost makes it possible for states, terrorist groups and even individuals to acquire cyber-conflict capabilities with relative ease. Cyberspace is accessible to all and therefore makes conflict more thinkable. The less lethal appearance of cyber-conflict and the possibility of concealing the attacker’s true identity (plausible deniability) put serious pressure on every war-related aspect.35

Increasingly, as combatants communicate digitally and operations are automated, their vulnerability to CW efforts increases. For instance, drone warfare is entirely guided by digital means, with the pilot often sitting on another side of the globe. Missiles, warplanes, smart-bombs, and other deadly devices may be guided by GPS signals originating from a network of geosynchronous satellites. Should these signals be interrupted or redirected,36 then weapons might be turned against their users or uninvolved third parties. Recently, a high-end, highly classified intelligence U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone crashed in Iran while on a surveillance mission. There is some compelling evidence that Iranian malware was introduced into the Predator control network, compromising the drone and enabling the Iranians to capture the airplane nearly intact.37

The very real possibility of disrupting basic civil infrastructure38 and services has catastrophic potential for civilians who are protected as non-combatants by Just War morality. Denial of basic human services to an entire society through the disruption of civil networks brings new meaning to the concept  of Total War. A civilian population might be brought to its knees by drought, famine, disease, or civil disorder by some disruptive software adroitly inserted into vulnerable control systems.

Recent cases of cyber-attacks in Estonia in April-May 2007 and Georgia in August 2008 confirm that the conflict spectrum has expanded and includes cyberspace as well (Blank2008). The Estonia cyber-attack, which primarily targeted commercial financial networks, shut down the heavily online Estonian banking system for several days. The cyber-attacks in Georgia defaced the presidential website and made other government websites unavailable. Georgia was unable to communicate on the Internet for days and relocated cyber-assets to the United States, Estonia and Poland….39

CW is judged such a critical battle space that the U.S. Army stood up Cyber Command, headed up by a four-star General Officer. Cyber Command will soon become a Unified Combatant Command in the U.S. military structure.40 CW has nuanced and powerful possibilities for interaction with and response to our nation’s adversaries.

In early October of this year, Harold Koh, the State Department’s Chief Legal Advisor, announced U.S. Policy for Cyber Warfare.41 Henceforth, the USA would regard certain categories of Cyber Attacks as constituting “a use of force.” That particular phrase is a legal term from the charter of the United Nations that denotes the initiation of hostilities. This policy has been affirmed by Secretary of Defense Panetta in recent speeches.42 Announced U.S. policy has, in fact, set a Cyber standard for the initiation of armed hostilities well ahead of the international community.

JUST WAR

How is it possible to justly wage war over cyber networks? The conduct of war must always be ethically and morally judged, for it involves the entire realm of human endeavor. Just War morality is a comprehensive ethical guide for the virtuous warrior working in extremis.

 Civil and military leaders alike must not become mesmerized by the apparent moral “free fire” zone that Cyberwarfare offers. During the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), Cyberwar like all other means of warfare must be conducted morally. Familiar and time-tested Just War categories of discrimination, proportionality, military necessity and responsibility still apply. Human actions, no matter how far removed by layers of automation, have eternal consequences. We are responsible to God for all that we do.

Unauthorized taking of property by commercial, ideological, criminal or other non-governmental entities is simply theft. There is no need to refer to Just War principle for the sanctity of property, since it is a well-established Biblical ethical principle (Exodus 20:13; Romans 13:9). Theft is also legally forbidden (even if the laws are not enforced) by every nation on the planet. It is nonsense to pretend that theft of property, intellectual or otherwise, is somehow legitimated by the necessities of the marketplace, ideology, religion, or avarice— no matter how pragmatically satisfying the results may be to the thief.

A case for the application of Just War ethics can be made for espionage as practiced by legitimate authorities. Espionage is both an action of prevention and the prosecution of war. How does this differ from simple theft discussed above? There is a fine line here that rests upon the concept of legitimate authority. The Church Father, Augustine, expanded the teaching of the Greek Philosopher Cicero, and placed it firmly within the Christian faith. A Just War must have both Just Cause and Legitimate Authority. In International Law, “Legitimate Authority” has been identified since 1648 (the Treaty of Westphalia) as residing solely with sovereign nations. However, conflicts are rarely this simple, it usually doesn’t matter how the various sides originate when they are at war.43 The United Nations has accorded a measure of legitimacy to insurgent and revolutionary movements by internationally recognizing their right to self-determination.44

Historically, when one nation is considerably stronger than its neighbors, it is inevitably lured toward conquest and empire. Espionage of national secrets has long been safety valve for nations—preventing one nation from attaining such a great advantage that it is tempted to launch a conflict. Espionage levels the playing field. For example, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg’s perfidy of divulging U.S. atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets actually had the result of militarily balancing the two superpowers for more than 40 years.

Just war ethics are deontological, that is, the ends do not justify the means—the morality of an action is not dependent on the consequences alone. So consequentialist imperative45 “safety valve” reasoning is insufficient to make this a just war rationale. The relative anonymity, ease and safety of a cyber-penetration are pragmatic, not deontological, notions. The practicality and end results of an action are always significant, but of higher importance is the question, “is it moral?”46

Espionage accomplished at any time prior to hostilities is pre-emptive in nature, but may arguably be construed as a defensive action. Just War ethics recognizes the God-ordained role of government to order and defend its society (Matthew 22:21, Romans 13:1). Considering actions accomplished Jus ad Bellum, the Just War ethic identifies a legitimate authority’s role in preserving justice in the world under the rule of Just Cause and Right Intention. Jesus related a brief illustration about a strong man (Luke 11:21-22) and how no one would dare rob him unless there was someone stronger. In the cause of preserving justice, there is much to be gained by the international balance of powers, which has historically served as a preventative to war. So espionage done by a legitimate authority with the right intention (to maintain an equitable balance of power) for a just cause (preserving the peace) is an acceptably moral action.

Is it permissible in Just War ethics to retaliate for Cyber Attacks with conventional weapons and subsequently wage a conventional war? As noted above, the policy of the United States is to respond to certain cyber-attacks as if there were “a use of force” by another party. U.S. policy is both a warning about limitations and a notice that unspecified offensive actions would follow a cyber-attack. Can such a policy be just?

Just War morality is not a suicide pact. Serious provocations by another nation or entity may justly be met with proportionate force exercised across any or all of the five domains of war. Every nation has the moral obligation to defend its people against aggression. In the case of a cyber-attack, it is even more clear cut when the aggressor has broken either International Law or transgressed a previously announced boundary.47 A just response may demand creativity and much thoughtful consideration, especially if the cyber-attack was aimed principally at non-combatants. A just nation would not respond simply for the need to retaliate, but responding deliberately, purposefully, and in a manner aimed at the goal of restoring a just peace.48

For instance, a cyber-attack on a nation’s power generation capabilities in the dead of winter would obviously be directed against the non-combatant population. But it would only marginally affect the government or military, which would have secondary, dedicated sources of power generation. Civilian lives would be in direct jeopardy, and perhaps scores of deaths would result. Thus a just response might be cyber-retaliation against the attacking nation’s banks to destabilize the national currency or a conventional military strike against governmental and military installations. The first suggested response would not place the populace in immediate physical danger, but it would certainly destabilize the government. The second possibility is a more conventional solution to the provocation and would surely result in both enemy and friendly casualties.

Such a response would satisfy the requirements for self-defense, discrimination, proportionality, military necessity and responsibility. The offended nation has a moral obligation to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. We realize that this is not a perfect world, and there may be some non-combatants tragically intermingled with combatants— such as a baker delivering bread. However, the response is not aimed at the baker who circumstantially happened to be present but at the military node. The Just nation must deliberately choose targets based upon their military and governmental value to the enemy. Finally, the offended nation must take care to act responsibly in all of its actions, carefully weighing intent, actions and consequences.

CONCLUSION

CW is a newly developing field that may be the real revolution in military affairs. Yet, war will still consist of the fundamentals of attack and defense. As Clausewitz noted, it is simple and yet very difficult. Entry into the fifth dimension of conflict complicates decision making and actions by adding layers of complexity that may effectively distract our attention from more significant issues.

Humans remain morally accountable for their actions regardless if they pulled a trigger, launched a missile, or set a computer program into operation. The entire cyber domain is a field of human endeavor that expresses the value placed upon the moral character of all who enter there. Every action in the conduct of hostilities in any and all of the five domains of warfare must be carefully weighed as to the justness of intent, action and consequences.

Finally, Just War morality is not a checklist of good things, nor a set of legal limits, but moral principles that encompass the conduct of warfare. To live and fight justly requires Virtuous Warriors who are dedicated to justice on the contemporary frontiers of human existence.

Reverend Wylie W. Johnson serves as the Senior Pastor of Springfield Baptist Church, Springfield, Pennsylvania. Until his retirement in June 2012, he was the first Command Chaplain for the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Readiness Command.


ENDNOTES

1. Hichkad, Ravi R. & Bowie, Christopher J. Secret Weapons & Cyberwar. Armed Forces Journal, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA. June 2012, p.14ff.

2. The five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, space, cyber.

3. Cyber War is inexpensive when compared with development of nuclear weapons, or major conventional weapons systems like aircraft carriers or armor formations.

4. Rustici, Ross M. Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field. Parameters, Vol. XLI, No. 3, Autumn 2011. U.S. Army War College, 1222 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238, p.32.

5. Ibid, Rustici, p.34.

6. Bell, Daniel. The Moral Crisis of Just War: Beyond Deontology toward a Professional Military Ethic. Journal of Faith and War. Summer 2012, www.faithandwar.org, Monday, 02 July 2012 14:37.

7. Ibid, Bell.

8. Niebuhr, Reinhold. “Chapter XIII: The Case Against Pacifism.” In Reinhold Niebuhr On Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age As Expressed In His Writings, edited by Harry R. Davis & Robert C. Good. (New York: Scribner, 1960); p.147.

9. This fallacy is endemic in current American secular society which expects humans to live inclusively and harmoniously out of the goodness of their beings. In essence, it is expecting persons to live out religious virtues without the underpinnings of any sort of faith.

10. A Commander’s principle task in war is to impose his or her will on the enemy.

11. Liaropoulos, Andrew. Cyber-Security and the Law of War: The Legal and Ethical Aspects of Cyber-Conflict, Academia.edu. http://piraeus.academia.edu/AndrewLiaropoulos/Papers/617962/Cyber-Security_and_the_Law_of_War_The_Legal_and_Ethical_Aspects_of_Cyber-conflict, Sept. 26, 2012.

12. Ibid, Liaropoulos.

13. Gorman, Siobhan and Barnes, Julian E. Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks. The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY. Vol. CCLX, No.88, October 13-14, 2012, p. 1.

14. Mark 7:15, New Living Translation.

15. Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Chapter 7.

16. Myerson, Roger B. Learning from Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict, Journal of Economic Literature 2009, 47:4, 1109–1125, http:www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.47.4.1109, September 24, 2012.

17. Ibid, Myerson.

18. It may also be labeled “information warfare,” although that distinction is incomplete.

19. Buennemeyer, Timothy K. A Strategic Approach to Network Defense: Framing the Cloud. Parameters, Vol. XLI, No. 3, Autumn 2011. U.S. Army War College, 1222 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238, p.47.

20. Lin, Patrick; Allhoff, Fritz, & Rowe, Neil. Is It Possible to Wage a Just Cyberwar? The Atlantic, 19 July 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/is-it-possible-to-wage-a-just-cyberwar/258106/?. Jun 5 2012.

21. http://www.geek.com/articles/mobile/chinese-ios-developer-accused-of-stealing-torchlight-assets-booted-from-app-store-20120720/

22. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lost-control-of-it/

23. A rootkit is malware code designed to hide from normal means of detection and to allow stealthy access to a computing system.

24. “Flame is the Swiss Army knife of spying tools: It can collect data entered into forms, collect passwords, record audio and capture screenshots. It may have played a reconnaissance role to scout out systems for later infection by Stuxnet, which disrupted industrial control systems made by Siemens and used by Iran for refining uranium. According to the research, Flame’s command-and-control system was designed to look more like a content management system (CMS).”  Computer World, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9231380/_39_Flame_39_malware_may_have_siblings_study_finds

25. A Trojan Horse is malware masquerading as a legitimate file in the computational software but is designed to allow another to have unauthorized access to the computer.

26.Rowe, Neil C. Ethics of Cyberwar Attacks, http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/attackethics.htm, 19 July 2012

27. Fryer-Briggs, Zachary. Despite Changes, US Cyber Bill Fails, Defense News, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA., August 6, 2012, p. 30.

28. Schabas, William A. Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices, RICR June 2001 Vol. 83 No 842, www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/439-460_schabas.pdf, Sept. 21, 2012.

29. No Legal Vacuum In Cyber Space, August 16, 2011 Interview with Cordula Droege, ICRC Legal Adviser. http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2011/cyber-warfare-interview-2011-08-16.htm, Sept. 20, 2012.

30. Ibid, Clausewitz.

31. Biron, Lauren. DARPA Tests Gigapixel Cameras. C4ISR Journal, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA., August 2012, p.8.

32. Donley, Michael and Maybury, Mark. Air Force Cyber Vision 2025. Armed Forces Journal, October 2012. Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA., p.22.

33. Garretson, Peter. The Case for Optionally Manned Aircraft, Armed Forces Journal, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA. Sept. 2012, pp.11ff.

34. Rustici, Ross M. Cyberweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field. Parameters, Vol. XLI, No. 3, Autumn 2011. U.S. Army War College, 1222 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238, p.38.

35. Ibid, Liaropoulos.

36. Sanborn, James K. University Demonstrates Drone Spoofing, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA. Sept. 2012, p10.

37. Commentary. 6 Ways to Improve UAVs. C4ISR Journal, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA., March 2012, p.30.

38. Also consider second order effects: “What may seem a precisely targeted disabling of a software module on a military computer may have profound consequences on civilian computers that happen, unknown to attackers, to use that same module.” Ibid, Rowe.

39. Ibid, Liaropoulos.

40. Fryer-Biggs, Zachary. CYBERCOM Moving Toward Command Elevation, Defense News, August 20, 2012.

41. Fryer-Biggs, Zachary. U.S. Moves Toward Normalization of Cyber Warfare. Defense News, Gannett Government Media, Springfield, VA., October 1, 2012, p.15.

42. King, Rachel. US Defense Chief Warns of Digital 9/11. The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2012. (accessed October 26, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/10/11/u-s-defense-chief-warns-of-digital-911/?KEYWORDS=panetta+affirms+cyber+war+policy, internet..

43. Czege, BG Huba Wass de. “War With Implacable Foes: What All Statesmen and Generals Need to Know.” Army 56, no. 5 (2006): 9-14.

44. It is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Common Article 1, paragraph 1 of these Covenants provides that: “All peoples have the rights of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” International Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs. (accessed 2009) available in http://www.iwgia.org/sw228.asp; internet.

45. Consequentialist Imperative is concerned with ends and not means, pragmatic actions and not ontology.

46. Ibid, Rowe.

47. Such as the new U.S. cyber policy that the USA would regard certain categories of Cyber Attacks as constituting “a use of force.”

48. The Just nation does not respond out of fear or outrage but out of a moral duty to maintain the peace. Lynn, John A. II. Fear and Outrage as Terrorist’s Goals. Parameters, Vol. XLII, No. 1, Spring 2011. U.S. Army War College, 1222 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5238, p.51ff.

TWO COMMENTARIES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Freedom of Religion Requires Freedom to Offend

By Dr. Brian Lee, Pastor, Christ Reformed Church, Washington, D.C.
–Originally published in The Daily Caller (online) on 14 September 2012

With a mob at the gates on 9/11, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo issued the following statement:

“The Embassy of the United States in Cairo condemns the continuing efforts by misguided individuals to hurt the religious feelings of Muslims — as we condemn efforts to offend believers of all religions.
“Today, the 11th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Americans are honoring our patriots and those who serve our nation as the fitting response to the enemies of democracy. Respect for religious beliefs is a cornerstone of American democracy. We firmly reject the actions by those who abuse the universal right of free speech to hurt the religious beliefs of others.”

This statement is now a political orphan. Both Obama and Romney have distanced themselves from it, and it has been expunged from the U.S. Embassy’s website. As no one stands by these words, they will be mostly ignored by the next news cycle.

Before these words fade, it is crucial that we consider their significance for religion, as well as politics. Both the left and the right would be remiss if we didn’t try to set all politics aside and consider the fundamental question about the nature of religious freedom, and religion itself, that they raise. For these words reflect widespread assumptions about religion, and could just as easily have been drafted during the Bush administration.

There are two obvious rejoinders to the statement. First, it relegates religious freedom to the realm of utter subjectivity by condemning “efforts to hurt religious feelings.” On this score, anyone could limit the exercise of opposing religions by claiming that their religious feelings were hurt (“What is a religious feeling?”). The second problem is that this standard of not giving offense has clearly not been equally applied by secular elites (see “Piss Christ,” et al.).

By condemning “incitement,” the statement’s title suggests that the author is mindful of these objections. The freedom of speech doesn’t protect yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater, nor should we protect religious speech that does the same. And since Christians don’t typically riot when offended, offending them isn’t incitement. Were I a foreign service officer watching my flag burn, I might be inclined to take a similar approach to distance myself from the Christian bigot who yelled fire halfway around the world.

But the real problem with the statement is its failure to grasp the inherently offensive nature of most religious belief. It belies the widely held belief that “good religion” must be utterly private, banal, and non-offensive. We may limit the exercise of Terry Jones’s religion — even seek his persecution — because our definition of religion doesn’t include that kind of quackery. “Respect for religious beliefs is a cornerstone of American democracy” … unless those beliefs aren’t respectable, and respectable religion doesn’t make other people feel bad.

Christianity is a religion of love, but it is also a religion of redemption, and therefore offense. The Apostles clearly proclaimed Jesus as a “stone of stumbling and a rock of offense” (1 Peter 2:8), and Paul located this offense centrally in “Christ crucified, a stumbling block [offense] to Jews, and folly to Gentiles” (1 Corinthians 1:23). The cross is foolish and weak; it offends both the reason and religion of us all.

The Apostles did not hijack the message of Jesus, who often gave offense (Matthew 13:57; Mark 6:3). Jesus even asked his followers, “Do you take offense at this [teaching]? Then what if you were to see the Son of Man ascending to where he was before? It is the Spirit who gives life; the flesh is no help at all” (John 6:61 – 63). Jesus’ claim to be God, to have pre-existed in heaven, was his most offensive claim of all.

Christianity isn’t just offensive to Muslims; it’s offensive to everybody. The Gospel calls us all to account for our sin. It tells us there is no such thing as “self-help,” we have no power, no solution for sin in ourselves. It promises us death and eternal destruction unless we confess, repent, and place all our confidence in a crucified Jew, now raised from the dead — who claimed, by the way, to be the very Son of God.

Of course, God is love, but what is said in love may yet give offense. The law of God requires us to love our neighbor as ourselves. Paul teaches that we should not seek offense (1 Corinthians 10:32), and he can proudly say that “Neither against the law of the Jews, nor against the temple, nor against Caesar have I committed any offense” (Acts 25:8). And yet, throughout his public ministry we see scenes reminiscent of Cairo and Benghazi. Ephesus and Jerusalem erupt in righteous anger at his proclamation of the risen Christ as Lord (Acts 19, 21). God offends Jew and Gentile alike.

Ironically, this offensiveness of Christianity is why the freedom of religion is the only public policy position for which we can claim the direct support of the New Testament. As Paul is driven from synagogue and marketplace across the Mediterranean, he appeals to Roman authorities on the basis of the rights he possesses as a Roman citizen for the freedom to proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The Acts of the Apostles may be read as an apology for Christianity as a religion of peace and love, while its opponents claim falsely that it “upsets the world,” even as they do. While the church has often fallen short of this ideal, the teaching of the New Testament is the basis for true religious tolerance.

Christianity not only may give offense, it must give offense. The embassy statement was wrong. “Respect for religious beliefs” is not a cornerstone of our democracy. Respect for our fellow man, and his right to dissent, is. There is a world of difference. A freedom merely to exercise an inoffensive religion is no freedom at all.

The State Department’s Dangerous Version of “Religious Tolerance”
By Brian J. Lee, Pastor, Christ Reformed Church, Washington, D.C.
Originally published in The Daily Caller (online) on 21 September 2012

Ten days ago the U.S. Embassy in Cairo — under siege from riotous mobs — issued a despicable statement vitiating the freedom of religion. It could fairly be chalked up as a loss of nerve under fire, and the statement was quickly abandoned by the Obama administration, condemned by the Romney campaign, and removed from the Embassy website.

Now the U.S. State Department is doubling down on its perfidy, using $70,000 of taxpayer funds to run television ads in Pakistan purportedly “distancing” the U.S. government from an Internet video. Unfortunately, these ads also enshrine a “religious tolerance” that dare not offend. By rejecting both “all efforts to denigrate” as well as the content of a particular message, we as a nation are now advertising our intolerance toward specific kinds of speech, religious or otherwise.

Crucially, this understanding of tolerance — premised on the widespread belief that true religion must be banal and inoffensive — is substituted for our true constitutional liberty, namely the free exercise of religion, which may in itself disparage others.

Superficially, the advertisement is inoffensive, made up entirely of quotes from public statements made by President Obama and Hillary Clinton:

President Obama: “Since our founding, the United States has been a nation that respects all faiths. We reject all efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others. But there is absolutely no justification to this type of senseless violence. None.”

Secretary of State Clinton: “Let me state, very clearly, and I hope it is obvious, that the United States government had absolutely nothing to do with this video. We absolutely reject its content and message. America’s commitment to religious tolerance goes back to the very beginning of our nation.”

I understand the desire to distance oneself and our nation from the crudest forms of anti-Muslim discourse, and this video certainly qualifies. But as Clinton admits, it’s not entirely clear that anyone, even in the Middle East, believed this video was produced or sponsored by the U.S. government. In fact, that denial serves as something of a fig leaf for the advertisement’s central message, which is a condemnation of the video’s content and message, as well as “all efforts to denigrate religious beliefs of others.”

Note that Obama and Clinton aren’t simply personally rejecting the message. By using the first person plural “we,” they are not speaking for themselves, but in the place of their office, and for our country, as the two highest and most recognizable American officials on the international stage.

The advertisement is therefore a condemnation of protected speech by the U.S. government — and religious speech, at that. The danger of these statements for freedom of speech and religion, issued personally by our highest government officials, lies in its subtlety. Cloaked in the platitudes of tolerance is an explicit limitation on protected speech.

The error is fundamental, and particular. Fundamentally, the United States does not respect all faiths. Rather, it isn’t the respecter of any faith. The Constitution prohibits Congress from establishing, or respecting, any faith, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. You may say this is due to an inherent regard for religion; it is more likely a bulwark against the terrors of religious tyranny. Thus the Constitution protects the exercise of faiths which many, even a majority, may find unrespectable.

Furthermore, while I personally reject the denigration of opposing religious beliefs, our government does not. It cannot. The freedom of speech stands alongside the freedom of religion, protecting the right to verbally pour scorn upon, belittle, or degrade opposing religions.

Even if we understand the denigration of religious beliefs to go so far as to entail defamation, the U.S. government does not criminalize this act, but rather allows it as a ground for civil legal actions. Even the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has ruled that the criminalization of libel violates the freedom of expression.

The error is also particular. How can the government “absolutely reject” the “content and message” of the anti-Muslim video? While crudely communicated, many of the ideas expressed have been communicated elsewhere by historians and religious critics of Islam. Does our government reject these messages as well? Or is the State Department passing subjective value on the tone of the message?

A cornerstone of Old Testament prophetic religion was the denigration of idols, and those who worshiped them. The Psalmist mocks the idols who have ears but cannot hear, and feet but cannot walk, and warns that those who worship them are bound to become like them (Psalm 115). The New Testament church, unlike Israel in the Old Testament, is scattered throughout the world, and endeavors to live peacefully alongside the worshipers of false gods. Yet still it proclaims that on the last day “every knee will bow, and every tongue confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord” (Philippians 2:10 – 11), and urges us all to be prepared to give a defense for the hope that we have within us.

To tell idolaters and atheists alike that they will soon bow before Jesus may not seem to be an expression of respect. To explain to an idolater the folly of his way may seem to denigrate. Yet this speech — and other evangelistic and apologetic language — is essential to the free exercise of my religion, and protected by the Constitution.

I fear the new U.S. policy of tolerance being sold abroad will soon criminalize the Christian faith.

Rev. Dr. Brian Lee is the pastor of Christ Reformed Church in Washington, D.C. (www.ChristChurchDC.org) He formerly worked as a communications director both on Capitol Hill and at the National Endowment for the Humanities. Dr. Lee is founding pastor of Christ Reformed Church and holds a baccalaureate degree from Stanford University, a masters’ degree from Westminster Seminary, California, and a doctorate from Calvin Theological Seminary.

THE CALL TO ARMS: CHRISTIANITY AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION

By Major Patrick J. Reimnitz, U.S. Air Force, M.A., Chief of the Developmental Threats Section, Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Introduction

Since war first showed its ugly face on the scene of history, humanity has dreamt of a world without conflict. Throughout history, many attempts have been made to end hostilities between nations: peace treaties, arranged marriages, the League of Nations, the United Nations. None, however, have succeeded.

Sadly, history has demonstrated time and again that war is an inevitable part of human existence. Efforts towards peace, though noble and necessary, have not been able to eliminate all conflict between nations. We live in a fallen world, and this reality predicates that conflict will arise. As long as our current system of nation-states exists, war will remain a certainty.

Along with that certainty comes the need for rules to govern its conduct. What defines a just cause to go to war? Are all wars just? Who can be targeted in a war? Are there moral limits to what a military force can do to the enemy?

The traditional answer to these questions has been a set of guidelines known as the just war theory. The just war theory, which has been shaped by such thinkers as Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, lays down the conditions for when the use of force is justifiable in a conflict between nations. Additionally, it delineates how combat is to be conducted once a war has begun. Perhaps most importantly, it emphasizes the protection of non-combatants; those not directly participating in the conflict are not to be targeted for military actions.

The tenets of the just war theory have guided the conduct of war amongst western nations for centuries. However, with the advent of nuclear weapons in the mid-1900s came a change in warfare philosophy, one that made no moral distinction between combatant and non-combatant, between direct and indirect targeting. War, it was reasoned, could be avoided through the threat of mutual destruction by nuclear arms. No longer would it be necessary to conduct war in the traditional sense. Rather, by stockpiling these weapons of mass destruction, politicians hoped to create an atmosphere of mutual annihilation, one in which only the most irrational would risk war, with the consequence being nuclear retaliation.

But the threat of mutual annihilation is effective only if one actually intends to carry out that threat. In other words, in order to keep the Soviets in check through the fear of having their cities destroyed by nuclear weapons, the United States had to be willing to actually use those weapons against Russian cities. This is where the doctrine of deterrence breaks ways with the traditional understanding of the just war. By making whole cities viable military targets, deterrence did away with long-established distinctions; it was now possible to directly target civilian centers without regard to combatant status.

It is this prospect that Paul Ramsey, a noted moral theologian and scholar, addresses in his 1968 book, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. Ramsey believes that the doctrine of mass deterrence – that the threat of mutual destruction by nuclear weapons will deter war – is both irresponsible and immoral as it eliminates the traditional moral guidelines for just actions in combat. “The [nuclear] weapons in existence today have made the ‘unjust’ conduct of war … into the central war”1 by making cities and population centers, considered immune from direct attack under the just war theory, into the primary targets.

Faced with the prospect of a war without rules, without a moral economy to govern its conduct, Ramsey asks us to revisit the principles of the just war theory. In this essay, I will explore the need for a set of the rules to govern the conduct of a just war. I will demonstrate how the theory of justifiable war has its roots in Christian love, and how this moral economy at the same time justifies and limits war by distinguishing between legitimate and non-legitimate targets. Finally, I will explore how the just war theory still has relevance in today’s War on Terror.

The Just War Tradition

Before we continue, let us define what constitutes the just war theory. First, it is important to note that the theory, perhaps better referred to as a tradition, has changed and developed over time. Theologians in different times and places have chosen to emphasize different aspects of the tradition. As such, I will focus on those tenets with which most just war theorists agree.

Traditionally, the just war tradition has two sets of criteria: jus ad bellum, or the right to go to war; and jus in bello, or the just conduct of war once it has begun. The main concepts of jus ad bellum include the following:2 1) Just Cause – a nation must have a just cause to go to war, such as defending itself against an aggressor nation; 2) Legitimate Authority – only duly appointed public authorities have the right to wage war; 3) Right Intention – one may go to war only to correct an injustice, not for material gain; 4) Last Resort – a call to arms should be undertaken only when all other means of settling a dispute have been exhausted; and 5) Proportionality – the benefits of going to war must outweigh the evils that will result. In other words, going to war must not “do more harm than good.”3

Jus in bello, the just conduct of war, “historically … appears in terms of two sets of legal or customary restraints.”4 The first is distinction. A military force must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets, between combatants and non-combatants. The principle of distinction protects non-combatants from being directly targeted for military operations and limits the amount of harm, if any, that may be done to them as a result of indirect actions. Illegitimate targets include any persons or facilities that do not directly serve a military purpose such as civilians, hospitals, and religious centers.

The second restraint is proportionality. Proportionality, or the “prudential balancing of effects,”5 dictates that “the proportionately greater good or lesser evil in one effect of such action must justify producing a lesser evil effect.”6 In other words, a military attack cannot be undertaken if the expected civilian casualties from such action would exceed the anticipated tactical advantage that would be gained. This concept also limits the types of weapons that may be employed. Weapons that would result in disproportionate suffering, such as biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, are immoral and cannot be used.

The Necessity of the Just War Tradition

The aim of the doctrine of deterrence is to prevent the outbreak of war through the fear of destruction by nuclear weapons. But while it purports a solution, in reality it creates an insupportable system. Mass deterrence does not put an end to war. Rather, by ignoring the principles of the just war tradition, it produces a condition whereas the only option available, should war arise, is the immoral destruction of non-combatants. By removing the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, all restraints on warfare are abolished.

For Ramsey, unrestrained warfare cannot be the answer. It attempts to force peace through unjust means. “The traditional teaching about the conduct of war taught us that it is never right to intend or do wrong that good may come of it.”7 Military actions that directly intend and effect the deaths of non-combatants are tantamount to murder.8

In order for warfare to be conducted in a just manner, to be “enclosed again within the political purposes of nations from which it has escaped,”9 a return to the principles of the just war tradition are necessary. Limits must be placed on the execution of warfare. Otherwise, “military force becomes senseless violence.”10 The just war tradition provides these limits by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Warfare must shift away from people-counter-people warfare and back to force-counter-force warfare.11 This, Ramsey contends, is the Christian thing to do.

Rooted in Christian Love

But how can any participation in war be the “Christian thing to do”? Did Jesus not command us to love our neighbor?

The pacifist movement, which also has its roots in Scripture and tradition, holds that war is never justified under any circumstances. Christians who fall into this camp take a legalistic approach to Scripture and see in Jesus’ moral teachings “a rejection of all violence.”12 They focus on the literal meaning of such passages as Matthew 5:39, where Jesus instructs us to “turn the other cheek.” For the pacifist, Jesus’ command to love seems to rule out any possibility for a Christian to take up arms against his fellow man.

But “while Jesus taught that a disciple in his own case should turn the other cheek, he did not enjoin that his disciples should lift up the face of another oppressed man for him to be struck again on his other cheek.”13 Our Lord commanded us to love one another. How is it love to allow another human being to be harmed when we can take action to prevent it?

It is only a misunderstanding of Jesus’ teaching, and the Sermon on the Mount in particular, that leads one to entirely rule out a call to arms. In his article “The Universal Claim of Biblical Ethics,” Eberhard Schokenhoff argues that the Sermon is not intended to serve as a new moral law. Rather, it provides an upper bound that attempts to transform the heart and not just limit evil action. The Sermon achieves this aim through an elaboration of Old Testament ethics. The Decalogue provides a set of precepts designed as a lower boundary against evil. It provides behavioral guidance that, if followed, protects one’s neighbor and one’s self from harm. But while the Decalogue sets up boundaries against evil, it does not provide a solution to combat its source. A person is fully capable of adhering to the precepts of the Decalogue and yet possess an evil heart. Jesus criticized the Pharisees for law observance without a heart truly conditioned towards God, a piety that outwardly fulfilled the precepts of the law but inwardly did not fulfill the intent of the law: that is, love of God and love of neighbor.

In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus transforms the Decalogue precepts from a lower boundary designed to prevent wrong actions into an upper boundary designed to change people’s hearts. According to Schokenhoff, Jesus accomplishes his goal through a series of “antitheses as illustrations of the greater righteousness.”14 Through antithesis, Jesus expands on the meaning of the Decalogue by creating what Heinz Schürmann calls the “apparent paradoxes in which he puts commandments in an extreme form.”15 An example can be found in Matthew 5:27: “You have heard it was said, you shall not commit adultery.” Jesus amplifies the commandment by equating even lustful desire with adultery. He does likewise with the commandment “you shall not kill,” likening anger towards one’s brother with murder. In so doing, he “uncovers the original meaning of the Ten Commandments afresh by demanding their ‘radical’ fulfillment out of a spirit of undivided love.”16 Jesus here is attacking not just the sinful acts themselves but the “‘evil impulse’ which must be overcome within us.”17 His aim is to go beyond the law and requirements of the Old Testament towards a transformed heart based on love of God and love of neighbor. It is only when one understands this purpose that sense can be made of the Sermon’s ethical call.

It is this upper bound that is to shape our Christian actions. Jesus is teaching us that we are to strive towards “unlimited service towards one’s neighbor in love.”18 And it is this unlimited service that, under certain circumstances, may require us to use force against another human being. Ramsey illustrates this point through a provocative retelling of the parable of the Good Samaritan:

It was a work of charity for the Good Samaritan to give help to the man who fell among thieves. But one step more, it may have been a work of charity for the inn-keeper to hold himself ready to receive beaten and wounded men … By another step it would have been a work of charity, and not of justice alone, to maintain and serve in a police patrol on the Jericho road to prevent such things from happening. By yet another step, it might well be a work of charity to resist, by force of arms, any external aggression against the social order that maintains the police patrol along the road to Jericho. This means that … it may be a work of justice and a work of social charity to resort to other available and effective means of resisting injustice: what do you think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell work?19

It is from this understanding that, according to Ramsey, “the western theory of the just war originated … from the interior of the ethics of Christian love.”20 While he is the first to admit that “this is no proper way to interpret a parable of Jesus,”21 the retelling tells us something about the intention behind the teaching. Love of neighbor extends beyond just helping a man once he has been attacked. It works also to prevent the attack from happening and, if necessary, to defend the man from his attackers. One can see from this example how “a social ethic emerged from Christian conscience formed by this revelation.”22 War is in some instances the justifiable answer to the moral call to love our neighbor. The military personnel of an aggressor nation, still our fellow men, may be killed only because they oppress an even greater number of God’s children. “The Christian is commanded to do anything a realistic love commands (and so sometimes he must fight).”23

Before moving on, I want to stress that support of the tenets of just war tradition does not equate to warmongering. The purpose of the just war theory is to limit war, both its undertaking and its execution. Its intent is to prevent war under most circumstances and to then limit the amount of death and damage once it has begun. War must be conducted solely for just causes and only as the last resort. Just war theorists despise war the same as pacifists. The difference is that the former see in Jesus’ teaching a moral call to defend one’s neighbor, peacefully if possible, but by force if necessary.

The problem with pacifism is that it “teaches people to believe that there is no significant moral difference, except in the ends sought, between murder and killing in war.”24 Such an understanding fails to make a distinction between murder, or the killing of innocents, and “the shedding of any human blood.”25 Murder, by its very definition, is never justifiable. But what about the killing of an enemy soldier in combat?

Whether the killing of another human being during war is ever justifiable centers on one’s interpretation of the precepts of Scripture. In order to avoid a contradiction with the Decalogue, those who take a legalistic approach are forced either to displace the responsibility of combat deaths to the governing authorities or make an exception for soldiers to break the commandment “you shall not kill.” Neither option provides a satisfactory answer to the problem at hand. By focusing on the letter of the law rather than the intent behind the law, people who hold to this perspective are left trying to make exceptions in order to justify actions traditionally classified as immoral. They admit the need for Christians to take up arms when necessary to defend their fellow men; they are just unable to reconcile this need with a purely legalistic understanding of Biblical moral precepts.

In order to find a satisfactory answer to our question, we must expand our criteria for determining the morality of a particular act. According to Josef Fuchs, “a moral judgment of an action may not be made in anticipation of the agent’s intention.”26 An act is morally neutral until the purpose of the action is understood. It is only after we consider both the circumstances of the act and the intent of the one committing the act that we can come to some conclusion as to its rightness or wrongness.27

Additionally, we must weigh the good effects against the bad effects that would come about as the result of a particular act. Take, for instance, surgical amputation. The removing of the damaged limb – a bad effect – also renders the good effect of healing the patient. The “rule of double effect” considers this action moral if 1) the intent of the moral agent is to effect the good and 2) the bad effect that results is proportionately justifiable in light of that good. In the case above, the doctor’s intent is to cure his patient. The bad effect – the amputation of the limb – is offset by the greater good that the patient will continue to live. Thus, the amputation is a moral act.

Given this criteria, is the killing of an enemy combatant during war an exception to the commandment “you shall not kill”? Since the intent of the soldier is not to kill but to protect others from harm, Ramsey would say no.28 Rather, he would argue that armed resistance to aggressors in defense of others is the “fulfilling of the meaning of the commandment.”29 The Christian command to love may include the taking of life during combat if it is done to protect the lives of others.

But while it is the expression of Christian love that justifies going to war under certain circumstances, it is this same Christian love that ultimately limits its implementation. Just as it is the duty of a Christian to defend the innocent against aggression, it is his duty to insure that the innocents he is defending are not harmed while attempting to subdue the enemy. The Christian’s call is to save life; he takes up arms only as a last resort to restrain “an enemy whose objective deeds [are] judged to be evil.”30 He cannot, therefore, take the life of innocents in an effort to restrain that evil.

At the same time, it was never presumed that non-combatants would be immune from all harm, “roped off like ladies at a medieval tournament.”31 There is the potential in any conflict that those not actively engaged in military hostilities may be killed. The goal of the just war tradition is not to prevent all non-combatant deaths, only to limit it as much as possible. Non-combatants may never be directly targeted for military action; however, injury and death may result indirectly from such action. For example, the destruction of a weapons depot may effect the deaths of several civilians in the surrounding area. These deaths would be justifiable under the rule of double effect since they were not directly intended and are proportionate to the greater good of ending the war.

The ends, however, do not in themselves justify the means. The bad effect that results must be proportionately justifiable. In the example above, the extension of the target area to include the neighborhood surrounding the weapons depot would be immoral since it would now directly intend the deaths of the civilians in that neighborhood. Military actions must always effect the least amount of death and destruction and direct those effects only towards combatants. The good intent of ending a war never justifies the bad means of directly intending harm to the innocent.

The Relevance of the Tradition Today

The society that Ramsey originally addressed in The Just War had abandoned the long-standing tradition of the just war theory. They wrongly believed that the only way to prevent war was to threaten total war. By casting off the rules that restrain the conduct of war, the world was in constant fear of nuclear annihilation.

The doctrine of mass deterrence did not create the peace that it had promised. The Vietnam War is but one example of how hostilities have continued even in the nuclear age. Fortunately, the frightening possibility of an all-out nuclear war never materialized. But the fact that we spent 40 years on the brink of such a war should serve as a warning. Without restraints to keep warfare barely civilized, conflict will devolve to mere barbarism.

With the end of the Cold War came a refocus on the just conduct of war. While it was the technology of nuclear arms that first led to questioning the relevance of the just war theory, it was technology that led us back. The use of smart bombs and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in the First Gulf War demonstrated how a just war could be fought in the modern era. The days of carpeting bombing and the resulting civilian casualties were over; we could now take out military targets with accurate precision. A munitions depot could now be destroyed with a single bomb while leaving the surrounding buildings undamaged. The just conduct of war was now more practical than ever before.

But now a new threat has emerged. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 and our subsequent military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq have once again called into question the relevance of the just war tradition. Al-Qaeda is not a nation; yet it declared war on the United States through its reprehensible attack on the World Trade Center. The insurgents our troops are facing in the Middle East owe allegiance not to a particular flag but to an Islamic fundamentalist ideology. The just war tradition and its subsequent codification in the Geneva Conventions and Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) were meant to guide conflict between nation-states with clearly identifiable military forces. It is this kind of warfare that our smart bombs and PGMs were designed for. But how does one conduct a just war when the enemy is not a nation but a group of religious extremists who do not conform to the traditional definitions of combatants? How does one fight an enemy that disguises itself as non-combatants in order to get close enough to kill our soldiers, and still maintain the principle of distinction?

We are faced today with the same dilemma that Ramsey addressed more than 40 years ago. Have the “previous norms for the ‘just’ war,” as the editor of Worldview contends, “been rendered obsolete”?32 Our current enemy blatantly defies the tenets of just war conduct and the LOAC. They dress as non-combatants in order to get close to our soldiers; they attack non-military targets to induce terror; they hide in hospitals and mosques, knowing it is illegal for our military to target these structures; they do not discriminate between combatant status, readily beheading civilians for the purposes of propaganda and using women and children as suicide bombers. We are facing an unscrupulous enemy that knows no moral limits. Do we in turn then lift the restrictions on our conduct as well? When a mob encroaches, do we indiscriminately fire into the crowd since we cannot distinguish between those that are hostile and those that are not? When we discover that Al-Qaeda operatives are hiding in a city but cannot narrow down their exact location, do we directly target civilian centers rather than risk the possibility that they might escape?

The answer, of course, is no. Adherence to the LOAC is not only mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it is the moral choice. We must still respect the immunity of non-combatants even though our enemy does not. While it may be a just action for a Christian to forcefully resist an enemy military force, he cannot in the process directly intend the harm of innocents. Just as Ramsey argued against the immorality of targeting cities for nuclear obliteration, it would be immoral for us to target civilian areas indiscriminately in an effort to kill an enemy that may or may not be hiding there. The ends do not justify the means.

We as a nation cannot abandon the principles of distinction and proportionality in order to achieve our objectives in the Middle East. No matter how evil our enemy, we must continue to abide by the rules of just conduct. Now more than ever, it is important that we hold ourselves to the higher standard even when our enemy will not. This is how we turn the other cheek: by not fighting for revenge, but by treating POWs humanely, by respecting the non-combatant status of those we are there to protect even when it may put us in harms way. We will never win the war on terror unless we demonstrate the love of God to those we are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is for love of neighbor that we fight; it is also for love of neighbor that we must eventually make peace.


Patrick J. Reimnitz is a major in the United States Air Force and is currently stationed at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, where he serves as a program manager and Chief, Developmental Threats Section. He received his M.A. in Theological Studies from Loyola Marymount University (LMU) in 2012.

Prior to his current assignment, Major Reimnitz served as an Air Force ROTC instructor at Detachment 040 at LMU, where he taught Leadership Studies for three years. He wrote this paper to help his students reconcile their moral beliefs with military service. It was selected as the best graduate-level paper in the Huffington Ecumenical Institute’s 2011 War and Peace Symposium.


Endnotes

1. Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1968), 181.

2. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), xxii-xxiii.

3. Ibid., xxii.

4. Ibid., xxiii.

5. Ramsey, The Just War, 161.

6. Ibid., 161.

7. Ibid., 147.

8. Ibid., 154.

9. Ibid., 164.

10. Ibid., 164.

11. Ibid., 146.

12. Johnson, Just War Tradition, xxvi.

13. Ramsey, The Just War, 143.

14. Eberhard Schokenhoff, “The Universal Claim of Biblical Ethics,” in idemNatural Law & Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World, trans. Brian McNeil (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 268.

15. Heinz Schürmann, “How Normative are the Values and Precepts of the New Testament?” in Principles of Christian Morality, by Josef Ratzinger, Heinz Schürmann and Hans Urs von Balthasar (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1975), 25.

16. Schockenhoff, Natural Law & Human Dignity, 272.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 275.

19. Ramsey, The Just War, 142-143.

20. Ibid., 142.

21. Ibid., 143.

22. Ibid., 143.

23. Ibid., 145.

24. Ibid., 146.

25. Ibid.

26. Josef Fuchs, “The Absoluteness of Behavioral Moral Norms,” in Introduction to Christian Ethics, ed. Ronald Hamel and Kenneth R. Himes (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 503.

27. Ibid.

28. Ramsey, The Just War, 150.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 152.

31. Ibid., 145.

32. “The Pacifist Question,” worldview, Vol. III, No. 7-8 (July-August 1960), 1.