RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS OF THE JUST WAR AND MILITARY ETHICS

By Ivar Hellberg, Colonel, British Army, Retired, OBE, MPhil

Introduction

The term ethics relates to the study of human behaviour in respect of being right or wrong. Throughout history ethical reflection has seldom been carried out in isolation from theology. Although many would argue that morality in the West today is driven by secular rather than religious values, this is not the case in the Muslim world, nor in many developing countries with a strong religious or ideological tradition.

Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the West has come to realise that they do not have a monopoly of ethical values. For example, many in the Muslim world feel that there is both a degree of arrogance and hypocrisy when Western democracies start to speak about ethical foreign policies and ethical (and accountable) military doctrines. However, in recent years traditional Islamic belief has been distorted by extremist militant doctrine, which is epitomised by intolerance and bigotry. The West in turn is portrayed as the enemy of Islam; it is seen as collectively amoral, aggressive and greedy, with the USA depicted as the Great Satan!1

It is an unfortunate fact that down the centuries it is intolerance and bigotry that has been the cause of so much death and suffering at the hands of religion of whatever persuasion. It is therefore vital for us to counter extremism by both political and military doctrine and deeds; we need to show compassion during military operations and to give no cause or excuse for extremist leaders to make propaganda from the inadvertent killing of innocent lives and the mistreatment of prisoners.

Our Western laws and ethical values are principally derived from Christian principles, which in turn are based upon Old Testament and Judeo-Christian tradition. Although these traditions and teachings have been eroded and sometimes prostituted over the centuries, they still form the basis of our ethical thinking. At the centre of this thinking is the belief that life is sacred, has value and should be respected. That the Almighty is both creator and mentor of the human spirit and human life is precious to Him. It therefore follows that whatever protects or enhances human life is good and whatever destroys or degrades human life is wicked. Thus our attitude to right and wrong is inextricably linked to this thesis and must equally apply to the military as to all other professions who espouse Western values. However, it is important to balance these ethical values against those of other faiths, for example we must compare them with Islamic traditional values.

The Christian Tradition

In the early days of the Christian Church, military service was not encouraged. Indeed most early Christians were pacifists, believing in Christ’s injunction to turn the other cheek and walk the extra mile.2 However, it is clear that Christ implicitly respected the role of the Centurion, who requested healing for his servant, where Christ responded with the amazing words: “Truly, I say to you, not even in Israel have I found such faith…go; be it done for you as you have believed.”3

Much later we read in the Canons of Hippolytus (336 AD) that a “Soldier is not to kill even when ordered to do so.” He goes on to say, “A Christian is not to become a soldier, unless he is compelled by a chief bearing the sword. He is not to burden himself with the sin of blood.” Alan Kreider explains that if a Christian soldier took life, he could not participate in the Holy Communion until he was “purified by a punishment, tears and wailing.” However, he fails to give detail of the punishment, or how long his exclusion would last!4

Over a period of time, Christian military doctrine was developed and became known as the theory of the “Just War”. St Ambrose (340 – 396 AD), like Cicero (106 – 43 BC), believed in justice and called upon soldiers to risk their lives to protect the innocent. St Augustine (354 – 430 AD) enlarged upon the teachings of Ambrose by determining whether the “Cause of the war was just and declared by a legitimate political authority that is rightly motivated”. A further development of the “Just War” theory centres on the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274 AD), where he lists three necessary conditions for a war to be just: sovereign authority, just cause and right intention. The latter had two components, namely, a right intention that aimed at peace as well as the need to avoid a wrong intention.5 The work of Aquinas led to the development of the principles of the “Just War” by various 17th Century Jurists.6 In summary the “Just War” criteria is as follows:

Jus ad Bellum (Just War)

  • The war must have a just cause.
  • The war must be waged by a legitimate authority.
  • The war must be fought with a right intention.
  • The war must be a last resort.
  • The expected results of the war must be proportionate.
  • There must be a reasonable hope of military success.

Jus in Bello (Conduct of War)

  • The weapons and acts of fighting must be discriminating: non combatants may never be targeted.
  • The weapons and acts of fighting must be proportionate.
  • All the legal rights of enemy soldiers and civilians must be honoured.

The Muslim Tradition

In Islam the focus is on moral character. The Prophet Mohammad repeatedly said that the best Muslim is the one who has the best moral character. Mohammed was asked: “Which Muslim has the perfect faith?” He answered: “One who has the best moral character”.7 Also, Mohammad said: “On judgement day there will be no deed weightier in the scale of the believer than his noble character. Allah does not like an obscene and rude talker, and the person who has a good character achieves the status of a person who prays and fasts”.8

Islam is a religion that focuses heavily on character building. There is a strong relationship between faith and good character. A person cannot attain full or perfect faith without attaining good character. “A person can reach a high status in the hereafter by his good conduct though he may be weak in matters of worship…”9 To achieve good character he must obey the Five Pillars of Islam:

1. To Believe in the oneness of God (Tawheed)

2. Prayer five times a day (As-Salat)

3. To give charity (Zakat)

4. Fasting during the month of Ramadan (Sawm)

5. A pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj), if you are able

The third admonition, “to give charity,” is relevant here as it shows the practical reality of character. It shows compassion as an obligation to serve the welfare of citizens, also to establish a relationship of kindness and love amongst all classes of society. It is also intended to reduce the love of material wealth and increase the desire to help those in need. These injunctions of compassion are very relevant when considering military ethics and the conduct of war (military jihad.10 In the Q’uran we find the following verse, which shows a strong element of both justice and compassion: “If two sides quarrel, make peace between them. But if one trespasses beyond bounds against the other, then fight against the one that transgresses until it complies with the law of God; and if it complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair” (Sura 49:9). And also, “If the enemy inclines towards peace, then you must also incline towards peace” (Sura 8:61)

A useful summary of the conduct of military operations was given by Muhammad’s successor, Abu Bakr, in the form of ten rules for the Muslim army: “Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy.”11

An examination of Islamic tradition concerning the “Rules of War” from the Quran and the Hadith suggests that war is not regarded as a good thing. Islam means peace – “Salaam aleikum”. That it is not right to inflict suffering to take power or gain food or land. This is tyranny: “If anyone walks with an oppressor to strengthen him, knowing that he is an oppressor, he has gone forth from Islam.”12 That war should only be called in the following situations:

  1. In defence of the cause of Allah, not conquest
  2. To restore peace and freedom of worship
  3. For freedom from tyranny
  4. When led by a spiritual leader
  5. Only fought until the enemy lays down his arms
  6. Women, children, old and sick should not be harmed. Trees and crops should not be damaged.

With regard to point number 4 (above) only certain spiritual leaders can declare a Jihad:

  1. The Prophet himself and the first four Caliphs
  2. The Caliph of the Ummayad (Abu Sayad) dynasty
  3. The Caliph of the Abbassid (Abu Abbass) dynasty
  4. The Caliph of the Ottomans
  5. The last call for a Jihad against non-Muslims was called by the Ottoman caliph-sultan in 1912. It was a failure
  6. A leaders’ call to Jihad is not binding – he must convince the faithful!

Although written in the Seventh century, these directives are still very relevant today. However, the problem in the minds of many people today is how these admirable principles could be distorted by some militant Islamists, such as Osama bin Laden, who wrote in 1998: “American policy does not differentiate between civilians and military. Child, human or animal. Example Hiroshima and Nagasaki where they tried to eliminate a whole nation…we also do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets of our fatwa. This includes all who share in the killing of Muslims, assaulting their holy places or helping the Jews occupy Muslim land.”13

The clear assertion here is that the Americans (and their Allies such as the United Kingdom) have forfeited the right to be treated with the same respect as the earlier enemies of Islam at the time of the Prophet. However this interpretation of absolute war is contrary to the classical (Salafist) doctrine from the early years of Islamic conquest. It is also far removed from the principles of honour applied by the great Muslim leader, Saladin the Great (1138 – 1193 AD). His generally chivalrous behavior was noted by Christian chroniclers at the time, especially in the accounts of the siege of Kerak in Moab (1183). Despite being the nemesis of the Crusaders, Saladin won the respect of many crusaders, including Richard the Lionheart. Saladin became a shining example of the principles of honour and chivalry.

Analysis

It can be seen that there is great synergy between the general ethical principles of military warfare reflected both by Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradition. The military in both the USA and the U.K. embrace standards of professional ethical conduct, both written and unwritten. The West Point motto is “Duty, honor, country,” and the Sandhurst motto is “Serve to Lead.” All professions lay down standards of conduct, for example the medical profession is dedicated to the preservation of human life as laid down in the Hippocratic code.

The problem for the military is that they need to define much more clearly what is meant by an ethical code of practice, as the consequence of getting it wrong can lead to appalling loss of life. It can also threaten to destroy the purpose of the mission itself by alienating the very people they are intending to help. History tells us that this has happened all too often in the past. For example the Amritsar massacre (1919), the My Lai massacre (1968), Bloody Sunday (1972), and until recently the indiscriminate aerial bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. and British forces.

The result has been the destruction of trust and respect in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as creating a dangerous security environment, which has led to the killing or maiming of many hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent lives. Some of the mistakes made are that of misunderstanding or underestimating the importance of local religious and cultural traditions and thereby causing unimaginable anger. Generally, British servicemen have lived up to the very highest ethical standard in the most difficult situations, but even if a very few fail and let their service down, the consequence can be fatal to the whole mission.

Conclusion

Although much work has already been done, we need to clarify further our basis for ethical standards and practices, in particular our knowledge and understanding of the ethical values and cultures of other countries and their religion. It follows that these values must be translated into more detailed guidelines for everyday activities. Once these values have been both accepted and embraced they need to be taught to subordinates, who need to wholeheartedly accept and commit themselves to these ethical principles and practices. In this way we can challenge extremist dogma and intolerance.

Leadership is by example and this includes morality and integrity. These aspirational characteristics are common to both Islam and Christianity. An example of the latter is the motto, “Serve to Lead”; whereby we are urged to put our soldiers’ interests before our own. However, although we teach selflessness, we tend to reward ambition. Sometimes officers appear to be brilliant to their superiors, but in some cases they are sycophants who treat their subordinates with arrogance and contempt. On some occasions officers initiate massacres of the innocent, and these isolated incidents need to be examined in detail to determine whether they were caused by a predictable character flaw.

Although some work has been done on military ethical standards and practices, I believe further research is needed. For example we need to:

1. Re-examine current British military ethical codes and practices, with a view to producing a more robust ethical code within a multi-cultural society. This may or may not reinforce the traditional Judeo – Christian values, but these need to be challenged and tested in the light of the secularisation of our Western society with its changing mores and customs.

2. Research and identify the ethical codes and practices of other countries that, for example espouse Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist traditions. From this we can adjust our procedures and practices to avoid unnecessarily antagonising the indigenous peoples of the countries in which we serve.

3. Re-examine past failures, violations and massacres, to learn the lessons and to determine why they happened and whether they can be avoided in the future by a more rigorous code of ethical practice. We also need to examine successes, where good leadership has succeeded in establishing well respected ethical values.

4. Establish a firm academic and empirical basis for the teaching and training of British military ethical codes and practices. This should take the form of an anthology covering the following elements:

· A review of the Judeo – Christian ethical tradition in the U.K. and U.S.

· A review of military ethical traditions and practices in Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist countries to form a basis of understanding and possibly a connection with U.K. practices

· A examination of a varied number incidents where massacres, atrocities and violations of human rights have taken place at the hands of the military in order to determine patterns and lessons

· Studies of successful operational commanders, who have been constrained by ethical principles, integrity and moral courage

· The profiles and psychology of infamous leaders, who have not been bound by any ethical code. Can they be recognised or profiled early in their military careers and, if so, can they be retrained?

The results of these research studies should point the way to changes that need to made to U.K. military ethical codes, practices, teaching and training. This is a most urgent requirement as the consequence of getting things wrong will seriously undermine the purpose of any military operation and reflect badly on the United Kingdom’s standing in the world and especially that of our excellent Armed Forces. Who knows, sometime in the distant future we may realise Isaiah’s dream of “beating our swords into ploughshares”…and neither shall they learn “war anymore.”14.


ENDNOTES

1.Shaykh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin and Amir Ayman al-Zawahiri: “We — with Allah’s help — call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim Ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson”. 23 Feb 1998

2. The Gospel of Matthew, Ch 5 v 39 – 41

3. The Gospel of Matthew, Ch 8 v8-13

4. Kreider, Alan. “Military Service in the Church Orders”. Journal of Religious Ethics. 2003 p 419

5. Dobbin, Victor. Why Ethics, Why Christian, Why You?. Impact Printing, Ballycastle, 2009

6. Spanish theologians, Francisco de Vitoria (1486 – 1556AD) and Francisco Suarez (1548 – 1617AD) and the Dutch Jurist Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645AD).

7. Tabarani. http://learndeen.com/jm/deen-islam/aqueeda-a-tawheed/36/105

8. Imam Ahmed. Encyclopaedia of Islam Online

9. Abu Dawood. Encyclopaedia of Islam Online

10. Jihad literally means “struggle”. So military Jihad is war, but spiritual jihad is the battle, or struggle, to improve oneself spiritually etc. The term Jihad was also used by Ayatollah Khomeini to rebuild Iran after the first

11. Aboul-Enein et al, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, P 22, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Diane Publishing Co, Derby PA

12. Hadith. Bukhari Islam

13. Newsweek, 20 Jan 2008

14. Isaiah 2 v 4, Micah 4 v 3

CHRISTIANITY, VIRTUE, AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSION

Introduction

God must love spying, but it is not clear that he loves spies. Both the Old and New Testament record moments when God’s chosen people relied on spies to ensure their safety or further their cause. But at the same time, the Bible clearly reflects God’s displeasure at some of the acts spies do, such as lying and stealing. God’s displeasure stems not just from the nature of the acts themselves, but also because repeatedly committing such acts will make one a liar and thief. The tension between the just demands for intelligence and the apparently unjust acts intelligence professionals are sometimes called upon to do poses a dilemma for Christians who would serve in the intelligence community.

From a human perspective, these activities are justified by their contribution to national security and the fact that wars are won, or better yet avoided, because the right information analyzed the right way got to the right decision makers at the right time. But the question remains, how does the collection and analysis of this information affect those who do it? The question is not trivial. Many have left the profession or suffered moral damage because they felt that the deceiving and harming they have done—or in the case of analysts, exploited—in service to their country has corrupted their integrity. Further, many felt this corruption was exacerbated by a perception that the intelligence community serves a “cloudy moral purpose.”1This paper will discuss the role virtues can play as a moral framework to resolve this tension and balance the requirements of the intelligence profession with the moral principles that constrain it. It will begin with illustrating shortcomings in other ethical decision making frameworks and then discuss how virtues can overcome these shortcomings. Once the virtues are identified and discussed relative to the intelligence profession, the paper will then discuss how these virtues may be acquired and applied as a means to increase resources available for ethical decision making.

Necessity and Rules


Intelligence professionals often engage in activities that Christians would generally consider immoral. Lying about one’s identity and activities as well as invading others’ privacy to collect information clearly violate two of the Ten Commandments. Yet, in what is arguably the Old Testament’s best known case of spying, Israelite spies not only concealed their identity, they relied on the lies of the prostitute Rahab in order to evade capture.2

The risks the presence of the Israelite spies posed for Rahab demonstrates another ethically problematic aspect of spying. Intelligence professionals often must recruit sources who they must then put at risk by asking them to do something which for them is arguably immoral: betray their country. Analysts must then assess this information and provide finished intelligence products to key decision makers. Thus no one in the Intelligence Community (IC) escapes moral taint. While the Bible is not clear about how much lying they may have done, given the King of Jericho’s efforts to capture them it is likely they misrepresented their identities multiple times. If nothing else, their positive reaction to Rahab’s example suggests they would not have had moral objection to doing so.

Governments and militaries, of course, justify these kinds of activities because of their utility to national security. That national security is a morally worthwhile pursuit from the biblical perspective is evidenced by Paul’s injunction in Romans 13, “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God.”3 But just because national security is a morally worthwhile goal does not mean that everything done in its pursuit is morally worthwhile. This uncertainty can result in feelings of guilt if intelligence professionals are not able to place their actions clearly within a moral framework they can understand and accept.

Of course, the problem of balancing just goals with seemingly unjust means is not exclusively a problem for members of the IC. The job of a professional, whether she is a doctor, lawyer, soldier, or intelligence officer, is to achieve some morally worthwhile result. For the doctor, it is a healed patient, for the lawyer, the just application of the law, and for the soldier, security. The activities of the professional often involve engaging in activities, like surgery or the use of deadly force, which would not be permissible for a non-professional. Thus, most discussions of professional ethics begin with a discussion of utilitarian ethics. Utilitarian ethics requires that a particular action maximizes some good, such as happiness or pleasure, or minimizes some harm, such as misery or pain. In the context of the intelligence profession, it is assumed that anything that contributes to national security maximizes the good. As long as the contribution of an action toward national security outweighs any accompanying harm the act is not only permitted, it is required.4When choosing any particular target, the means for collection or analysis is not always in itself a moral choice. Intelligence professionals still have a prima facie moral obligation to accomplish their assigned tasks. Therefore, when making moral decisions in the context of the intelligence profession, one must determine the utility of the act in terms of whether its accomplishment maximizes or minimizes the chance of success.

Decisions thus arrived at are often justified or explained under the rubric “necessity.” But if necessity were the only consideration, then acts that would otherwise violate treaties or intelligence oversight regulations would be morally obligatory. If this were true, then intelligence professionals would be free to disregard the law as long as it was necessary to achieving success. In fact, one would never have to consider the law in the first place.

In fact, some intelligence professionals will argue just that. One former intelligence professional was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “It’s (intelligence ethics) not an issue. It never was and never will be, not if you want a real spy service.”Not surprisingly, this same intelligence professional was once indicted for perjuring himself before Congress.

However, intelligence professionals are obligated to take the law seriously. By accepting their role, members of the intelligence profession promise to abide by treaties to which the United States is a party as well as intelligence oversight regulations. Given Paul’s words cited above, this seems especially true for the Christian member of the IC. Thus, always deciding in favor of necessity would undermine the professional’s ability to make promises; however, promise-keeping is an essential part of maintaining one’s integrity. For this reason, a policy that undermines an officer’s integrity, when pursued as a general policy, corrupts the profession.

But often necessity and rule-following conflict, and it is not clear which to choose. Interrogators who know a detainee possesses life-saving information will often claim necessity justifies crossing moral and legal lines to obtain that information. Case officers must sometimes choose between the welfare of their source and obtaining critical information.6 Sometimes analysts have to decide whether to whether to tell an uncomfortable and unpopular “truth,” knowing that their superiors will likely reject their conclusions. Unfortunately, space does not exist to develop scenarios to illustrate these kinds of moral conflicts.7

But to claim that even in the case of such conflict a good intelligence officer always abides by the rules will not always yield the best answer. In many of these cases whether a rule applies or what the consequences will be is not clear. When this is the case, resolving conflicts is especially difficult. To arrive at a better informed conclusion we need a moral framework that accounts for both rules and consequences and provides a means for sorting out conflicts and filling in gaps. Sometimes the answer to the question: “Should following the rules take precedence over mission accomplishment?” will be “yes,” but not always.8 Making the correct distinction is one of the primary tasks of the professional, and the distinguishing mark of a person of character.

There is a gap between the kinds of ethical questions intelligence professionals confront and the kinds of answers that consequence and rule-based approaches can give. When considerations of necessity are insufficient and rules also fail, what intelligence professionals do depends ultimately on the type of person they are. Thus, it is important to develop professionals of character who understand what it means to be good—not just what it means to follow rules, perform duties, or reason well, although these are important to being ethical. If professionals are to have the moral resources necessary to make ethically sound decisions, they need an approach to ethics that articulates what good character is, how it can be developed, and how it influences moral decision-making. Moral philosophers usually refer to the ethics of character as virtue ethics.

This approach to ethics seeks to determine systematically what kind of traits good people (or in this case, good intelligence officers) should possess, what it means to possess these traits, and how people can come to possess these traits. In this context, virtues are the traits of good character. A person of character is more concerned with being the kind of person who does the right thing, at the right time, in the right way, and is not as concerned with the act itself. The ethics of character avoids most dilemmas because the focus is no longer on deciding between two unfortunate outcomes or two conflicting rules but on being a certain kind of person. Virtuous professionals do not assign values to outcomes or preferences to duties. Virtuous intelligence professionals have habituated dispositions that make them the kind of people who do the right thing, even in the complicated and dynamic environment of modern intelligence operations.

The Virtues of the Good Intelligence Professional


In virtue ethics, the virtues are determined by understanding the purpose or role a person serves.9 In non-moral terms, knowing the purpose of a thing reveals whether it is functioning well or poorly. For example, if the purpose of pack animals such as mules is to bear burdens, we can tell which mules do better and which do worse. Further, we can tell what qualities a mule must possess, such as strength, surefootedness, and endurance, to do its task well. To the degree a mule possesses these traits, the better the mule is. A human being must also have certain characteristics to be a good human being. Aristotle, who saw the purpose of humans was to reason and form communities, claimed that the virtues of the excellent person include courage, temperance, liberality, proper pride, good temper, ready wit, modesty, and justice.10 Plato listed, and subsequent Christian thinkers have accepted, the cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice.11

The lengthening and shortening of the “list of virtues” does on the surface seem arbitrary. Part of this lack of clarity results from the complexities associated with determining what human nature actually is. Because what it means to function well for a human is much more complex than what it means to function well for a mule, defining “functioning well” is difficult. Part of the problem is that a complex combination of biology, environment, culture, and tradition determines what it means for humans to function well. What this complex combination is and how its components relate to each other are not always well understood and are therefore subjects of much debate. This lack of clarity not only complicates discerning what the virtues are, but also how they should be interpreted.

But the function, environment, culture, and traditions of the Christian community, like the intelligence community, are well understood. Aquinas, drawing on Aristotle, noted that man’s nature in part determines which traits will lead to flourishing and which ones will not. He referred to this kind of flourishing as “imperfect happiness,” since it was limited both by human nature as well as the fallible human ability to discern how best to attain them.12 But Aquinas also accepted a kind of “role-specific” virtue as he argues that as Christians, we are called to have a right relationship with God and to do that required by other virtues, namely, faith hope and love.13

Similarly, the IC has a purpose that allows us to distinguish it from other forms of human activity. This purpose is to collect and analyze information from foreign sources essential for national security.14 Fulfilling this purpose requires conducting clandestine operations as well as safeguarding state secrets. It requires also telling truth to power.15

Given these functions, one can determine some of the virtues that are associated with the intelligence profession. These traits include: selflessness, prudence, courage, secretiveness, conscientiousness, and integrity. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but rather is intended to illustrate a process by which to develop an ethical approach based on the role intelligence professionals fill and how that should affect the kinds of traits they acquire.

To properly establish goals and methods of intelligence operations, intelligence professionals will need to be prudent and selfless.16 Prudence is necessary to discern the proper ends and selflessness is necessary to mediate when proper ends conflict with self-interest. Intelligence professionals require courage, conscientiousness, secretiveness and integrity to achieve the goals they establish.

Courage is required because clandestine operations require risks. Even analysts require courage because often speaking “truth to power” is not welcomed by the powerful. Conscientiousness is required because decision makers need to know that collectors did not take short cuts in collecting the information and that analysts did not “cherry-pick” intelligence, but rather engaged in the sometimes painful research necessary to ensure that their products are based on the most complete data available. Intelligence professionals also need to be appropriately secretive to ensure that information critical to national security is safeguarded. Finally, integrity is required because at all levels of the profession, decision makers need to be able trust that the information provided is not tainted by political bias or personal interest. In the next section we will discuss what it means to possess these virtues.

It should be noted that these virtues do not replace, supplant or supersede other virtues associated with living the Christian life. The point of virtue ethics is that there is an objective human nature, created by God and which ultimately depends on the right relationship with God in order to be fully realized. This is similarly true for the Christian intelligence professional. The special virtues of the profession do not conflict with the exercise of Christian virtues, rather they are a theoretical framework that clarifies decision making in the context of the intelligence profession

Applying the Virtues

Having decided what the virtues of good intelligence officers are, we need to discuss what it means to act virtuously. Virtues are excellences of character, that is, they are fixed dispositions toward certain behaviors that result in good acts.17 Aristotle viewed virtues as the “golden mean”—a mean between the two extremes (vices) of excess and deficiency in regard to certain human capacities. For example, with regard to feelings of fear, courage is the mean. A person can feel too much fear and be cowardly or feel too little fear and be foolhardy. A person, who runs away in the face of danger, when the proper thing to do would be to stand his ground, is a coward. But the person who stands his ground because he does not comprehend the danger, is also not courageous. The moderation criterion works the same way for other virtues as well.

For example, with regard to selflessness, one extreme is careerism, where intelligence professionals are too concerned with personal advancement and fail to place the needs of the organization above their own. But one can also be too selfless. Intelligence officers who never take care of personal interests might impede their ability to lead. For example, persons who deny themselves sleep, so as to demonstrate their commitment to the task, quickly become incapable of making good decisions.18

In the context of professional ethics, we can identify character traits which are particular to the profession, and which outside the profession may not be considered a virtue. Consider secretiveness, a trait most closely, and perhaps exclusively, associated with the intelligence profession. The extremes are being too open and too “withdrawn.” Intelligence professionals spend most of their day working with secrets, but must still function as members of a more open society, and in the role as spouse or parent must develop the bonds appropriate for a good marriage or raising of children. Intelligence professionals who talk too much about their work, even to close family members and friends, make themselves vulnerable to exploitation by adversary intelligence organizations.

In fact, much good human intelligence is obtained by clandestine operators or recruited sources who exploit the human need to develop close and intimate relationships. On the other extreme, it is commonly reported that the intelligence profession’s aura of secrecy and requirement to protect sensitive information often gradually expands over personal matters until eventually the intelligence professional is unable to effectively communicate with family members or friends. This can lead to feelings of abandonment by children, spouses, and close friends, which is arguably a morally undesirable outcome.19

Not all virtues are found in the mean between extremes. Virtues like conscientiousness and integrity are required if we are to instantiate properly the other virtues. In virtue ethics one must consciously and conscientiously cultivate a virtue—that is, one must habitually perform acts that reflect the relevant virtue if one is to say he or she possesses that virtue.20 Psychologically, the habituation of virtue can take on the qualities of a duty. For example, to develop the virtue of integrity—which can be understood as a commitment without coercion to a consistent set of well-founded moral principles and values—one must always act in accordance with those principles and values.21

It is worth emphasizing that for Aristotle the mean is sought only because it is beneficial; the mean between two extremes enables the individual to live well. To discern what the mean is one must develop the ability to reason well, itself a virtue that Aristotle called prudence or practical wisdom. This virtue is necessary to resolve the tension between the feelings that emerge from natural appetites, concerns of self-interest, and the requirements of virtue.22 The conflict between reason, feeling, and self-interest lies at the heart of the virtues. What drags us to extremes detrimental to our long-term happiness are passions and feelings, such as excessive (or defective) fear or excessive love of pleasure. Reason is required to control behavior, passions, and feelings. Virtues are applications of reason to behavior and emotion. These virtues can emerge with proper officer development.

Virtue ethics allows us to take into account considerations of necessity and law, rules, duties, and principles in a way that resolves the tension inherent among them. As in consequence-based ethical theories, we must be concerned with consequences of an action to determine its normative value. In virtue ethics, one must be sensitive to the conditions that frame moral choices. Acting on the principle of always telling the truth is good, but ignoring how that truth might affect others risks doing moral harm. A caring husband, for example, should bring to his wife’s attentions matters negatively affecting her health. A vicious (or at least stupid) husband will simply announce that she is fat.

Developing the Virtues of Good Character


A virtue ethics approach to intelligence ethics can help resolve certain dilemmas that reasoning from necessity or simply following the rules cannot. Instead of focusing on doing good things, the virtuous person focuses on being good, and the doing good naturally follows. How one becomes good is by acquiring certain virtues or character traits that lead to doing virtuous things. However, rule-based approaches can play a key role. Virtues do not develop overnight. One cannot wake up one day and decide to be courageous, for example, and immediately be so. Being virtuous means knowing the right time, place, circumstance, and manner in which to be courageous. One acquires these traits by habituation.

According to Aristotle, whose writings greatly influenced modern virtue theory, one becomes virtuous only by performing virtuous actions until doing so becomes habitual. In other words, practice and experience are necessary. Aristotle makes this point by contrasting virtues with natural capacities:

Of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g., men become builders by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.23

Thus, just as one becomes a good musician only by practicing an instrument, one becomes a good intelligence officer only by practicing the profession. Musicians follow rules and care about results, but the end is to be become a musician of excellence, not simply to be in conformity with certain rules or achieve certain results. But how does one who has no experience in virtue development create such necessary experiences? When we try to describe a virtue, we tend to list the acts we must perform to embody the virtue. Listing these acts is just like listing rules and principles. This is line of reasoning is, in fact, one of the major critiques of the virtue approach. When we consciously set out to put rules and principles into practice, we end up with what appears to be essentially a rule-based system. When this happens, we lose sight of the role of character.

To illustrate this point, consider rules regarding the disclosure of classified information. Not only are members of the IC prohibited to disclose classified information to those without the proper security clearance, they are also prohibited from disclosing certain information to members within the community, even if they have the appropriate clearances. These restrictions are driven out of a concern of protecting sources and methods: the risk being that the more people who have a piece of information, the more likely it is to be leaked.

Further, these lines are not as clear as they may seem. Sometimes, members of the IC as well as the decision makers they support will pressure an analyst or collector for information they want, but are not cleared to receive. Other times, the collector or analyst will want to provide information to a wider audience, but be restricted because of these clearance issues. To handle such situations, the IC employs a number of disclosure procedures to ensure that information gets to those who need it.

Following these procedures can often be tedious and time consuming. But if we understand the rule to be: Do not disclose classified material to those not authorized, one can be a good rule-following professional by not doing anything. The cost, of course, is that information does not get to where it can do the most good. But that cost does not factor in to a rule-following ethic. And here we can see the difference with the virtue ethics approach.

The virtuous analyst will of course uphold the rule, but being conscientious, will undertake what procedures are necessary to get the information released (if possible) to whomever needs it. This is the difference between the virtue of integrity in truth-telling and mere failure to lie. Once this happens, the IC professional is no longer simply following rules. He or she has actually developed the capacity to make them. What motivates him or her to adopt this attitude is an understanding that it is not enough to do good, it is just as important to be good. In fact, doing good flows from being good.

Aristotle also points out that one cannot develop virtue by accident or by doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. The analyst or collector who undergoes disclosure procedure in order to increase the distribution of their work and thus serve their career interests may not be said to act virtuously. This is why intent is important. One simply cannot become conscientious or wise or honest unless one is trying to become so. For an action to be truly virtuous, a person must be in the right state of mind, and have the right attitudes about his or her own development.

The Role of Mentorship


If rules initially have a role in habituating virtue, it is critical for the person making the rules to possess that virtue. In this way, the rules are right-minded and constructive, becoming a pathway one can take to becoming a good member of the profession. As noted earlier, Aristotle likened the acquiring of virtues to playing an instrument, which requires a teacher and habitual practice. Unless one is a musical prodigy, one does not pick up a guitar and, by fooling around with it, play it well. One might, after a fashion, be able to make pleasant sounds with it, but without someone to provide instruction and example, developing true proficiency will be long and arduous, fraught with mistakes, and certainly inefficient. One might even pick up a book and memorize the principles of good guitar-playing. Those who have tried that method know that doing so might make them better to an extent, but to achieve true excellence it takes a good role-model and teacher.

For the Christian, the role model is of course Jesus Christ. By emulating what we know of his life, we begin to learn how to live virtuously. But, it is not always obvious how Christ’s example would inform the Christian intelligence professional. To that end, junior intelligence professionals must look to older ones to acquire the necessary virtues. Junior officers can learn from seeing how virtues are embodied by those who are effective at moral officership. Only then can they incorporate virtues into their own characters.

Exercising a virtue involves a delicate balancing between general rules and an awareness of particulars. Awareness of the particular carries more weight, in the sense that a good rule is a summary of wise particular choices, not an exclusive choice itself. The rules of ethics, like rules of medicine, should be held open to modification in the light of new circumstances. The good intelligence professional must cultivate the ability to perceive, then correctly and accurately describe his situation and include in this perceptual grasp even those features of the situation that are not covered under the existing rule. The virtues provide a framework around which officers must engage in this process.

Conclusion: The Potential to Do Good or Harm


In the complex, dynamic, and dangerous environment of modern intelligence work there is great potential to do harm, even evil, and little time to apply rules or to calculate consequences to avoid harm. Even if there were time, such one-dimensional approaches to ethics are not always successful. Rules, duties, and principles can conflict. Sincere, well-intentioned compliance with them can sometimes lead to the most disastrous outcomes. But acting in such situations does not necessarily make someone a bad person. Actions might be evidence of the presence or the absence of virtue, but they are not in themselves virtuous. Acting virtuously might not spare one from the moral costs of intelligence work, but doing so provides a framework in which one can maintain one’s integrity as well as the integrity of the profession.

This is why developing the virtues of the profession is so important for the intelligence professional. In situations where any action can lead to a morally impermissible or harmful outcome, it will be professionals of character who will be best able to resolve the conflict and maintain their own integrity and the integrity of the profession as well. Character is an essential part of an ethical framework for any professional. This does not mean that the virtuous never consider consequences or rules to determine where their duties lie. The point is that the virtuous intelligence professional has developed the disposition to know how and when to do so in the best way possible.

Charles A. “Tony” Pfaff is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer who has taught on the faculty at West Point, served two tours in Iraq, and served as Defense Attache in Kuwait. He is currently a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), in Washington, D.C., and a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University.

Endnotes


1.Kent Pekel, Integrity, Ethics, and the CIA in Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998) p. 87-89. and Langan
2. Joshua 2: 1-22.
3. Romans 13: 1, NRSV. Of course, not all governments are just and there are times when Christians should oppose the government they are under. But Paul’s words do suggest that where the government is relatively just, the authorities should take actions to secure it.
4. It is worth noting that utility theory is best characterized as a way of making ethical decisions and as such does not compete with Christian ethics since it does not determine, by itself, how different outcomes are evaluated. In fact, some have argued for a Christian utilitarianism where what is valued is the Kingdom of God. See C. Stephen Layman, “The Kingdom of God,” in Readings in Christian Ethics, Vol I, David K Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw eds (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books: 1994) 32-40.
5. Scott Shane, “An Exotic Tool for Espionage: Moral Compass,” New York Times. 28 January 2006
6. R.V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1989, p.42. Jones, an intelligence professional in WWII and noted scholar on the subject considers betraying an agent immoral under any but the most extreme examples. According to Jones, Allied intelligence professionals considered betraying a German double agent by letting another agent ‘sell him out.’ By betraying that agent the other agent would ingratiate himself to the Germans and be in a position to pass false information regarding the landings on D-Day. According to Jones, this did not happen and would have been viewed by the intelligence community at the time as unacceptable, whether the agent was a member of the organization or a foreign national working for it.
7. See Ethics of Spying ….
8. For a more complete discussion of why rule- and duty-based ethics do not form complete ethical approaches, see Charles A. Pfaff, “Virtue Ethics and Leadership,” unpublished presentation to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, available on-line at www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE98/PFAFF98.htm. See also Julius Moravcsik, “On What We Aim At and How We Live,” in The Greeks and the Good Life, ed., David Depew (Fullerton, CA: California State University, 1980), 199. 9. Aristotle believed that a human being’s function is to reason. Human beings who reason well will also live well because they are the best human beings they can be.
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Terence Irwin, (Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing Company), Book IV.
11. Plato, “Laws,” trans., A.E. Taylor, 1.631d, 12.965d, and “Republic,” trans., Paul Shorey, 4.427e, 433, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds., Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).
12. Summa Theologica, Q5a5.
13. Summa Theologica, Q62a1.
14. Not intended to be definitive formulation. Also doesn’t include covert operations
15. See Pfaff, Bungee Jumping Off the Moral Highground.
16. Distinguishing between what Plato and Aristotle referred to as practical wisdom (phronesis) and philosophical wisdom (sophia) is important. Practical wisdom expresses itself in the prudent conduct of one’s public and private business. This virtue, also often called prudence, is distinguished from the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. In the context of the discussion of leadership, Plato, in the “Laws,” discussed what qualities a good legislator should possess and claims that a good legislator relies on prudence to determine what laws to enact. Since good laws achieve good ends, the good legislator must discern both the good end and the means to the good end. With regard to selflessness, my use of the term here is synonymous with the idea of public virtue. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 71. See also James M. Stockdale, Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995),75.
17. Louis Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, (Albany, NY: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1999) 163.
18. Jonathan Shay, “Ethical Standing for Commander Self-Care: The Need for Sleep,” Parameters, (Summer 1998): 93-105.
19. Richard “Freeman”. (2004). Report from a Counterintelligence Officer on Two Devastated Veterans of Covert Operations. Interview conducted by J.M. Arrigo, Crozet, VA. Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, CA.
20. James Wallace, Virtue and Vices, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 90.
21. Pekel in Goldman, p. 54
22. Nicomachean Ethics, Book II.
23. Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1103a27-1103b1.

Quotations


“The tension between the just demands for intelligence and the apparently unjust acts intelligence professionals are sometimes called upon to do poses a dilemma for Christians who would serve in the intelligence community.”

“…always deciding in favor of necessity would undermine the professional’s ability to make promises; however, promise-keeping is an essential part of maintaining one’s integrity. For this reason, a policy that undermines an officer’s integrity, when pursued as a general policy, corrupts the profession.”

“Sometimes the answer to the question: “Should following the rules take precedence over mission accomplishment?” will be “yes,” but not always.[xxiii] Making the correct distinction is one of the primary tasks of the professional, and the distinguishing mark of a person of character.”

“Virtuous intelligence professionals have habituated dispositions that make them the kind of people who do the right thing, even in the complicated and dynamic environment of modern intelligence operations.”

“The point of virtue ethics is that there is an objective human nature, created by God and which ultimately depends on the right relationship with God in order to be fully realized. This is similarly true for the Christian intelligence professional. The special virtues of the profession do not conflict with the exercise of Christian virtues, rather they are a theoretical framework that clarifies decision making in the context of the intelligence profession.”

“A virtue ethics approach to intelligence ethics can help resolve certain dilemmas that reasoning from necessity or simply following the rules cannot.
Instead of focusing on doing good things, the virtuous person focuses on being good, and the doing good naturally follows.”

“Acting virtuously might not spare one from the moral costs of intelligence work, but doing so provides a framework in which one can maintain one’s integrity as well as the integrity of the profession.”

REACTING TO THE COMING CHANGES IN “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” (DADT)

by Don M. Snider, Ph.D.

A talk presented on 6 May 2009 at a seminar on “Integrating Faith, Family and Profession” at the Memorial Chapel of the U.S. Army War College

Note: The views expressed here are those of the author, not the Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense

Introduction

It is good to remind ourselves that some of the greatest challenges to our ability to think and to act as Christians come from those circumstances to which we must re-act, rather than autonomously acting first. Such I believe will be the case in the coming changes to DADT, which many leaders might well prefer not to be changed at all.

Thus, Christian officers, and particularly those at the level of strategic leadership, will face a moral and ethical dilemma when the laws that govern service by homosexuals in U.S. armed forces change to allow such citizens to serve openly.

Morally, the dilemma will be manifested in terms of the officer’s personal morality which, based on Christian teaching, views homosexual conduct as wrong and thus not to be legitimized socially by open service in the Republic’s armed forces.

Ethically, the dilemma will be to accommodate fully an evolving professional ethic, which evolution in DADT directly confronts and contradicts the officer’s personal morality. Under their commission, it is rightly expected that officers individually can in all circumstances abide by and fully support the profession’s ethic (…”and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion…”). Thus, if they cannot resolve the cognitive dissonance between personal morality and professional ethic, then they simply cannot integrate faith, family, and profession, and should seriously consider whether they should remain on active duty.

I will not focus on the specific Christian beliefs behind your, and my, views on homosexual conduct, as I believe we here this morning are part of a larger Christian consensus that it is simply wrong; it is sinful behavior. But in passing I will note that the same Christian perspective makes quite clear that it is no more wrong and sinful than any number of other behaviors you deal with daily among a few members of the profession – adultery, drunkenness, lying, stealing, abuse of spouses and children, failure to pay legitimate bills… clearly, we all, each one, are fallen and live in a fallen world.

That perspective also makes quite clear that those who are the object of the cultural wars within our society and this policy change are not just “gays” or “homosexuals.” By the Christian narrative they are human beings created in the image of God. All humans are therefore valuable without having to prove their worth; they are to be accorded the dignity and respect called for by their unique creation. Christian officers, above others, must understand and support this belief by their leadership both personally and officially.

What is behind the policy change; How to contextualize it?

I believe as military professionals you must see this as an issue of an evolving professional ethic. Remember, the three influences on the ethic of military professions are: 1) the values and behavioral norms of the society being defended, how they expect their sons and daughters to be treated when in uniform and how they expect their wars to be fought and won and a better peace then established, 2) the military imperatives for an effective fighting force, e.g., the obese may not serve, etc.; and 3) the terms of international treaties to which the United States is a party. In that regard, the evolution in DADT can be seen in three interrelated trends:

· The first trend is the now well-publicized secularization of American society. Sadly, neither our military professions, nor their chaplaincies, are researching the influences of this trend. But recall the cover of Newsweek only a month ago, “The Decline and Fall of Christian America.1 The article reported new statistics from the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008) documenting that America is becoming less Christian.2 86% of American adults self identified as Christians in 1990; but only 76% in 2008; those with “no stated religion, atheist, or agnostic” rose in the same period from 8.2% to 14.1%; etc. While discussions of a currently post-Christian America are fanciful, a slow trend is unmistakable. How are you going to incorporate/accommodate this trend in your own understanding of the evolution of the profession’s ethic and DADT?

· The second trend is the significantly increasing acceptance of homosexual lifestyles among generation Y Americans, including those volunteering for service in our armed forces. In my experience teaching at West Point the past 13 years, the trend was clear and when discussing it with the cadets the influence of their secondary school experiences was more than obvious. In similar manner, and equally unscientific in method, is a 2008 Military Times survey of active duty military personnel indicating that while 54% of active duty personnel oppose a change in the policy, 71% will have no difficulty at all accommodating the change.3 So my point to you is, as always, be aware of the generational issues that you must deal with as you lead at the strategic level. Simply stated, everyone you lead does not believe, and therefore think, as you and your generation do.

· The third trend is the lack of any effort since 1993 by the strategic leaders of our military professions to study, analyze, and otherwise argue for the military necessity of the current DADT policy. In other words, if it was necessary for task cohesion within the force, the leadership never made the case; and it is now far too late. You will have to draw your own conclusions as to why this was the case, but my own take is it simply remained in the “too hard” box; sadly a case of a profession being led as a politically correct bureaucracy rather than studying for itself what is ethically necessary for an effective fighting force and then defending that fact in public. If I am correct, there is also another lesson here for you as future strategic leaders!

Having contextualized, some questions to ask yourself

First, I suggest you ask yourself if you really believe in an evolving professional ethic… is this a welcome and good thing? I suggest that it is, and offer only one example to make the point. During the last era of conventional war (post-RVN to the end of the first Iraq War) the profession’s ethic of force was singular – maximum force permissible. However, in hybrid warfare under the COIN doctrine employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now rightly added a second ethic of force – least force necessary. You recent participants in that theater know far better than I how much the U.S. military’s ethic of force has evolved and how hard it has been to inculcate it at every level of operations. But my point is that American military ethics do change and for good reasons.

Second, have you thought recently about the limits of liberal democracy and what our constituted form of government is able to produce in terms of governance? Theoretically, we have from our Founders a form of government with federalism and institutional checks and balances that will not allow the minority citizens to be tyrannized by the majority. Sadly, our national history belies that theory. There are however many, myself included, who have never been in the minority on issues that personally touched us. I have never felt tyrannized, except perhaps under Roe v. Wade, but as a male that did not touch me personally. My point is that now, under a changed DADT, some of you are going to have to wrestle for the first time with minority status, and you are going to have to be careful as to how you re-assess your personal expectations of your government… the constituted form of governance to which you took a solemn oath.4

Third, I suggest that you ask yourself how the role of your own Christian witness as a strategic leader might change under this policy change. We know that those who follow you within your small part of the military will naturally know of your faith walk and will be keenly observing you to see how you handle the policy change, thus my question. You will have to arrive at your own answer, but I suggest that for many other Christians and searchers within the ranks, those of less professional and spiritual maturity than yourself, your actions will be critical (as always they will watch what you do far more than they will listen to what you say). Carefully thought through in advance, this might well be a golden moment for lifestyle evangelism done, as always, by your professional excellence.

Fourth, and last, I ask that you rethink this policy change through in the context of your original calling into the military. In the big picture, what has changed? Certainly not the purpose of our armed forces – it remains to execute faithfully the policies of our government by the use of lethal force or the threat thereof. And to enable this American soldiers must continue to fulfill their fourfold purpose – to prepare to kill, and under right authority, to kill; to prepare to die, and when necessary, to die. So you will have to answer yet again your original question, “Who is now worth dying for?” I do not pose this question to be melodramatic but to remind you of the bald essence of your calling and focus your attention solidly on its evolving salience. In the words of Rick Warren, “It’s not about you,”5 rather this is about your dual callings from God and from this beloved Republic, things far greater than self or a job.

Summary

It is quite insufficient for the Christian officer to react to this change in professional ethics with what I have heard on occasion, “We will just have to suck it up.” That is not leadership, rather a very poor form of followership. With study and reflection on your own part and much discussion within the fellowship, this is an evolution that you can deal with forthrightly, either in or out of active military service. But you will have to be clear as to who you are, what you really believe, and whether you can be authentic as a Christian officer in your approach to the personal and professional tensions this change will produce. Needless to say, an inauthentic or incongruous reaction will be self-defeating to your leadership, and perhaps even toxic to your organization’s effectiveness. Time is short. I trust this outline will help you to start the necessary study and reflection.

Don M. Snider, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D., serves as Adjunct Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; He formerly served as Director of Defense Policy for the National Security Council in both the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, as Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies at West Point (1995-1998), as Project Director for The Future of the Army Profession (2nd Edition, April 2005), and as Project Director for Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer (2007).


ENDNOTES

1. John Meacham,”The Decline of Christian America,” Newsweek, April 13, 2009: 34-38.

2. ARIS Survey available at www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org

3. Branden McGarry, “Troops oppose repeal of ‘don’t; ask’,” Military Times, December 29, 2008.

4. For those who want more on this, I suggest Robert P. Kraynak, Christian Faith and Modern Democracy (University of Notre Dame, 2001).

5. This is the first sentence of the first chapter of Warren’s Purpose Driven Life (Zondervan, 2002).

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FAITH, REASON, AND THE WAR AGAINST JIHADISM

A presentation to the Union League of Philadelphia on February 4, 2008


by George Weigel

In the late summer of 2001, a stateless man of whom most Americans had never heard sat in a cave in the mountains of Afghanistan, surrounded by a few disciples, a satellite dish receiver, and a TV set. The TV wasn’t working, so one of the disciples sought the BBC’s Arabic service on a radio. There, he learned that an airplane had struck the World Trade Center in New York. He excitedly told the others, who broke into celebration; but their leader said, simply, “Wait, wait.”

News came of the second tower being hit, and the leader wept and prayed; Osama bin Laden also stunned his disciples by holding up three fingers. When news of the strike on the Pentagon came, bin Laden held up four fingers, amazing his disciples even further. In this instance, they would be disappointed; because of the heroic actions of the passengers on United 93, the U.S. Capitol was spared. Yet in two hours, the landscape of twenty-first century public life had been radically changed.

Viewed through a wide-angle lens, the events of 9/11 were a particularly lethal expression of the globalization of religious passion. Yet those events were something else, and something more: for Americans saw that day represented a specific, mortal threat to our civilization. War had been declared upon us by an enemy whose motivations were utterly alien to the 21st century sensibility of the West.

That it has taken us some time to grasp this new and dominant fact of international public life should not have been a surprise. It was difficult to recognize it for what it was before it struck New York and Washington; an acute intelligence operative, studying fragments of information about al-Qaeda and its allies before 9/11, was like a biologist looking at a laboratory slide of some previously unknown virus. But now, six-and-a-half years after 9/11, we cannot not understand. For unless we grasp the character of this new kind of war, its religious and ideological roots, the passions that have grown from those roots, and our current vulnerabilities to those passions, our chances of prevailing against an adversary with a very different view of the human future – and a willingness, even eagerness, to die for the sake of hastening that future – are weakened.

The war is now being fought on multiple, interconnected fronts: there is an Afghan front, an Iraqi front, an Iranian front, a Lebanese/Syrian front, a North African front, a Gaza front, a Somali front, a Sudanese front, a southeast Asian front, an intelligence front, a financial-flows front, an economic front, an energy front, and a homeland security front. These are all fields of fire in the same global war, and they ought to be understood as such. Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States and on American diplomatic and military assets were, for example, planned in the Philippines and other parts of southeast Asia; places unknown to the vast majority of Americans – Waziristan comes to mind – are now among the most evil places on earth; what happens there has direct effects on our armed forces in Iraq and elsewhere, and could have devastating effects on the homeland.

Bernard Lewis, reflecting on all this, noted the difference between our times and the days when he worked for British intelligence during World War II. Then, he said, “we knew who we were, we knew who the enemy was, we knew the dangers and the issues. It is different today. We don’t know who we are. We don’t know the issues, and we still do not understand the nature of the enemy.” Not knowing, however, is lethal. My purpose in this lecture is to identity what we should have learned, these past six-and-a-half years, about the enemy, and about us. Let me cluster the lessons we should have learned under three headings. Understanding the Enemy; Reconceiving Realism; Deserving Victory.

UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY


Lesson 1. The great human questions, including the great questions of public life, are ultimately theological.

How we think about God – or don’t think about God – has a great deal to do with how we envision the just society and determine the appropriate means with which to build it. This means taking theology seriously, which includes others’ theologies as well as the theologies that have shaped the civilization of the West. If we have not learned this over the past five years, then one wonders if we have learned anything. Yet that very question – what have we learned? – arises every time a commentator or statesman uses “theology” or “theological” as a synonym for “superstition” or “mindless.” Such glib usages are an impediment to clear thinking about our situation.

Lesson 2. The trope that describes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as “the three Abrahamic faiths” obscures more than it illuminates, and ought to be permanently retired.

There is an obvious truth here, in that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all trace their origins to Abraham, and that from the perspective of a Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Shinto adherent, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam look perhaps more similar than different. But in fact the theological parallelisms are rather limited, especially with regard to Islam. It is often suggested that there is an affinity between Christianity and Islam that is virtually identical to what Rabbi David Novak calls the “common border” between Judaism and Christianity; Islamic regard for Abraham and Moses, Jesus and Mary, is often cited as an example of this affinity. Yet as Alain Besançon has pointed out,

The Abraham of Genesis is not the Ibrahim of the Qur’an; Moses is not Moussa. As for Jesus, he appears, as Issa, out of place and out of time, without reference to the landscape of Israel….
Jesus is indeed granted a position of honor in the Qur’an, but this Jesus is not the Jesus in whom Christians proclaim their faith. The Jesus/Issa of the Qur’an promulgates the same message as the earlier prophets. Indeed, all possess the same knowledge and proclaim the same message, which is Islam. Like the rest, Issa is sent to preach the oneness of God. He is emphatically no Trinitarian; ‘do not say Three,’ he protests. Nor is he the son of God, but a simple mortal. Nor is he a mediator between earthly men and their heavenly Father, because Islam knows not the concept of mediation. Nor…does he die on the cross; a double is substituted for him.

In addition to these dramatic discontinuities, Islam’s deep theological structure includes themes that render the notion of “three Abrahamic faiths” less than helpful in understanding Islam’s faith and practice – particularly if this trope is understood popularly as a matter of three legs on a single monotheistic stool.

Take the question of Islamic supersessionism: Islam’s claim that it supercedes Judaism and Christianity, which are finally unveiled, in the revelation to Muhammad, as false religions. Despite the supersessionist claims that some Christians have made throughout history vis-à-vis Judaism, no orthodox Christian holds that God’s self-revelation in Christ negates God’s self-revelation in the history of the People of Israel. Islam, by contrast, takes a radically supersessionist view of both Judaism and Christianity, claiming that the final revelation to Muhammad de facto negates any prior revelatory value (so to speak) that might be found in the Hebrew Bible or the Christian New Testament.

Then there is the nature of the Qur’an itself. The mainstream Christian understanding of biblical inspiration was expressed by the Second Vatican Council: “To compose the sacred books, God chose certain men who, all the while he employed them in this task, made full use of their own powers and faculties so that…it was as true authors that they consigned to writing whatever he wanted written, and no more.” That theological understanding of “inspiration” provides for the possibility of interpretation of the sacred texts, and indeed for the development of doctrine in light of an evolving understanding of the full meaning of Scripture. The Qur’an, by contrast, is understood to have been dictated by its divine source, word for word, so that there is much less question of “exegesis” or of a post-scriptural development of doctrine. The Bible is a moral teacher which calls faithful Jews and Christians to use their reason to understand the meaning and import of its teaching, including the commandments. Islam’s holy book, by contrast, is described by an influential Egyptian Islamic activist in these terms: “the Qur’an for mankind is like a manual for a machine.” Thus Besancon does not exaggerate when he writes:

Although Muslims like to enumerate the 99 names of God, missing from the list, but central to the Jewish and even more so to the Christian concept of God, is ‘Father’ – i.e., a personal God capable of a reciprocal and loving relationship with men. The one God of the Qur’an, the God Who demands submission, is a distant God; to call him ‘Father’ would be an anthropomorphic sacrilege.

Thus Islam is “other” in relationship to Christianity and Judaism in a way that Christianity and Judaism cannot be to one another. The late Pope John Paul II recognized this. In the international bestseller Crossing the Threshold of Hope, John Paul expressed his admiration for “the religiosity of Muslims” and his admiration for their “fidelity to prayer;” but prior to this he had cut to the theological heart of the matter:

Some of the most beautiful names in the human language are given to the God of the Qur’an, but He is ultimately a God outside of the world, a God who is only Majesty, never Emmanuel, God with us. Islam is not a religion of redemption. There is no room for the Cross and… the tragedy of redemption is completely absent. For this reason not only the theology but also the anthropology of Islam is very distant from Christianity.

That theological anthropology – Islam’s theologically-driven concept of the human person as one called to submission to a distant God of majesty – yields, in turn, a view of the just society that is dramatically different from that of Judaism and Christianity. Islamic theological anthropology is one root of what Efraim Karsh has termed “the fusion of religious and temporal authority” in Islam, which is not peripheral to Islamic self-understanding. That fusion has, in turn, led to what Karsh calls “Islam’s millenarian imperial experience” – and, one might add, the millenarian political expectations of some Muslims today.

Islamic theological anthropology also helps explain Islam’s difficulties in creating the cultural conditions for the possibility of social pluralism. Whether Islam can evolve into a religion capable of providing religious warrants for genuine pluralism is thus one of the great questions on which the future of the 21st century will turn.

Lesson 3. Jihadism is the enemy in the multi-front war that has been declared upon us.

There are many forms of Islam. Some of them, often called “fundamentalism” or “Islamism,” stress the need for a deep religious and moral reform within the House of Islam and the reestablishment of Islamic political power. The specific form of Islamism which threatens the West is best described as jihadism.

Jihadism was recently defined by Richard John Neuhaus: “Jihadism is the religiously inspired ideology [which teaches that] it is the moral obligation of all Muslims to employ whatever means [are] necessary to compel the world’s submission to Islam.” That, I suggest, is naming the enemy correctly: those who hold this view are, de facto, in a state of belligerency against the rest of the world. Neuhaus goes on to note, “It will be objected that, in the Qur’an, jihad can also mean peaceful spiritual struggle. That is true, as it is true that those Muslims who believe jihad means peaceful spiritual struggle are not the enemy.” Indeed, much of the history of this century will turn on the question of whether the jihadists’ definition of jihad becomes the most culturally assertive definition within the many worlds of Islam. But that the jihadists understand jihad as Neuhaus describes it cannot be doubted, since this is precisely what they claim.

Lesson 4. Jihadism has a complex intellectual history, the chief points of which must be grasped in order to understand the nature of the threat before us.

Modern jihadism is rooted in a profound Islamic sense of Islamic failure: the world has not turned out the way it should. One can see traces of that sense of failure in the inertia of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. In fact, though, the inertia has a far longer pedigree, which involved a kind of turning-off of intellectual inquiry in a Muslim world that once found ample room within itself for an incorporation of the wisdom of the classical world, and helped transmit that wisdom to the medieval West.

The causal chain that takes us from medieval debates about Islamic law and theology to the caves of Tora Bora and 9/11 involves numerous figures, among them Ahmad ibn ‘Abd al- Halim ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4-1792), and two contemporary theorists, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1903-1966). To make a long story desperately short: At a time when the Mongols had conquered much of the Islamic umma, ibn Taymiyya taught that the survival of Islam requires political power; that the pursuit of that power could, indeed should, be undertaken by the use of armed force; and that jihad involved both an absolute love of God and an “absolute hatred” for all that God proscribes, which includes “not only heretics, apostates, hypocrites, sinners, and unbelievers (including Christians and Jews)…but also any Muslim who tried to avoid participating in jihad. Ibn Taymiyya thus adumbrated the intra-Islamic civil war that has now spilled over into jihadism’s struggle against the rest of the world.

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the radical unicity (oneness) and lordship of God, whose relationship to the world is that of an absolute lawgiver: God is will, period, and there is no spiritual wrestling, so to speak, with the divine will – there is only submission. Yet Wahhab had little influence in his own time, however, or indeed for centuries afterwards; it would take a vast transfer of western wealth to Saudi Arabia to make Wahhabism a potent force in the world.

Hasan al-Banna, Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned the “mental colonization” of Islam under colonial rule, and urged a struggle against a West that he perceived as having thus far won a “ruthless war whose battlefield has been the spirits and souls of Muslims…” Al-Banna proposed an Islamic social reformation. The educational, social, economic, religious, and charitable activities of the Muslim Brotherhood would be one form of this reformation. Jihad would be another, for God had given Muslims the privilege and duty of saving the world from its errors. After cleansing the House of Islam, true Muslims would cleanse their territories of infidels and unbelievers, beginning with al-Banna’s own Egypt, and then move on, until, as he put it, “…all the world shouts the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will Muslims achieve their fundamental goal…”

Sayyid Qutb, whose formative experiences included being scandalized at the “decadence” he perceived at a church social in Greeley, Colorado, in 1949, brought these various lines of jihadist thought together in a singularly influential way. He, too, stressed the idea of God as Absolute Will, God as the unique lawmaker; thus, for Qutb, liberal political thought (even conservative liberal political thought), was a false religion, not simply bad politics. Like others before him, but in a harsher way, Qutb stressed that those Muslims who did not live authentic Islamic lives (as he understood the term) were enemies to be fought and, if necessary, killed; so were those Jews, Christians, and unbelievers whose existence was a permanent, unchanging, and necessarily aggressive threat to the success of Islam, exactly as it had been from the beginning. Here, then, was a mind literally frozen in time, in which the Crusades and the Spanish Reconquista were present realities, summoning forth a perpetual struggle, violent if necessary, until the final, global triumph of Islam.

The power of jihadism derives from its theological roots. As Pope Benedict XVI pointed out in his Regensburg Lecture in September 2006, the key theological move that underwrites today’s jihadist ideology (and practice) is the identification of God as Absolute Will. If God is absolute will, God can command anything – even the irrational. And so, in an extension of the thought of Sayyid Qutb, contemporary jihadists believe that the murder of innocents is, not simply morally acceptable, but morally required, if such murders advance the cause of Islam. This deeply distorted understanding of the nature of the God of Abraham leads, in turn, to other theological distortions.

Mercy, for example, comes to be understood as weakness. Justice, one of the four cardinal virtues in Christian moral theology, is traduced by jihadism’s defective concept of God into revenge. Given Sayyid Qutb’s conviction that Islam, rightly understood, and modernity were “utterly incompatible,” and given the defective theology that undergirds Qutb’s worldview, what seems incomprehensible to many westerners – the “death cult” that forms “the core of al-Qaeda” and similar entities – begins, within a jihadist frame of reference, to make a certain perverse sense.

Jihadism thus creates a theologically warranted “world without limits” in which the battlefield “now spans pizzerias, buses, public squares, commuter trains…subway stations,” and a Jewish center in Seattle; in which a Turkish film, “Valley of the Wolves,” depicts an American Jew harvesting organs at Abu Ghraib for resale; in which the Palestinian state press mocks the Secretary of State of the United States for her race and appearance; and so forth, and so on, in a seeming infinity of variants on the instruction posted in Kabul by the Taliban’s religious police: “Throw reason to the dogs – it stinks of corruption.”

The line from Taymiyya and Wahhab that would later influence Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb came to one conclusion when Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, an Egyptian and a Saudi, a veteran political operator and propagandist and a somewhat dreamy charismatic leader – joined forces to form al-Qaeda: the result was something new, and something terribly dangerous: global jihad.

Lesson 5. Jihadists read history and politics through the prism of their theological convictions, not through the prism of Western assumptions about the progressive dynamic of history.

Thus jihadists read the 1990s as a moment that revealed fatal Western weaknesses. To jihadists, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan (irrespective of the fact that it was made possible by Western aid and technology), meant that modernity was on the run. This provoked new patterns of aggression, which were reinforced when the generally feckless response of the United States led to bin Laden’s apotheosis as the jihadist champion who had taken on the Great Satan and prevailed. Then, when the U.S. failed to respond to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in such a way as to ignite the war in Afghanistan in which bin-Laden hoped to trap the Americans (as, according to his own mythology, he had trapped the Soviets), he decided that something else was required: as Lawrence Wright puts it, “he would have to create an irresistible outrage.” The result was a vast hole in the ground in Lower Manhattan, the loss of almost three thousand lives, and an economic cost of billions of dollars.

To understand that jihadists read history in a distinctive way leads to several other sublessons:

  1. As Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted in a September 2006 address to the Labour Party, “This terrorism isn’t our fault,” and “until we shake ourselves free of the wretched capitulation to the propaganda of the enemy, that somehow we are the ones responsible,” we will not prevail.
  2. Jihadism is not caused by poverty. Sayyid Qutb sailed to the United States in a firstclass cabin on one of the great trans-Atlantic liners. The nineteen death-cultists of 9/11 were middle-class and well-educated. Poverty, in and of itself, doesn’t turn men and women into jihadists.
  3. Jihadism isn’t caused by the fact of the State of Israel. Israel is, for jihadists, the excuse not the reason, the “deadliest of all Arab alibis” in a political culture formed in part by an ideology of victimhood. Jihadis do not hate the West because of Israel, they hate Israel because it is part of the West – hence, that standard jihadist trope, “Zionist-Crusaders.”


It is a great folly to think that jihadism and the terrorism it underwrites are to be understood as a psychological aberration. Within their own theological frame of reference and the reading of history it warrants, jihadists are not crazy; they make, to themselves, a terrible kind of sense.

Lesson 6: It is not “Islamophobic” to note the historical connection between Muslim expansion and conquest, or between contemporary jihadism and terrorism. Necessary truth-telling is the pre-requisite to genuine interreligious dialogue.

In Pope Benedict’s Regensburg Lecture, the Holy Father gave the world an interreligious and ecumenical vocabulary to engage in a genuine conversation about the threat jihadism poses: the vocabulary of “rationality and irrationality.” Criticized at the time as a diplomatic “gaffe,”, the Pope’s proposal has now drawn two responses from international groups of Muslim leaders, and a meeting in March [2008] at the Vatican is planned. It is not without interest that this newfound interest in senior Islamic circles in serious theological conversation with the Pope about the right-ordering of society (which Benedict XVI has insisted be the focal point of the discussion) followed, not the usual exchange of banalities and pleasantries that too often characterizes interreligious dialogue, but a robust critique of the theological roots of jihadism. Surely there are lessons here for the future.

One is that the western media acquiescence to Muslim complaints about “Islamophobia” should stop: it is not “Islamophobic” for the Pope, or anyone else, to pray in the presence of Muslims; to defend religious freedom; or to condemn violence in the name of God – suggestions made by National Public Radio, the New York Times, the Associated Press, and the New York Daily News during Benedict XVI’s December 2006 visit to Turkey. It would also be helpful if the Western press – and particularly that part of the Western press that reaches the Islamic world, like CNN and the BBC – would call things by their right names: murderers in Iraq are murderers and terrorists, not insurgents or sectarians; suicide bombers are, in fact, homicide bombers; and so forth.

Lesson 7. This is a multi-generational struggle.

The below-replacement-level birthrates that prevail throughout virtually the entire Western world are another factor in this global struggle for the human future. As the inimitable Mark Steyn puts it, given present demographic trends, “the Belgian climate-change lobbyist will [soon] be on the endangered species list with the Himalayan snow leopard” – a fact that, given Belgian parallels in the Netherlands, France, Spain, and elsewhere, has already changed the political landscape of Western Europe.

Yet Steyn notes that birth rates are already declining in some Islamic countries, such that the jihadists’ demographic advantage will eventually decrease as well. So the historical window for the achievement of the jihadists’ most ambitious goals will likely begin to close in, perhaps, twenty-five years or so. The demographics of the Islamic world, coupled with the staying power of the passions unleashed by jihadist ideology and distorted religious conviction, thus suggest that the current phase of the contest for the human future will last at least two or three generations. This is, indeed, a long war. It is important that we understand that, acknowledge it politically, gird ourselves for it, and plan both strategy and tactics accordingly.

RECONCEIVING REALISM


Lesson 8. Genuine realism must avoid premature closure in its thinking about the possibilities of human agency in the world.

Grasping the inevitable irony, pathos, and tragedy of history; being alert to unintended consequences; maintaining a robust skepticism about schemes of human perfection; cherishing democracy without worshiping it – these elements of the Christian realist sensibility associated with Reinhold Niebuhr remain essential intellectual furnishing for anyone thinking seriously about U.S. foreign policy in the war against jihadism. Yet realism must always be complemented by a commitment to the possibility of human creativity in history.

As Dean Acheson said at another moment when history’s tectonic plates were shifting, the world which he and Harry Truman faced “only slowly revealed itself. As it did so, it began to appear as just a little bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis. That was to create a world out of chaos…” Our task today is not dissimilar. In carrying it out, we would do well to remember the counsel of Charles Frankel: “The heart of the policy-making process…is not the finding of a national interest already perfectly known and understood. It is the determining of that interest: the reassessment of the nation’s resources, needs, commitments, traditions, and political and cultural horizons – in short, its calendar of values.”

The Bush Administration’s efforts to accelerate change in the Arab Islamic world were determined by a realistic assessment of the situation after 9/11. Mistakes in implementation notwithstanding, the attempt to accelerate the transition to responsible and responsive government in the Middle East was a realistic objective, given an unacceptable status quo that was inherently unstable; that was unstable because it was corrupt; and that was producing terrorists and jihadists determined to challenge those corruptions.

Lesson 9. The objective in the Middle East is the evolution of responsible and responsive government, which will take different forms given different historical and cultural circumstances.

Bernard Lewis is, as usual, a wise guide here. As he recently wrote, “There is a view sometimes expressed that ‘democracy’ means the system of government evolved by the English-speaking peoples…I beg to differ from that point of view. Different societies develop different ways of conducting their affairs, and they do not need to resemble ours…Democracy is not born like the Phoenix. It comes in stages, and the stages and processes of development will differ from country to country, from society to society.”

Professor Lewis’s cautions, as well as his convictions that “there are elements in Islamic society which could well be conducive to democracy” and that the “cause of developing free institutions – along their lines, not ours – is possible” in Islamic societies suggests several sub- lessons from the still-unfolding drama of Iraq and the miscalculations of American policy there:

  1. American policy-makers miscalculated the damage done to the fabric of Iraqi civil society by 25+ years of Baathist totalitarianism.
  2. American policy-makers miscalculated the degree to which post-Saddam Iraq would quickly become a battlefield in the wider war against jihadism. The exposure of the “false world” within which Arabs had been living was intolerable – to the remaining Baathists in Iraq and Syria, to the forces of the status quo among the Arab leadership, to the apocalyptics in Tehran, and to jihadists everywhere. And thus it now seems, in retrospect, almost inevitable that Iraq became a “devil’s playground:” its porous borders were a magnet for jihadists looking for a field of battle – Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Saudis, Palestinians, Iranians, all of whom grasped the fact that, if America were to succeed in Iraq, and Iraq to succeed as a modern Islamic society, their various dreams would be dealt a major blow.
  3. This we seemingly did not understand, or at least did not grasp quickly enough – that major combat in Iraq had only “shaped the battlefield” for what was coming next. Since March 2003, in fact, America has found itself fighting four Iraqi wars: the war to depose Saddam Hussein and create the possibility of responsible Iraqi government; the war against the remaining Iraqi Baathists and their allies; the war against jihadists, in which the late, unlamented Abu Musab al-Zarqawi played a deadly role; and the war between Shia and Sunni that erupted after jihadists destroyed the Shia Golden Mosque at Samarra in February 2006.
  4. Inadequate resources were allocated for post-Saddam reconstruction in Iraq, a failure compounded by the American intelligence community’s failure to grasp just how much damage had been done to Iraq’s infrastructure and by a lack of bureaucratic coordination among American agencies involved in Iraqi reconstruction.
  5. American policy-makers failed to devise an effective “hearts-and-minds” strategy for post-Saddam Iraq. After dominating the information dimensions of the first of the four Iraq wars (the war against the Saddam Hussein regime), the U.S. too often left the information field to sources of misinformation and disinformation like Al-Jazeera, with serious strategic consequences – some of which are now, thankfully, being reversed, thanks to the Petraeus counterinsurgency strategy.


The difficulties of post-Baathist political transition in Iraq should not, however, blind us to the fact that the war against jihadism and the quest for freedom are linked, and neither can succeed without the other. Moreover, and without gainsaying the difficulties involved, Bernard Lewis nonetheless encourages us to think that there is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance toward freedom, rightly understood. Trying, through a variety of instrumentalities, to support, and perhaps even accelerate,that advance is the only realistic course of action.

Lesson 10. In the war against global jihadism, deterrence strategies are unlikely to be effective.

This is perhaps most evident in Iran, or at least among Iranians like President Ahmadinejad who believe that they can hasten the messianic age by unleashing nuclear holocaust in Jerusalem. As Adam Garfinkle asks, “How does one deter people who…are willing and even eager…to turn their country and their entire religious sect into a suicide bomb?”

It should be clear that any deterrence value or dampening of jihadist enthusiasms that we might have expected to gain from Iraq will be lost if the outcome there is widely believed to be an American defeat. Such an outcome would be little short of a catastrophe, a point one wishes were better grasped on Capitol Hill and among certain presidential candidates. It may be that the final outcome in Iraq is not, ultimately, of our determining – that the immediate future of Iraq will inevitably reduce itself to the question of whether Iraqis want a state (even a loosely federal state) more than they want to kill each other. But the premature abandonment of the effort to prevent that nightmare scenario from playing itself out would be read by global jihadists as a sign of fecklessness that will have untold, but surely awful, consequences.

DESERVING VICTORY


In my study, I keep a small postcard copy of a British World War II poster, in which Winston Churchill points a stubby finger at you over the emblazoned slogan “Deserve Victory!” What must we do, in remedying our own incapacities, to deserve victory in the war against global jihadism?

Lesson 11. Cultural self-confidence is indispensable to victory in the long-term struggle against jihadism.

The second part of Pope Benedict’s Regensburg Lecture was a reminder to the West that, if irrational faith poses one grave threat to the human future, so does a loss of faith in reason. If the West loses its faith in the human capacity to know the truth of anything with certainty, it will have disarmed itself intellectually, culturally, and morally, unable to give an account of its commitments to civility, tolerance, the free society, and democratic self-government. Saying “No” to radical skepticism and moral insouciance is very much part of homeland security.

Lesson 12. Islamist salami tactics must be resisted, for small concessions in the name of a false idea of tolerance inevitably lead to further concessions and to further erosions of liberty.

This process is well-advanced in Europe, where enclaves of shari’a law exist in Great Britain, France, the low countries and elsewhere – enclaves where the writ of local law does not run, even in the matter of “honor” killings. The path to legal surrender was paved by cultural surrender, as when (to take the most ludicrous example) “Piglet” mugs disappeared from some British retailers after Islamists complained that the Winnie the Pooh character offended Muslim sensibilities. The Danish cartoons controversy of 2006 was the most ominous expression of the problem to date, for here kowtowing to Islamist agitations led directly to the infringement of classic civil liberties.

The European experience of accommodation to Islamist and jihadist threats and demands has shown where the first concessions lead. Becoming a dhimmi, a second-class citizen, is not always a matter of accommodating to an imposed Islamic law. As the European experience demonstrates, self-dhimmitude is a danger when the nature of tolerance is misunderstood. Not only must the West defend its core values at home; it should intensify its efforts to promote religious freedom around the world.

Lesson 13. We cannot, and will not, deserve victory (much less achieve it) if we continue to finance those who attack us.

Therefore, an urgent program to de-fund jihadism by developing alternatives to petroleum-based energy as a transportation fuel is a crucial component of the current struggle.
Global jihadism would not be threat it is had the West not transferred some $2 trillion in wealth to the Arab Islamic world since the Second World War – which, inter alia, has allowed Saudi Arabia to spend an estimated $70-100 billion spreading Wahhabi doctrine all over the globe. The national security threat of oil dependency is obvious. It is also self-demeaning.

This is not the occasion to get into the details of various alternative energy strategies, but there ought to be broad agreement on former CIA Director R. James Woolsey’s argument that “energy independence for the U.S. is…preponderantly a problem related to oil and its dominant role in fueling vehicles for transportation.” In March 2006 testimony before the Senate Energy Committee, Woolsey proposed “two directions for government policy in order to reduce our vulnerability rapidly,” in both cases using existing technologies, or technologies that can be brought into the market quickly and can work within our existing transportation superstructure.

Government policy should, in Woolsey’s view, “(1) encourage a shift to substantially more fuel efficient vehicles…including promoting both battery development and a market for existing battery types for plug-in hybrid vehicles; and (2) encourage biofuels and other alternative and renewable fuels that can be produced from inexpensive and widely-available feedstocks – wherever possible from waste products.”

A nation that created the Manhattan Project, Project Apollo, and the global revolution in information technology surely can, by analogous acts of will and leadership by both the public and private sectors, de-fund global jihadism by drastically cutting the transfer of funds related to petroleum imports for transportation fuel. It beggars belief that peoples who did not discover a resource, much less the means to exploit it and make it the source of vast wealth, have profited by its development in ways that now threaten the very possibility of world order. This is dhimmitude, if of a global economic sort, and it must stop, as a matter of self-defense as well as of self-respect.

Lesson 14. Victory in the war against global jihadism requires a new domestic political coalition that is proof against the confusions caused by the Unhinged Left and the Unhinged Right.

If we are indeed “present at the creation,”once again, we would do well to adopt a lesson from Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Vandenberg and create, if possible, a domestic political coalition that understands global jihadism and is broadly agreed on the measures necessary to defeat it. There is a serious question, though, as to whether the kind of coalition that was assembled in the late 1940s can be replicated today, given the dependence of the Democratic Party on the Unhinged Left for funding and the willingness of Republicans upset about deficits, “No Child Left Behind,” budget-busting prescription drug benefits for seniors, and the administration’s proposals for immigration reform to throw George W. Bush over the side –irrespective of what would happen, in real-world consequences and public perception, to his administration’s accurate identification of the principal threat to both U.S. national security and a minimum of world order. But were such a coalition to be formed, it should take as one of its tasks a rationalization of our homeland security policy.

We have not yet reached the point of Great Britain, where one of the country’s most wanted terrorists slipped through Heathrow in 2006 by wearing a burka, as Scottish grandmothers bent over to remove their shoes at x-ray machines. But we could get there, unless we decide that effective counter-terrorism is more important than political correctness in devising airport screening measures. Risk-profiling and the development of trusted-traveler identification cards would be two important elements in rationalizing homeland security.

The rationalization of homeland security will also require effective measures to rein in those parts of the federal judiciary that put irrational obstacles in the way of detecting terrorism plots. On a 2005 ruling by a federal district court, the U.S. government can alert Scotland Yard and MI-5 if the National Security Agency intercepts a phone call from Peshawar to London in which jihadists plot to unleash a dirty radiological bomb in Trafalgar Square; but any such NSA intercept of a call between Kandahar and Chicago in which terrorists plot to set off a similar bomb at 16th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue is unconstitutional and records of it must be erased. This is, quite literally, insane. And it, too must stop.

Lesson 15. There is no escape from U.S. leadership.

The challenge of global jihadism cannot neither be avoided nor appeased. The war that has been declared against us – and by “us” I mean the West, not simply the United States – can only be engaged, and with a variety of instruments, many of them not-military. Whatever the post-9/11 incapacities identified above – and they are serious, and they must be addressed – the fact remains that there is no alternative to U.S. leadership in the war against global jihadism. As Michael Gerson has put it, “There must be someone in the world capable of drawing a line – someone who says, ‘This much and no further.’ At some point, those who decide on aggression must pay a price, or aggression will be universal.” That someone can only be the United States. The President must insure that, whatever else happens, he leaves the American people, at the end of his term, with a clear understanding of the nature of the threat, and the magnitude of the stakes on the global table. His successor, whoever he or she may be, will quickly learn that there is no escape from the burden of American leadership. That president, whoever he or she may be, ought also to see that burden as an opportunity for national renewal.

George Weigel is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington and author of Faith, Reason and the War Against Jihadism: A Call to Action (2007). He also serves as Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army for the District of Columbia. He gave this BookTalk at the Union League of Philadelphia on February 4, 2008. It was published online by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). FPRI is a U.S. non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests, adding perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.

This article is available on the web in print, video, and audio formats at: http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20080204.weigel.faithreasonjihadism.html
Copyright 2008 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute: www.fpri.org. Used by permission.

QUOTATIONS

All quotations are by the author except for the Lewis quotes:

“…unless we grasp the character of this new kind of war, its religious and ideological roots, the passions that have grown from those roots, and our current vulnerabilities to those passions, our chances of prevailing against an adversary with a very different view of the human future – and a willingness, even eagerness, to die for the sake of hastening that future – are weakened.”


In World War II, “We knew who we were, we knew who the enemy was, we knew the dangers and the issues. It is different today. We don’t know who we are. We don’t know the issues, and we still do not understand the nature of the enemy.” –Bernard Lewis, Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.


“The demographics of the Islamic world, coupled with the staying power of the passions unleashed by jihadist ideology and distorted religious conviction, thus suggest that the current phase of the contest for the human future will last at least two or three generations. This is, indeed, a long war. It is important that we understand that, acknowledge it politically, gird ourselves for it, and plan both strategy and tactics accordingly.”


“The President must insure that, whatever else happens, he leaves the American people, at the end of his term, with a clear understanding of the nature of the threat, and the magnitude of the stakes on the global table. His successor, whoever he or she may be, will quickly learn that there is no escape from the burden of American leadership. That president, whoever he or she may be, ought also to see that burden as an opportunity for national renewal.”

“It should be clear that any deterrence value or dampening of jihadist enthusiasms that we might have expected to gain from Iraq will be lost if the outcome there is widely believed to be an American defeat. Such an outcome would be little short of a catastrophe….the premature abandonment of the effort to prevent that nightmare scenario from playing itself out would be read by global jihadists as a sign of fecklessness that will have untold, but surely awful, consequences.”

POINTING NORTH: LESSONS LEARNED BY AN INFANTRY PLATOON COMMANDER IN AFGHANISTAN

by First Lieutenant Paddy Bury, First Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment
May 2009


“The platoon is a gun, the platoon sergeant the bullets, and you are the safety catch.”

Most soldiers do not want to kill. Almost all of us have an inherent belief that killing is wrong. However, the situations we find ourselves in often mean we are forced to consider the use of lethal force.

Our training helps us differentiate between threat and appropriate use of force, but also, by its very nature, makes it easier for us to kill. Moreover, the environments to which we deploy increasingly display large and growing grey areas where threats and rules of engagement can be interpreted in a number of ways. Thus it falls to the junior tactical commander on the ground to not only make the correct judgements given the situation, but to maintain a sense of morality in seeking the right course of action


I distinctly remember sitting in Sandhurst, trying not to nod off, through one of the many morality lectures. I found them boring, as to me it was explaining the obvious. ‘Morality, as a leader is something you have to hold inside you, like a moral compass’, they said. ‘Well then’, I thought, ‘why are you harping on about it so much.’ To me, at the time, it seemed the least important, most obvious lesson I had learnt at Sandhurst to date. How wrong I was.Killing, whatever its form, can be morally corrosive. Mid-intensity counter insurgency, with its myriad of complex situations, an enemy who won’t play fair and the constant, enduring feeling of being under threat, compounds such corrosiveness. A good tactical leader must recognise this and constantly maintain the morality of those he commands.

In 7 Platoon I was lucky to have an excellent working relationship with both my sergeants during our tour of Afghanistan. I was also lucky in that my platoon did not contain any psychopaths, which studies show make up about two per cent of any army. Thus especially at the beginning of the tour, it was relatively easy to maintain a sense of morality amongst the platoon. But when the threat to our lives increased, as the Taliban began fighting increasingly dirty, as the civilians became indifferent and as we were either nearly killed or took casualties, this became increasingly difficult. Soldiers who did not want to kill for no reason began to become unconcerned.

There is a balance to be struck between morality and operational effectiveness, between softness and hardness. It is a fine line to walk, but one which must be walked nonetheless. My platoon sergeant would always strive to keep the soldiers sharp, aggressive and ready to fight their way out of any situation. ‘I would rather be judged by twelve than carried by six’ was his watchword at our platoon discussions on rules of engagement scenarios. He was completely right, and the robustness he bred into the platoon, especially at the psychological level, would stand it in good stead during the most testing parts of the tour.

However, as a junior officer I felt the need to morally temper what the platoon sergeant had said to the men. His could not be the final word on the subject. I would take their point of view and use it to explain a complex situation as best I could. In the morphing, grey conflict we found ourselves in I pointed out that the civilians, even if they were untrustworthy and indifferent, were still our best form of force protection. They told us where the IEDs were. If we lost them, we lost everything. Therefore, we had to maintain the softer approach at first. We had to smile and we had to joke and we had to be friendly, even if it was the last thing we felt like doing. We had to not shoot them if we could avoid it in any way. We had to treat captured Taliban correctly. Otherwise we might as well not bother coming out here.

I think, in hindsight, this unacknowledged agreement I had with my platoon sergeant worked well. He kept the platoon sharp and ready—‘loaded’ as it were—and I just made sure the gun didn’t go off at the wrong place at the wrong people. As the tour progressed and the commanders and rangers alike became increasingly familiar with their surroundings and the situations they found themselves in, but also increasingly frustrated, it became my primary role. The platoon was so well drilled it barely needed me for my tactical acumen. But they did need me for that morality.

Sometimes I felt my own morality begin to slip, that hardness creeping in. Sometimes I thought that I was soft, that my platoon sergeant was right and I should shut up and get on with it. Sometimes I’m sure the platoon felt like that! I was unsure. And at these times my memory would flit back to Sandhurst, to the basics, and I would find renewed vigour that what I was saying was indeed right. My moral compass, for all its wavering, was still pointing North. And that was the most important lesson I was taught in Sandhurst, and that I learnt in Afghanistan.

“THE ABUSIVE EXPLOITATION OF THE HUMAN RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT”: MICHAEL BURLEIGH AS HISTORIAN OF “POLITICAL RELIGION”

by Daniel J. Mahoney

Michael Burleigh, a distinguished English historian, is the author of a remarkable trilogy on the “political religions” that have been the scourge of late modernity. In his authoritative The Third Reich: A New History (2000)Burleigh studied Nazi Germany as a form of totalitarian society.

In doing so, he rehabilitated the category of “political religion” as the indispensable interpretive framework for deciphering the National Socialist enigma. That book provides a detailed account of the “moral breakdowns and transformations of an advanced industrial society,” one where Hitler’s “rage against the world was capable of infinite generalization.” Burleigh eloquently locates the atavistic modernism at the heart of National Socialism: Nazi ideology offered redemption from a national ontological crisis, to which it was attracted like a predatory shark to blood. . . . It lacked Communism’s deferred, but dialectically assured, ‘happy ending,’ and was haunted by and suffused with apocalyptic imaginings and beliefs which were self-consciously pagan and primitive. Although it paradoxically claimed to speak the language of applied reason . . . Nazism had one foot in the dark, irrational world of Teutonic myth. (TTR, 12)

In the Introduction to The Third Reich and again in the later volumes of his trilogy, Burleigh expresses his fundamental debts to earlier anti-totalitarian thinkers including Eric Voegelin, Raymond Aron, and Waldemar Gurian. They were among the first to confront this strange phenomenon of “political religion” in its hypermodernist manifestations. With their help, Burleigh explores what the early twentieth- century Italian Catholic statesman and political thinker Luigi Sturzo called the “abusive exploitation of the human religious sentiment” by the totalitarian ideologies of our time. Burleigh’s eloquently written books are informed by impressive erudition and by deep moral seriousness, but he is not a philosophic historian in the manner of those such as Alain Besançon and Martin Malia who have delved deeply into the intellectual origins and the elusive “pseudo-reality” posited by totalitarian ideology.He is, instead, an anti-totalitarian historian of evident theistic and Christian conviction.

Burleigh shows how National Socialism was founded on an almost unimaginable demonic willfulness, with a monstrous disregard for “charity, reason, and skepticism.” Like its frère-ennemi Bolshevism, Nazism aimed to create a “New Man” who in this case intensified the evils of the “old Adam” and who, as with Bolshevism, would discard the moral limits that are integral to any modicum of decency and civilized human existence. In Burleigh’s capacious view, the Holocaust “does not exhaust everything there is to say about National Socialism.” But this crime that cried out to heaven was indeed the horrific logical consequence of a fevered social doctrine that reduced man to a “beast of prey” and that rejected any superintending principle above the human will.

The Church and the New Barbarism

In both The Third Reich and Sacred Causes,Burleigh emphasizes the widely unknown or deliberately ignored fact that the strongest opposition to Nazi ideology and criminality came from conservative “men of God.” This is no accident.

While left-wing critics of Nazism wrongly saw in it only a virulent version of either “late capitalism” or German nationalism, its conservative Christian opponents were far more sensitive to the movement’s profoundly antitraditional character. The more discerning among them saw in Nazism nothing less than a “revolution of nihilism.” And not a few of them courageously rose to the challenge of resisting the new barbarism.

In addition to Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen, the “lion of Münster,” who in a series of famous sermons in 1941 denounced the murderous Nazi euthanasia campaign, some of the Austrian and German bishops did not shrink from attacking the “racist madness” of Nazism. In his great encyclical Mit brennender sorge (1938), written pointedly in German and clandestinely smuggled into Germany, Pope Pius XI attacked modern racialism, the cynical Nazi appropriation of Christian symbolism, nationalist idolatry, and a false cult of human greatness.

Likewise, in the first encyclical of his pontificate, Summi pontificis, released in the fall of 1939, Pius XII affirmed the “fundamental unity” of the human race and expressed his profound sympathy for the plight of Poland. The whole world had no doubt at the time whom the same pontiff had in mind in his 1942 Christmas message when he spoke of “the hundreds of thousands of innocent people put to death or doomed to slow extinction, sometimes merely because of their race or descent.”

This prudent, perhaps too prudent, diplomat- pope, despising National Socialism but solicitous of putting an end to a suicidal total war, helped inspire the heroic witness of groups like Témoignage chrétien in France (whose anti-Nazi pamphleteers included such eminent philosophers and theologians as Gaston Fessard and Henri de Lubac) as well as the Italian Catholics who saved tens of thousands of Jews in the fall of 1944 when the Nazis unleashed full scale war against the Jews in occupied Italy.

The rewriting of history to suggest that the Christian West was somehow culpable in the murderous agenda of the National Socialists is one of the greatest intellectual distortions of our time. Burleigh has done a great service by recovering an appreciation for the impregnable wall that separated the Christian religion—with its affirmation of the fundamental unity of the human race and of conscience informed by right reason—from both the “horrors of applied rationality” (communism) and the National Socialist religion of the absolutized human will. This project of historical and moral restoration achieves something like its finished form in his magisterial two-volume history of political religion, Earthly Powers4 and Sacred Causes.

The Theory and Practice of Political Religion

In keeping with a venerable conservative-liberal tradition, in both works Burleigh highlights the links between Jacobinism, the secular “civil religion” par excellence, and the political religions that would do so much to despoil the twentieth century. Jacobinism was not only proto-totalitarian, it was the prototype for later and more fully developed ideological justifications of terror and tyranny.

Burleigh observes in Sacred Causes that the term “political religion” has a “more venerable history than many imagine.” It was widely used after 1917 to describe the new regimes established by Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. In the middle of the nineteenth century the French historian and political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville had already invoked the idea of political or secular religion. He did so in the opening section of The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) when discussing the social passions unleashed by the French Revolution of 1789. The Revolution “took on the appearance of a religious revolution” despite the contempt in which its progenitors and principal actors held the Catholic Church in particular, and the Christian religion in general. It brought forth a uniquely modern fusion of religious sentiment and rationalism, a “new kind of religion, an incomplete religion, it is true, without God, without rituals, and without life after death, but one which nevertheless, like Islam, flooded the earth with its soldiers, apostles, and martyrs.”

For its twentieth-century analysts and critics—heirs to both Tocqueville and Burke—secular religions, especially in their totalitarian forms, are so horrific and so destructive of human dignity in no small part because they are idolatrous. They erase the distinction, integral to Christian civilization and to decent and humane governance, between the things of God and the things of Caesar. They establish an unprecedented monism that makes the theocratic despotisms of the past seem humanly bearable. But—and here Burleigh’s approach is wanting, or at least incomplete—it is still necessary to painstakingly confront the philosophical sources of the misplaced modern emphasis on human self-sovereignty. As Pierre Manent has pointed out, for example, communism does not stand as an antithesis to modern democracy; rather, it can be located on a continuum with modern democracy in its inebriated confidence in Man as the “sovereign author” of the human world, in its faith in progress and “humanitarian” values, and in its belief that human beings are essentially “historical” beings not beholden either to nature or to God. At the same time, communism destroyed everything that is decent and good about the democratic order. Political philosophy is indispensable for unraveling this conundrum and for more fully exploring the vexing question of the relationship between modern rationalism and the totalitarian movements and ideologies that “radicalize” rationalism’s underlying premises.

Burleigh’s Project

In Earthly Powers, Burleigh surveys the prehistory of the twentieth-century totalitarianisms. He provides a fascinating account of Puritan messianism, the proto-totalitarianism of the Jacobins, the quasi-religious cult of the nation, the rise of humanitarianism as a self-conscious social ethos and even as a “religion” in the pseudophilosophical expression given to it by August Comte. A powerful chapter inspired by Dostoevsky’s Devils explores the deep convergence of moral nihilism and political fanaticism in nineteenth-century Russia. Burleigh also expertly chronicles the response of the Christian churches to the rise of secular ideology, as well as their responses to the modern “social question.”

His book breaks off with the bloody apocalypse of 1914, when liberal and Christian Europe confronted the abyss and was on the verge of committing suicide. Sacred Causes picks up where Earthly Powers leaves off. The twentieth century witnessed a radical intensification of Sturzo’s “abusive exploitation of the human religious sentiment”—an exploitation that, like “earlier attempts to realize heaven or earth,” would result in “hell for many people.”

In the nineteenth century the “dystopian strain” mainly occurred at the level of thought (Burleigh provocatively refers to “the hare brained schemes” of August Comte and Charles Fourier, the “moral insanity of Russian nihilists,” as well as “the scientific socialism” of Marx and Engels “which was morally insane in other ways”). The twentieth century turned out to be the century of applied ideology, of secular religions warring against the tripartite Western heritage of biblical religion, classical wisdom, and liberal constitutionalism.

The Totalitarian Political Religions

The most important chapter in Sacred Causes is the synthetic second chapter on “The Totalitarian Political Religions.” It brilliantly surveys historical facts and moral perspectives that have largely been forgotten, displaced by the dominant “antifascist” narrative of the twentieth century. That narrative gives communism a free pass by locating evil in the twentieth century in an ill-defined “fascism,” a word that is sometimes used so indiscriminately as to include both National Socialism and the civilization it set out to destroy. In the antifascist narrative, the central drama of the twentieth century was not the struggle between “liberal and Christian civilization” and a new ideological barbarism but rather the never-ending struggle between “progress”—whose ultimate victory is guaranteed—and the forces of “reaction.” In a more moderate form, this faith in progress is the common faith—or common illusion—of modern democratic societies. Burleigh’s work is blessedly free of such facile progressivism.

The chapter on “The Totalitarian Political Religions” shows exactly what was at stake in the instantiation of the “secular messianism” that first came to the forefront in the nineteenth century. Early on, Burleigh quotes the Russian religious philosopher Semyon Frank—a Jewish convert to Orthodox Christianity and one of the contributors to the remarkable collection Vehki (Landmarks). That 1909 manifesto powerfully challenged the Russian intelligentsia’s addiction to “progressive” ideals that eschewed the spiritual life, renounced any ethical affirmation of limits, and that demonstrated limitless indulgence toward the revolutionary Left. In his contribution to Vehki Frank took sure aim at the “nihilistic moralism” of the prerevolutionary Russian intelligentsia:

Sacrificing himself for the sake of this idea, he does not hesitate to sacrifice other people for it. Among his contemporaries he sees either merely the victims of the world’s evil he dreams of eradicating or the perpetrators of that evil. . . . This feeling of hatred for the enemies of the people forms the concrete and active psychological foundation of his life. Thus the great love of mankind of the future gives birth to a great hatred for people; the passion for organizing an earthly paradise becomes a passion for destruction. (SC, 39)

This “passion for destruction” is coextensive with the “ideological” dream to create another world, another reality. The best philosophical critics of the ideological project have shown how the aspiration to “change the world,” to alter the structure of reality, gives rise to a “surreality,” an imaginary present and future that is at odds with the nature of men and societies and even the ontological structure of the real world. In their own way, the ideologists are aware of this. The auspicious gap between reality and ideological surreality can only be bridged by what Solzhenitsyn in his Nobel Lecture has called the twin pillars of the ideological project: violence and lies. However, the revolutionary enterprise necessarily becomes routinized, stale, and sclerotic (witness the final decades of the Soviet regime—the “years of stagnation,” as they came to be called). Still, the never wholly extinguished impulse of the ideological project is a deep-seated nihilistic Manicheanism. The Bolshevik outlook remained to the end “essentially Manichean, dividing the world into good and evil, light and darkness, old and new, a view which led to the demonization of their enemies” (SC, 75).

These enemies famously ended up including “heretics” within their own ranks. The demonized included not merely “class enemies” (the bourgeoisie, aristocrats, independent peasants), not only “heretical” communists, but especially those intellectuals and ordinary believers who embodied a more traditional understanding of the world. In particular, the Bolsheviks “resolved to eradicate Christianity as such.”
They unleashed several waves of savage persecution against the Orthodox Church that are chronicled in detail by Burleigh. In the first wave, bishops and priests were brutally murdered or subjected to show trials. In a second wave of persecution that coincided with the collectivization of agriculture, churches were closed and bells removed from churches that had been at the center of Russian village life for centuries. And from 1937 to 1941, tens of thousands of priests and nuns were killed, while others were sent to labor camps to perish on the tundra. Eventually, the leadership of the Orthodox Church was infiltrated and even controlled by the atheistic authorities.

When reflecting on this scandalous fact, it must be remembered that Orthodox Christians experienced the worst persecution of the Christian religion in human history; untold numbers of believers conducted themselves in a spirit of fidelity and suffered martyrdom.

Burleigh also considers the other manifestations of ideological Manicheanism in the interwar period. He describes the intense decades-long struggle between Italian fascism and the Catholic Church to shape the lives and loyalties of young people. He also traces the myriad ways the Nazis dehumanized their enemies. The evocation of “blood”—of bloodlust and sacrifice and destruction as ends in themselves—was central to the Nazi view of man and nature. And the crude and incoherent assault on Judaism as the source of all the evils in the contemporary world (Jews being blamed simultaneously for “plutocratic” liberalism and rapacious Bolshevism) was at the core of the Nazis’ fevered redefinition of reality.

The Bolsheviks earlier had created a secular “theocracy” that aped the hierarchies of traditional religion without any of its moral wisdom or restraints. In one respect at least the Nazis went a step further. Their secular religion promoted an emotional and aesthetic intoxication, symbolized by the Nuremburg rallies, that made “everyone” a participant in these deluded collective rituals. The SS, Burleigh suggests, was the nihilist avant-garde of a hypermodern pagan religion that bowed to nothing except its own willfulness.

The men of the SS were “insanely fertile in destructiveness” and “their subscription to the codes of their own bureaucracy was never incompatible with the most irrational, pathological fanaticism.” This combination of bureaucracy and “moral autism,” so eloquently described by Burleigh, would reveal its demonic face in the murderous rage of the Einsatzgruppen on the eastern front, who killed millions even before the systematic unfolding of the Final Solution, and in the sadistic and cold “industrial rationality” of the Nazi death camps.

The Church Between Liberalism and Totalitarianism

In an important chapter in Sacred Causes entitled “The Church in the Age of the Dictators” Burleigh provides an exhaustive account of “the murderous conflict between church and state” in Mexico, Spain, and Soviet Russia during the interwar period. It is easy today to chastise the church for its hesitancy in accommodating itself to the full range of “liberal” and “republican” movements and regimes. But Burleigh reveals just how “illiberal” various forms of republicanism could be (the murder of 7,000 clergy in republican Spain between July and December 1936 is the most chilling manifestation of this phenomenon.)

While responding forthrightly to ferocious anticlericalism in Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s as well as to the persecution “raging within the unhappy borders of Russia,” Pope Pius XI continued Leo XIII’s policy of semi-neutrality with respect to forms of government. Burleigh recounts, for example, how the Vatican initially accepted the establishment of the Spanish Republic in 1931 with equanimity. The Vatican also showed much more moderation and good sense than the Spanish episcopacy in its dealings with Franco during the Spanish Civil War (the Vatican was rightly suspicious of Franco’s alliance with the Falangists, a secular movement of the totalitarian Right). Nonetheless, even the profoundly antitotalitarian Pius XI, a persistent and eloquent critic of the totalizing aspirations of the pagan state, remained deeply suspicious of liberal or bourgeois republicanism in its dominant forms. Not enough distinctions were made, and constitutional democracy was identified with the most extreme versions of philosophical liberalism. The Catholic Church in the United Kingdom and the United States provided the most notable exception to this antidemocratic tendency in Catholic thought.

As Burleigh shows, the church had an honorable record in fighting totalitarian political religions because it knew exactly what was at stake in the ideological “sacralization” of politics. However, it underestimated the moral resources of constitutional democracy and overestimated the prospects for Catholic “corporatism” in countries such as Austria and Portugal. At the end of the Second World War, the pontificate of Pope Pius XII “decided to abandon its prudent agnosticism towards forms of government in favor of democracy.”

This change was motivated in part by a deepening appreciation of the crucial role of “human rights” in the proper defense of human dignity (a “Christian democratic” position theorized by the influential Thomistic philosopher Jacques Maritain). In addition, a more liberal and activist ethos had arisen out of Christian currents in the resistance movements during the Second World War. There was also the need to mobilize Catholics for active citizenship and the defense of basic liberties against the Communist threat in France, Germany, and Italy after 1945. Burleigh tells this important story with the requisite nuance and scholarly care.

In chapter 6 of Sacred Causes (“The Road to Unfreedom: the Imposition of Communism after 1945”) Burleigh tells the other half of the story: the brutal imposition of Leninist-Stalinist totalitarianism on unwilling peoples in east–central Europe after 1945. The chapter provides an exhaustive account of the various assaults on the churches in the newly “liberated” Europe. Burleigh makes the heroism and moral grandeur of persecuted leaders of the Catholic Church such as cardinals Mindszenty, Beran, and Wyszynski known to new generations who will surely have never heard their names. Burleigh’s conclusion to this chapter is worthy of extended citation, not least because it reminds us of the crucial role of the churches in providing a space, however limited, for “civil society,” and in preserving an image of the moral order in societies that had been brutalized by ideological lies.

Burleigh writes: “Within a remarkable short time totalitarian rule had been reimposed on half a continent using a combination of force and fraud. . . . Although they were subjected to relentless assault from state-sponsored atheism, the Christian Churches remained the only licensed sanctuaries from the prevailing world of brutality and lies. Appropriately enough . . . they played an important role in the overthrow of Communism forty years later.” (SC, 344 )

The Catholic Church’s positive accommodation to liberal democracy was a matter of both principle and prudence and reveals that august institution’s deep-rooted capacity for self–renewal. But the church’s “Christian Democratic” turn also occurred on the eve of an immense cultural revolution that revealed the self–radicalizing propensities of democracy in the modern world. It was not an auspicious conjunction. I am, of course, referring to the cultural and political transformation of the 1960s. This revolution unleashed powerful antinomian and demotic forces lurking beneath the surface of seemingly complacent bourgeois societies.

The churches were lamentably slow in appreciating what was at stake in a full accommodation to the forces of late modernity. A hedonistic youth culture became the order of the day and authoritative institutions were challenged everywhere. The Catholic Church’s salutary efforts at aggiornamento, of liturgical, spiritual, and theological renewal, all too often degenerated into what Maritain, no reactionary himself, suggestively called “kneeling before the world.”

As believers had a harder time replicating their beliefs among their children, prominent Western churchmen flirted with progressivist ideologies and turned a blind eye to the fate of Christians behind the Iron Curtain. Most ominously, Christians had an increasingly difficult time articulating the ontological and moral structure that alone provides a sturdy foundation for the liberties and obligations of men. Burleigh tells the story with his characteristic élan and does justice to all the appropriate nuances.

But this issue cries out for a more searching reflection on the promise and risks inherent in the church’s accommodation to democratic modernity. Were the antinomian excesses of the 1960s inherent in the propensities of democracy itself? Were they bound to come to the forefront once the traditional elements of our societies lost their vigor and self-confidence? More fundamentally, how much has the cultural revolution of the 1960s undermined the continuity of Western civilization? Did a new civilization—antitraditional, hostile to political and social authority, and essentially non-Christian—come into being during those heady and tumultuous days? These questions arise naturally, so to speak, from Burleigh’s own exposition. They highlight the difficulties inherent in any unqualified assent of the Christian churches to democracy, not as a form of government, but as a comprehensive or total way of life.

Today’s World: Islam and Secular Europe

In the tenth and final chapter of Sacred Causes (“Cubes, Domes and Death Cults: Europe after 9/11”) Burleigh recounts the events leading up to “the day that changed the world,” September 11, 2001. He is undoubtedly right that it is necessary to read Conrad’s The Secret Agent or Dostoevsky’s Demons in order to truly fathom the minds and hearts of those contemporary “nihilists” who, like their nineteenth-century predecessors, are intoxicated with conspiratorial violence and their own set of deadly ideological abstractions. But Burleigh unfortunately overstates the case when he reduces Islamist terrorism to “a cover version of ideas and movements that have occurred in modern Western societies.” As a result he concedes too much to terms like “Islamo-fascism” that in my view obscure more than they clarify. Burleigh is on firmer ground when he criticizes contemporary European elites for their lack of self-confidence and for their willful restriction of European memory. He rightly criticizes those elites who want to reduce the European inheritance to a set of “humanitarian” abstractions as if “democratic” Europe is intelligible without some substantial reference to its Christian past.

But like many conservative- minded defenders of the Western tradition,
Burleigh makes too many claims for the Christian roots of “modern liberty.” Modern “autonomy,” the quest to create individuals shorn of attachments to every external or “heteronomous” domination, has profound roots in anti-Christian philosophical thought. Those associated with the radical Enlightenment self-consciously aimed to create a radically new civilization that owed nothing to the moral inheritance of classical Christianity.

These important reservations aside, Burleigh is right to stress the necessarily Christian component of any substantive or morally serious antitotalitarian defense of human dignity. Christianity’s “transcendental focus has set bounds to what the powerful could not, or more importantly, should not do by providing moral exemplars of good kingship and evil tyranny” (as Bertrand de Jouvenel has argued modern doctrines of sovereignty—of human self-sovereignty— point in a much more “monistic” or totalitarian direction). One conclusion is clear: the liberal “separation” of state and society depends upon individuals who are fully more “Christian” than “autonomous” in their self–conception and moral bearing.

Sacred Causes
 has the additional merit of confirming one of the deepest insights of the best “dissident” thought of our time. In light of the profoundly antihuman experiments to live in a world beyond good and evil, it is necessary to rethink our understanding of the moral foundations of liberty. As the Czech Catholic dissident Vaclav Benda strikingly put it in a remark quoted by Burleigh, in order to overcome totalitarianism, it was necessary “to shake that evil off, escape its power, and to seek the truth.” That invitation to open ourselves to truth has immense implications for the responsible exercise of freedom in our all-too-jaded liberal societies.

Paying Tribute to Those Who Understood

In all the volumes of his trilogy Burleigh pays tribute to a series of thinkers “who saw clearly . . . what these movements and regimes were,” who understood without equivocation their pretenses to change reality, their psychological commonalities, and their support for the most hyperbolic violence. The fact that Burleigh provides nearly identical tributes in all three books suggests not only the extent of his debt to the insights of these thinkers but also the sad fact that these wise and humane theorist-witnesses are largely unknown or ignored in “mainstream” intellectual quarters today. It is an indictment of the academy that apologists for European totalitarianism such as the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukacs or the French “existentialist” Jean-Paul Sartre remain prominent in our intellectual life while those who truly illuminated the tragedies of the age are cast into obscurity by the gatekeepers of intellectual prestige. Waldemar Gurian (1902–54) is a particularly important influence on Burleigh.

This Russian Jewish convert to Catholicism came with his mother to Germany in 1912 and fl ed the country in 1934 when it became apparent that he was being targeted by the Nazi regime. The author of an incisive critique of Communist theory and practice (Bolshevism: Theory and Practice [1932]), he was a scourge of Brown and Red totalitarianism alike. From his Swiss exile in 1936 he published the massive Hitler and the Christians, warning Christians that the Nazis would do their best to promote their racialist doctrines under the more palatable guise of a restoration of the spirit of Christian Germany against the alleged perfidies of the Jews. Burleigh rightly credits Gurian with “the most important analysis of Nazi Germany from a Catholic point of view.” Gurian went on to become the founder of the Review of Politics at Notre Dame, where he brought the penetrating thought of the best European writers (including Eric Voegelin, Jacques Maritain, Leo Strauss, and Hannah Arendt) to bear on “the crisis of our time.”

Burleigh is also deeply indebted to the various efforts of Eric Voegelin (1901–85) to come to terms with totalitarianism. Recognizing that “his thought is immensely complicated,” he nonetheless locates “one powerful moral consideration that drove it.” This is an aversion, in Voegelin’s own words, to the ideological “swindlers” who gained a “pseudo-identity through asserting one’s power,” through participating in or justifying mass murder. Burleigh highlights Voegelin’s critique of Nazi “racial science” as well as his affirmation, simultaneously moral and scientific, of “the fundamental commonalities between human beings across reaches of time.” Like Voegelin, Burleigh appreciates that “[e]vil (is) a palpable actor in the world” and that the “demoralization” of social science leaves scholars “emasculated” before “evil, immoral, and unethical political ideologies.”

Aron’s Faith Without Illusions

Burleigh also pays his respects to “one of the finest minds in twentieth century France, the liberal conservative sociologist and journalist Raymond Aron.” He praises Aron (1905–83) for his sobriety and for his “impassioned but limpidly expressed lucidity,” as accurate a description of Aron’s voice that I have ever come across. Burleigh is particularly impressed by Aron’s magisterial two-part analysis of the secular religions (“The Future of Secular Religions”) that first appeared in the exile journal La France Libre in July and August 1944.5 Aron stands out among Burleigh’s intellectual guides in part because he was not a believer. A self-described “de-Judaized Jew,” he nonetheless had genuine respect for religion. He liked to say that while he could not affirm the truth of transcendental religion in any unqualified way, he had no wish or right to “negate” it. He was an incisive critic of Marxist “prophetism,” of Marxism’s revolutionary historicism and its conflation of facts with desires. He despised the “idolatory” as well as the fanaticism inherent in the Marxist religion of “hyper-rationalism” and pointed out its deep roots in the modern project of making human beings “sovereign lords of nature through knowledge and his own will.” In his writings in La France Libre during the Second World War, Aron took particular aim at “the pessimistic irrational religion of the Nazis.”

Writing in 1944, Aron appreciated the untenability of the ideological lie. “It is not easy,” he wrote slyly, “for representatives of homo sapiens to believe that Mussolini is always right or that Hitler’s words define good and evil.” But Aron was a chastened or conservative-minded liberal because he knew that liberal rationalism in its nineteenth- century expressions was neither philosophically viable nor capable of moving the souls of men. Human beings in every time and place need “faith in ideas and in men.” When elites in bourgeois societies succumbed to cynicism and lost faith in the rational and moral foundations of a free and decent political order, fervent ideologists guaranteed that faith would be used at the service of “barbaric fury.” Aron offered no guarantee that a revitalized liberalism, buttressed by a renewed “conservative” confidence in the integrity of a moral order above the will of man, would finally win the day against the totalitarians. But in the elegiac conclusion of his 1944 essay, he cited the words of Tacitus that had been read out to the first Free French volunteers at the end of June, 1940: “One need not hope in order to try, nor succeed in order to persevere.” “I saw,” he wrote, “in that phrase and I see still, the watchword of revolt, always vanquished yet always victorious— the revolt of conscience.”

Conclusion

In Michael Burleigh the political religions have found a historian who resists the “demoralization” of the age, the tendency to write history as if moral evaluation and the imperatives of conscience do not matter. His work is a powerful challenge to the “antifascist” vulgate which confuses authority with authoritarianism, and which downplays the essential affinities between totalitarianism of the Left and the Right.

Readers of Burleigh’s work cannot help but reflect on the fact that all too often “progressive democracy,” as the Hungarian political philosopher Aurel Kolnai called it, shares with discredited totalitarianism a blind confidence in the sovereignty and self-assertion of man. The antitotalitarian thinkers to whom Burleigh pays such well deserved tribute all appreciated that the ultimate roots of totalitarianism lay in the human tendency, quintessentially modern yet as old as Adam, to forget that men are not gods. A democratic civilization that has truly absorbed this lesson will have already begun the ascent from the most problematic assumptions of theoretical modernity. Hence the vital contemporary need of histories of this quality and insight.

Endnotes


1. Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). Further citations to this source will be indicated parenthetically in the text as TTR.
2. For representative examples of their work, see Alain Besançon, A Century of Horrors: Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah, trans. Ralph C. Hancock and Nathaniel H. Hancock (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007) and Malia’s posthumously published History’s Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World (New Haven: Yale, 2006).
3. Michael Burleigh, Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2007). Further citations to this source will be indicated parenthetically in the text as SC.
4. Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War (New York: Harper Collins, 2005).
5. An English-language version of “The Future of Secular Religions” can be found in Raymond Aron, The Dawn of Universal History: Selected Essays from a Witness to the Twentieth Century, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 177–201.

Daniel J. Mahoney is professor of political science at Assumption College in Massachusetts. With Edward E. Ericson Jr. he edited The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings: 1947–2005 (ISI Books, 2006).

This article appeared in the Spring 2008 edition of The Intercollegiate Review, a journal published by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI). ISI is a non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt educational organization whose purpose is to further in successive generations of college youth a better understanding of the values and institutions that sustain a free and humane society. Copyright 2008 by Intercollegiate Studies Institute. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.